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CONFIDENTIAL.

(8510.)

PART V.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF THIBET.

October to December 1904.

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Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Thibet.

Part V.

No. 1.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 30th ultimo, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 1, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 1.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 30, 1904.

THIBET. Treaty referred to in telegram of the 3rd instant, proves to be taken from Ular's article in "Contemporary Review," December 1902.

Following news from Lhassa:—

On the 21st instant Younghusband, on paying ceremonial visit to Gokhang Cathedral, met with very civil reception from monks, who conducted him round the most sacred shrines. Younghusband and the Amban exchanged farewell visits on the 22nd, when latter again declared that he, personally, saw no objection to signing Adhesion Agreement. Younghusband was also visited by Councillors, who said they fully intended to carry out the Treaty, assured him of their friendly sentiments, and brought presents. They appointed an official to accompany party who are to proceed to Gartok; also one to go with Wilton, for whom they furnished passport. Before Mission started from Lhassa, Younghusband and Macdonald were visited by Ti Rimpoche, who promised to pray for their welfare, and presented each of them, as well as O'Connor and White, with an image of Buddha. Tent was pitched on road, and Mission received there by whole of Thibetan Council, including Secretary; marked cordiality being displayed. Mission left Lhassa on the 23rd instant.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 1.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *September* 30, 1904.

ON the 19th instant we telegraphed to Younghusband as follows :—

"You now have authority to remain until the 15th proximo in Lhassa, if you can do so in safety. His Majesty's Government have insisted on indemnity being reduced and our occupation of Chumbi Valley being terminated at an early date, and it seems to be doubtful whether Chinese Government will accept arrangements as now concluded; with the view, therefore, of putting our relations with Thibet on definite basis, whatever may happen with regard to China, the Government of India consider it most desirable that before you leave Lhassa you should make an effort to secure consent of Thibetans to new Trade Regulations, lien on customs, survey in Thibet, and additional trade mart in Zayul, with access to Batang. They trust that you will endeavour to meet their wishes on this point. No difficulty ought to be presented by the form in which the Trade Regulations have been drafted, as all knowledge of the Regulations of 1893 is disclaimed by the Thibetans; should you, however, be unable to get them to assent to the Regulations as drafted, you are authorized to make modifications required to bring them into accordonce with the form of those of 1893."

Following telegram dated the 24th instant, was received from Younghusband in reply :—

"I received your telegram on the evening before Mission left Lhassa. Had it been possible for me to have been informed last month that our stay at Lhassa might be prolonged till the 15th proximo, that additional trade mart would be acceptable, and that indemnity required was not to be more than Rs. 25 lakhs, Convention could have been arranged on these lines. Present arrangement, however, is distinctly preferred by Thibetans to one involving establishment of a third trade mart in a distant province where control they exercise is but slight, and in regard to which our action would arouse their suspicion. Had I attempted to alter, at this stage, settlement made with such solemnity, we might after all have failed to attain our object, while it is certain that all present good feeling, which is the best basis for our future relations, would have been lost. As regards best methods of meeting the views of His Majesty's Government, when revision of Trade Regulations is eventually taken in hand, I hope to give my opinion on arriving in India. Present was not the most suitable moment for arranging the matter, but it can, I think, be arranged."

Younghusband hopes to arrive at Simla on the 14th proximo. Matter must now stand over till then.

No. 2.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 213.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, October* 1, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram No. 211, and Indian Government's telegram of 30th September.

It seems impossible, since Younghusband left Lhassa on 23rd September, that the original intention that the Adhesion Agreement should be signed by him and the Amban, should be carried out.

Does your Lordship still desire me, under the circumstances, to take action in the sense of your Lordship's telegram No. 142, last paragraph ?

If so, in what form is it proposed that China should signify her adhesion ?

No. 3.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 144.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 1, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram No. 211 of yesterday.

We do not know what assurances were contained in Colonel Younghusband's letters to the Amban, but the insertion in the Adhesion Agreement of words expressing recognition of Chinese Suzerainty appears to us unobjectionable.

If it be necessary to add a reservation to the effect that Article IX should not be so interpreted as to deprive other Powers of their rights under existing Treaties we should have no objection, but we are not prepared to accept any modification of the terms of that Article.

Substance of above has been telegraphed to Government of India, but we have not yet had their views on the point.

Precedents quoted in telegram of the 29th September from the Government of India are certainly useful, but argument based on them should be used with caution, as it would apparently conflict with our repeated admission of Chinese Suzerainty and with our insistence on adhesion of Chinese Government.

As regards suggestion to spread indemnity over seventy-five years, I agree that it would be undesirable to mention it unless Chinese Government allude to the subject.

You may hint to Chinese Government that, if they continue to refuse their adhesion, we shall, nevertheless, consider Thibet as bound by the terms of the Agreement.

No. 4.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 1, 1904.

WITH reference to my letter of the 30th ultimo, I am directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* inquiring whether in view of the fact that Colonel Younghusband has left Lhassa, he is still to press the Chinese Government to give their early adhesion to the Agreement with Thibet, and, if so, in what form adhesion should be given.

Lord Lansdowne proposes, subject to Mr. Brodrick's concurrence, to inform Sir E. Satow that the Adhesion Agreement should be signed at Peking, *mutatis mutandis*, byhim and the Wai-wu Pu.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 5.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 4.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 3, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to request that you will draw Lord Lansdowne's attention to the Viceroy's telegram of the 29th September regarding the objections taken by the Chinese Government to the Thibet Agreement.

While Mr. Brodrick considers that the historical facts stated by the Government of India with regard to the position of practical independence enjoyed by Thibet in her relations, both with China and with neighbouring States, have an important bearing upon the attitude to be assumed towards the objections of the Chinese Government, especially with regard to the question of most-favoured-nation treatment, at the same time it must be borne in mind that, for diplomatic reasons, the suzerainty of China as entitling her to a *locus standi* in these negotiations, has throughout been accepted by His Majesty's Government.

* No. 2.

Mr. Brodrick would further observe that the right of limitrophe States to have diplomatic relations, independently of their Suzerain Power, though no doubt it is historically true that it has been exercised by Thibet, is hardly one which it would be expedient for His Majesty's Government to urge, in view of the position which they claim in regard to the foreign relations of Afghanistan.

Lord Lansdowne will observe that the Viceroy has repeated his telegram to Sir E. Satow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 6.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 4.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to the Thibet Agreement.

India Office, October 3, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 3, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegrams of the 30th September.

Lord Lansdowne is being consulted as to whether it would be possible to amend Convention through China; in any case, question of amendment cannot, as proposed by Younghusband, be postponed until revision of Trade Regulations eventually takes place. Younghusband's reply to the telegram which you addressed to him on the 19th September is very unsatisfactory; it appears to show that, having signed a Convention by which Thibet was bound to pay a tribute for seventy-five years, he has left Lhassa without attempting to carry out the orders sent him as to modifying it. Moreover, he gives no explanation of the reasons which led him to disregard the instructions of His Majesty's Government as to the indemnity. Those instructions were conveyed in my telegram of the 26th July, which laid down that no sum should be demanded which Thibetans could not pay within three years, and have been reiterated in my despatch of the 5th August and subsequent telegrams.

No. 7.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in letters from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 8th and 15th September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 4, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 12, 1904.

THE Amban called upon me to-day and I took an early opportunity of referring to the Guru fight. I said the Thibetans would doubtless always believe that we were guilty of an act of treachery on that occasion. But as a matter of fact we had shown

them every possible consideration and given them every warning. We know that they had been ordered not to fire on us and we accordingly, after giving them an opportunity to retire, advanced upon their position without firing. It was only when they would not retire and would not get out of our way and when they resisted our disarming them and commenced firing themselves that we returned the fire. I went on to say that the present situation promised to end very much like the Guru affair. The Thibetans were showing the same inertness. I quite believed they did not want to fight, but they remained impassive and inert, doing nothing and settling nothing. We could not remain equally inert. We would have to go on to bring the matter to a conclusion, and I greatly feared the futility of the Thibetans would end in some other such disaster to them as occurred at Guru.

2. The Amban said he had received a reply to our terms then, but it was so impertinent he could not even mention it to me officially. He had sent it back to the Thibetans censuring them for their stupidity and ordering them to send a more fit reply. He had pointed out to them their folly in not settling with us, and how impossible it was for them to contend against us. How could they fight, he said, when they had no more men to draw upon ?

3. He then made a singularly interesting remark. The ordinary people, he said, were not at all ill-disposed towards us. They liked us and were anxious to trade with us. Reports of our treatment of the wounded and of the liberal payment we made for supplies had spread about the country and the people in general would be glad enough to make a settlement and be on good terms. Where the opposition came from was from the Lamas, more especially those of the three great monasteries. They and they alone were the obstructionists, and if they were out of the way there would be no more trouble and the people would speedily be friends with us.

4. I told the Amban this was extremely interesting and gratifying to hear, and what he had said entirely bore out my own conclusion. It made me all the more sorry that so many of these poor peasants with whom we had no quarrel and who only wished to be friendly with us should have been killed, and this was one consideration which was restraining us from fighting now. I had on several occasions during the recent fighting gone round the dead Thibetans and invariably found that the dead were all peasants. A Lama was never seen. If we could be quite sure that the originators of all this fighting would fight themselves, I was not sure that we would have been so ready to suspend hostilities.

5. The Amban then talked of the position of these Thibetan Lamas in the Buddhist church as a whole. He said their see was after all only a small one and was looked down upon by the mass of Buddhists.

6. I took the opportunity to ask him if the Chinese Government had not some means of putting pressure on the Thibetans. Could they not, for instance, depose some in high position ?

7. The Amban said they could. But he asked what was the good of deposing the Abbot of a monastery. The only result would be the appointment of a worse one in his place. Besides which the question was very complicated. The Dalai Lama was regarded with great veneration by the Mongols and Buddhists in Manchuria, and any harsh treatment of him by the Chinese Government would be resented by the Mongols and might lead to trouble. I told the Amban that I had myself travelled round Manchuria and right across Mongolia and was aware of the veneration with which the Mongols regarded the Lamas of Thibet. If then he could by his exertions in inducing the Thibetans to agree to our terms prevent us from occupying the Potala, he would prevent the committal of an act which would be no less distasteful to us than distressing to many subjects of the Chinese Emperor. The Amban replied that he was not a whit less anxious than I was to get the Thibetans to make a speedy settlement and would use his utmost endeavours.

8. Before the close of his visit I asked the Amban if the Nepalese and Kashmiris kept on good terms with the Thibetans here. He replied that they got on well enough with the ordinary people but avoided the Lamas, as contact with them was liable to lead to trouble. He added that the Nepalese representative had been ordered by the Prime Minister of Nepal to advise the Thibetans to be reasonable and come to a settlement with us and to tell them that the British respected the religion of others and would not interfere with theirs. I said I had heard of this, and if the Thibetans had only followed this good advice which was given a year ago we might have settled up everything at Khamba Jhong. What the Prime Minister of Nepal had said about the tolerance of other religions was perfectly true. We had many millions of Buddhists under our rule, about 200,000,000 Hindus and 70,000,000 Mahommedans.

The Thibetan fear that we would interfere with their religion was altogether unfounded. The Amban replied that they were so jealous of their religion that they tried to prevent even Chinese Buddhists of other sects from their own from entering Thibet.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 13, 1904.

TWO Sha-pes, the Dalai Lama's private Abbot, a Secretary of Council, and the Accountant-General paid me a formal visit this morning. They asked that our mounted infantry should not be allowed to go about in bands of forty or fifty, as they had yesterday captured thirty-six Thibetan soldiers (the real number is sixty-four), and they feared there might be disturbances if this continued. I replied that such military operations would have to continue till I saw signs that they intended to agree to the terms we were demanding. At present I saw no such signs; the Amban had indeed told me that they had drawn up a document which they had presented to him as a reply to our terms, but which was so impertinent that the Amban had said he could not even mention it to me officially.

2. The deputation replied that they were really anxious to make a settlement and the document they had presented to the Amban merely represented their views and was not intended as a reply to me. Their idea was to give the Amban their opinion and he would give orders upon it.

3. I said I was quite sure that they desired a settlement, for I knew that they had come to the end of their military resources and had no more men to draw upon to fight against us; and I asked them whether they were prepared to obey the orders of the Amban.

4. They said that if the Amban gives orders acceptable to both them and him they would obey. I asked them if by that they meant that they would obey his orders if they liked them but would pay no attention to them if they were not according to their taste. They replied that their idea was that the Amban should act as a sort of mediator. We would both present our views to him and he would decide between us and make a settlement satisfactory to both. When they had stated their case to him they had no intention to be impertinent; they were a small people and ignorant of the ways of great nations; they thought that if they asked a good deal at first they might not obtain all they asked but would obtain part.

5. I told them I had already warned the Amban that I was not here to act the part of a merchant in the bazaar and haggle over terms. When I had arrived at Khamba Jhong last year I had, indeed, been prepared then to discuss the terms of a settlement and by give and take arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement. I had, for instance, announced that we were prepared to concede the Giaogong lands to them if they showed themselves reasonable in regard to trade concessions elsewhere. But they had declined to negotiate and had chosen to fight. They had been beaten and had no further means of continuing the struggle against us. They must, therefore, accept our terms or expect us to take still further action against them. The terms we were now asking were extremely moderate, but if we were compelled to undertake more military operations they would have to be made much more severe.

6. They begged me to be more reasonable and to discuss things more quietly; they said they were accustomed to talk matters over at great length; they hoped that the Amban would be able to persuade me to be more considerate; and they suggested that I should ask the Viceroy to let me demand easier terms from them. I reminded them that they had been aware of the terms for three weeks now, and I had been ready on the way up here to explain them to them. I had now been ten days here; they had not yet come to talk to me about them; and I had heard from the Amban that so far from showing any inclination to agree with them they had written about them in very impertinent terms. They must not be surprised, therefore, that my patience was exhausted. Nor was it of any use expecting that the Amban would be able to induce me to show any further consideration. When we had thoroughly beaten them and scattered their armies we might have marched straight into Dalai

Lama's Palace and sacked and looted the town. We had not yet done this and with that consideration they must be content. The terms which I had shown them were issued by command of His Majesty the King-Emperor, and no reference to his Excellency the Viceroy would have the slightest effect in modifying them.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 14, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Ta Rimbuchi, who is at present acting as a kind of Regent and presides at the National Assembly, came to visit me to-day, accompanied by the Nepalese Representative, and bringing with him a present of gold dust to the value of about 30*l.* and some silk from the Dalai Lama's brother. He is a cultured, pleasant-mannered, amiable old gentleman, who freely owned that he took little interest in worldly affairs, and would much prefer to have nothing to do with them. He said he would like to have come and seen me before, but was afraid of the Sha-pes. He had, however, now insisted upon coming, telling them that he would only talk of religious matters and not of political affairs.

2. He told me how he had been hastily summoned here by the Dalai Lama a few weeks ago, but on his arrival had found the Dalai Lama had fled. He had greatly disliked taking up political business, for he had spent his whole life in religious study and was altogether ignorant of the methods of public affairs. But the Sha-pes and people in the Palace had given him a message from the Dalai Lama, handing over the Dalai Lama's seal to him and telling him he was to act as Regent during the Dalai Lama's absence. The Ta Rimbuchi was careful, however, to explain to me that he had been given no authority to use the seal. It had accordingly been wrapped up in a cloth and sealed with the seals of the four Sha-pes.

3. The Ta Rimbuchi then stated that what he had come to see me about, was to ask me to show consideration towards their religion and not destroy their monasteries. When he had come to look into affairs he had convinced himself that those responsible for the conduct of affairs had acted very stupidly and should have made a settlement with us long ago. Now they were beaten and had to accept our terms, but he hoped we would show them consideration. They were sending to the Dalai Lama to return, and he thought he ought to be here to make a settlement with us.

4. I told him that I thoroughly sympathized with him in the very unpleasant position in which he was placed. Others had brought trouble upon the country, and he had been called in at the last moment to repair the mischief. But while he was in an awkward position I hoped he would realize the difficulty in which I also was placed. I have received the orders of the Viceroy to show the utmost consideration to their religion. I had also received orders to make a settlement on the terms which had been determined on by His Majesty the King-Emperor. But the settlement on these terms had to be made with the National Assembly which was almost entirely composed of ecclesiastics. The Amban had told me yesterday that the reply which they had made to our terms was so impertinent that he dare not even mention it to me officially. If then this Assembly of Ecclesiastics refused our terms what was I to do? I had to show consideration to them and their monasteries because of their sacred calling. I had also to get my terms agreed to. Could he suggest any way of doing this except by force?

5. The Ta Rimbuchi said he altogether disagreed with the reply which had been sent to the Amban, but the others were determined to send it; not that they really meant what they said, but they thought that if they put their case strongly at the beginning they might get easier terms out of us. He again begged me, however, to show consideration.

6. I said I would be very much obliged to him if he would, at the earliest opportunity, try to persuade the National Assembly that I was not here to bargain over terms. I was here by direction of the Viceroy to carry out the commands of the King-Emperor in making a settlement. The terms of that settlement were drawn up with an especial regard for their religion. We were annexing no part of Thibet. We were not asking for an Agent here at Lhassa itself. But we had to ask for an indemnity because the military operations which had been forced on us in 1886 and in the present year had cost us a very great deal of money. That money would have to

be obtained from the people of India by extra taxation unless the Thibetans paid it. But when the Thibetans had caused trouble it was not fair on the people of India to tax them for the war. We had, therefore, to ask the Thibetans to pay at least a part of the expense. We know, however, that Thibet was too poor a country to pay the whole. We were, therefore, asking not even half of the real cost, and we expected that the Thibetans would give us and the natives of India who had to suffer the extra taxation, necessitated by having to pay the remainder of the cost, the advantage of being able to come to Thibet to buy wool and other things which were produced more cheaply here than in India, and of selling to the Thibetans the surplus of articles produced more cheaply in India.

7. The Regent said he thought this quite reasonable, and he would explain my view to the National Assembly.

8. As to the Dalai Lama, I said I was quite prepared to give him the most positive assurance that he would be safe from us if he returned here. I did not wish to discuss personally with him the details of the settlement, but wished him to affix his seal in my presence; and it would certainly be more convenient if he were nearer Lhassa for reference during the negotiations.

9. The Regent said he would send two messengers to him to-morrow advising him to return. The trouble was through that he had nobody about him to advise him properly.

10. At the close of the interview I told the Ta Rimbuchi that I should be glad to see him again. He was an old man, and was, I know, very busy just now, but whenever he liked to come and talk with me I should be most pleased to receive him.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 15, 1904.

I HAVE had some interesting conversation to-day with some Chinese officials and the Nepalese Representative on the question of finding a substitute for the Dalai Lama in case of his flight from Thibet. The result of these conversations I have the honour to report for the information of the Government of India.

2. It appears that after his interview with me yesterday the Ta Rimbuchi visited the Amban, and was told by him to write at once to the Dalai Lama and inform him that if he did not return to Lhassa the Amban would denounce him to the Chinese Emperor. The Chinese officials added, in informing me of this, that if the Dalai Lama ran away altogether the Amban would have him deposed.

3. According to the Nepalese Representative, the Amban also told the Ta Rimbuchi that if the Dalai Lama disappeared he would call the Tashi Lama from Shigatse to act in his place, but the Ta Rimbuchi pointed out that this would not be according to custom. The Nepalese Representative says—and Captain O'Connor tells me what he says is correct—that the custom in the event of the death of the Dalai Lama (which would be assumed if he ran away altogether) was for one of the Chief Lamas of the four temples—the Tangye-ling, the Kundu-ling, the Tsomo-ling, and the Tse-chog-ling—to be chosen as Regent; the selection is made in turn. The Chief Lama of the Tangye-ling was Regent during the minority of the present Dalai Lama. The choice should now fall on the Chief Lama of the Kundu-ling, but he is himself a minor at present, so the choice would naturally fall on the Chief Lama of the Tsomo-ling. The Ta Rimbuchi is, however, looked upon as the highest lama in this part of Thibet after the Dalai Lama, and it is possible that he might in the present case be selected. The names of candidates would have to be submitted to the Emperor of China, who would nominally make the selection. The Nepalese Representative remarked that, though the Ta Rimbuchi had not much authority now, yet if supported by the British he would have great power. Owing to his intellectual attainments he is greatly esteemed here, and, according to the Nepalese Representative, the choice of him as Regent would be very popular.

4. Captain Jit Bahadur also said that the present Dalai Lama was extremely unpopular with both small and great here, on account of his oppression. His intrigues with the Russians are becoming more generally known, and it is felt that the present disasters are due to him. The impression is gaining ground that we are very reasonable people, and that the Dalai Lama made a fatal mistake in provoking us and

seeking the friendship of Russia. The Chinese had also told the Nepalese Representative that they would be glad to be rid of the present Dalai Lama.

5. An unfortunate circumstance is, however, that the seal which the Dalai Lama has taken with him is the temporal seal presented by the Chinese Emperor, with which official business is transacted, while the seal he has left behind is the ecclesiastical seal, which is of no use for the purpose of the Convention.

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 16, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday the Amban intimated to me that he had pressed the Thibetan Government to make a start towards settlement by releasing the two Lachung men (British subjects) who had been seized last year beyond Khamba Jong, and that the Thibetan Government had agreed. He wished to know when and in what manner they should be handed over. I informed him that they should be handed over to me at 10 this morning by two members of Council.

2. This morning I held a full Durbar, and two members of Council, accompanied by two lamas, brought the two Lachung men before me. I told the men, who showed the liveliest satisfaction at their impending release, that I had received the commands of the King-Emperor to obtain their release from the Thibetan Government, and they were now free. His Majesty had further commanded that if they had been ill-treated reparation should be demanded from the Thibetan Government. I wished to know, therefore, if they had been ill-treated or not. They said they had been slightly beaten at Shigatse, and their things had been taken from them; but since their arrival in Lhassa, they have been well fed and had not been beaten. I told them they would be examined by a medical officer to ascertain if their statements were correct.

3. I then turned to the Thibetan Councillors and said that the King-Emperor considered the seizure, imprisonment, and beating of two of his subjects as an exceedingly serious offence. It formed one of the main reasons why the Mission had been moved forward from Khamba Jong to Gyantse, and one of the principal terms in the settlement which I had been commanded to make at Lhassa itself was the release of these men. If the Thibetan Government had not cared to have them in Thibet they should have returned them across the frontier; or, in any case, have handed them over to us at Khamba Jong. Their seizure and imprisonment for a year was altogether unpardonable. I trusted they now understood that the subjects of the King-Emperor could not be ill-treated with impunity, and that we would, in future, as we had now, hold them strictly responsible for the good treatment of British subjects in Thibet.

4. The Lachung men were then taken out and examined by a medical officer in the presence of Mr. White and two Thibetan officials. The medical officer reported that there were no signs on their bodies of their having been beaten, and that they were in good condition.

5. On receiving this report, I expressed my satisfaction that the ill-treatment had not been severe. I would not therefore press the matter of reparation, but imprisonment for a year was in itself sufficiently bad treatment to British subjects who had committed no offence, and we expected that no British subjects would ever be so treated again.

6. The Sha-pes promised to respect the subjects of His Majesty in future. They expressed their pleasure that one of the terms of the settlement had been concluded; and hoped, now a start was made, an agreement would quickly be come to. It was, at any rate, their intention to proceed as rapidly as possible in their discussions.

7. It has subsequently transpired that the two men had been kept separately in dungeons twenty-one steps below the surface of the ground, and had not seen daylight for nearly a year. But as they were in excellent health and well fed, and as we had, while at Khamba Jong, seized over 200 yaks in retaliation, I am not pursuing the matter further.

8. The most satisfactory feature in this affair is the fact that the release has taken place entirely on the initiation of the Amban without suggestion from me.

Inclosure 6 in No. 7.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 17, 1904.

THOUGH I have been here only a fortnight and cannot yet gauge the situation with full accuracy, some account of my first impressions and an expression of my opinion on possible future developments may be of some interest to the Government of India. I have, therefore, the honour to make the following observations for their information.

2. In their despatch, dated the 8th January, 1903, to the Secretary of State, the Government of India stated their opinion that the military strength of the Thibetans was beneath contempt, and serious resistance was not to be contemplated though it would be unwise to run any risk, for reports had reached them that breach-loaders and other munitions of war had been imported into the capital. A certain number—though not a large number—of Russian, American, and German rifles were captured in the recent fighting, and it was found in addition that the rifles made in the arsenal here were quite serviceable weapons. Nevertheless, the Thibetans have not been successful in a single engagement against our troops. Every attack of theirs has been repulsed. They have been turned out of the strongest positions and out of a fort which in any other hands would have been impregnable. Their military forces have been scattered to their homes, and General Macdonald's force has reached Lhassa with a loss of less than forty killed in action. At this small cost the strength of the Thibetans has been broken, and the opinion of the Government of India has been justified by the event. The Thibetans acknowledge that whereas their bullets never reach us our bullets follow them for miles. Even the monks say they have had enough of it, and though the people could still be raised and driven against us like a flock of sheep at the command of the Dalai Lama; and some few irresponsible monks in the National Assembly still occasionally talk of dying rather than agree to our terms, both the well-informed Nepalese Representative here and the Tongsa Penlop tell me that the majority prefer to live, and they consider further serious resistance most unlikely. The Amban tells me they have no further men to draw upon. I have on two or three occasions pointed out to the Thibetans that they are at the end of their resources, and they have not demurred, while the Regent has openly acknowledged that they are beaten.

3. The field is, therefore, clear for negotiations, and the bravery and endurance of our troops have broken down the barriers which have so far separated me from any Thibetan in authority. After refusing for a year to negotiate they have been compelled by the force of our arms to seek a settlement, and while they have hitherto invariably refused to receive and much less to answer any written communication from us, I have now received one letter from the National Assembly and one from the Dalai Lama himself. Moreover, all the principal officials have come to visit me. I am, therefore, at last in touch with the Thibetan Government, but unfortunately the more I come to see of it the more incapable, inept, and intangible a body it appears. The uninformed in Thibetan affairs would imagine that the Dalai Lama was the supreme authority and that his word would be final. But such is not the case. No important matter and certainly nothing connected with our relations with Thibet can be settled by him without reference to the Tsong-du or National Assembly, a body composed chiefly of monks from the three great Lhassa monasteries, of a few lay officials and representatives from various parts of Thibet. It is, therefore, in a certain degree a representative body but the representatives have no responsibility to their constituents for there is no system of voting, and up till now there has been no presiding officer. A decision is only arrived at by talking incessantly till some one writes on a paper the supposed opinion of the Assembly and stamps it with the seal.

4. This is the body with which I have now to negotiate; and to make, as it would seem, the difficulty of transacting business doubly great, the Thibetans have ordained that the four members of the Executive Council should not be allowed to enter the National Assembly. These Shap-es or Councillors will come and interview me for hours, but if I influence them in a certain direction they cannot go to the Assembly and enforce their views upon it and make it feel any responsibility in the matter. They may only send in their Secretaries to the Assembly to represent their views while they themselves remain in an adjoining room awaiting the

decision. And now that our presence here is forcing responsibility on the National Assembly that body is attempting to shirk it by saying it cannot act without the sanction of the Dalai Lama, while the sacred Pontiff has betaken himself eight marches way from Lhassa, remarking when he left that as fighting had not been successful while he was present in Lhassa he would leave the place and see if things went more favourably in his absence.

5. The position then is this. The members of the Executive Council who come and see me have no authority and are rather less useful than telephones would be. Through a telephone I could at least present my views directly to the National Assembly. Through the Councillors they reach that body in a distorted form. The National Assembly should be able to assume final authority, but try to shift it on to the Dalai Lama, while the Dalai Lama says he can do nothing without the sanction of the National Assembly, and retires into what he calls religious seclusion, hands over a seal, which proves to be the ecclesiastical and not the official seal, to a so-called Regent and washes his hands of the whole business.

6. Even so, if the individual members of the Executive Council and of the National Assembly were capable and loyal men, and if they tried to work together for the common good there might be some hope of this awkward machinery evolving something useful. But the Ta Rimbuchi, whom the Dalai Lama has left in charge as a kind of Regent, is an old, weak man; the four original members of Council have been imprisoned; of the four new members one has already been set aside in disgrace, a second has gone to his home on the pretence of sickness, the third was the Chief Delegate who met Mr. White and me at Khamba Jong, who has been inimical and obstructive ever since, and who is thoroughly ill-favoured and incapable, and the fourth though amiable enough is quite ineffective. Each one works against and is surpicious of the other, and all are in terror of the National Assembly, which however little inclined to action is most thorough in its criticisms and immediate in its dismissals of those who act. Again, in the Assembly itself all are suspicious of one another. Every one criticises and vetoes but no one dares suggest or sanction, for the originator of a suggestion is invariably disgraced if his suggestion proves ineffective. Individual members, therefore, find it easier and safer to disapprove of everything the Executive Council do or propose, and to suggest nothing in return.

7. But the Amban, it may be thought, must surely have some authority and influence. So far I have not been able to discover any such, and the Amban himself disclaims having any. He roundly says that the Thibetans are impossible to deal with, that kindness is thrown away upon them, and nothing but force produces any effect—and force the Chinese do not at present possess here. He was unable to make them produce transport to take him to Gyantse or even to bring up Government money from China to Lhassa. The Thibetans still have a deep ceremonial respect for the Chinese, but in practice pay no attention to the Amban's word.

8. The saving feature of the situation is the disposition of the people generally. When forced on by the lamas to oppose us they come out and fight. Otherwise they are perfectly content to admit us among them and even keen upon trading with us and selling their country produce. Without exception every single officer commanding a small post on the line of communications has reported that the villagers round his post have been most friendly and ready to bring in supplies for sale and work for us, their only dread being punishment by their own officials for dealing with us. Outside the monasteries scowling faces are never seen, and there are no signs of that fanatical hatred of the stranger, so conspicuous a feature in the countries bordering our north-west frontier. A solitary Englishman in Thibet might be seized by order of the authorities; he would not be knifed by the personal initiative of the individual. We have found, too, that, with very few exceptions, the higher officials and gentry whom we have met have been exceedingly well-mannered, genial, and sociable. There is no caste system to keep us apart and no tradition of race hatred. Even the Chinese Amban has told me that the people have nothing against us, that they are, indeed, well-disposed and keen upon trading. The opposition to us, he says, comes exclusively from the lamas, especially the lamas of the three great Lhassa monasteries.

9. What, then, is it that makes the Thibetan Government so insistent in excluding us? Undoubtedly the fear of loss of priestly influence. They disguise this in their talk under the form of religion, and say they are afraid their religion will be spoilt by our presence here. But religion pure and simple has nothing whatever to do with it. What they dread is loss of that superstitious hold they have hitherto had over the

people. The Government is almost entirely composed of ecclesiastics and the head is an ecclesiastic. Obviously, then, anything that would make the common people think that the magic and charm and assertions of supernatural power by which these lamas preserve such a hold over the people as would scarcely be credited in Europe was false and baseless must be viewed with suspicion and resented. Not that we will interfere with their religion as such, but that we will undermine their priestly influence is what they fear.

10. The Nepalese Representative, however, assures me that every day the feeling in favour of making terms with us is growing stronger. There is an increasing number of even lamas who are saying that those responsible for the conduct of affairs committed a great mistake in not making a settlement with us in the beginning, that we appear after all to be a reasonable kind of people, and that it is wiser to have us as friends than as enemies. I learn, too, from many different sources that a strong feeling against the Dalai Lama is growing up. It is felt that he is largely responsible for the present trouble, and that he is playing a cowardly part in decamping just when he is most required to extricate them from the trouble he has got them into. The news of his dealings with the Russians is spreading, and resentment on that account is increasing. And, at the time of writing, the feeling at the National Assembly is that he must either be brought back to share with them the responsibility of the settlement or, if he flees the country altogether, he must be deposed. I have announced that I shall expect to be received by his Holiness some time during my stay here and that his seal shall be affixed by him personally in my presence to the Convention as a guarantee that it shall not be repudiated as the Convention of 1890 has been repudiated. Fortunately, the National Assembly are thoroughly with me in desiring the presence of the Dalai Lama on that occasion, for they fear that, if he is not there then but returns later when we have gone he will imprison some of them or throw them into the river or otherwise oppress them. At the same time, I detect very distinct symptoms of a devout hope that he will fly and so give the Chinese Emperor cause for deposing him on the ground that, as he has fled, they do not know whether he is alive or dead, and have to assume, therefore, that he is dead and seek elsewhere for a reincarnation. Both the Chinese and the Thibetans have been discusing this measure, and the Ta Rimbuchi, who was placed by the Dalai Lama in the position of Acting Regent, has made unmistakable approaches to me for my support in the event of the Dalai Lama being deposed. He occupies the chair of divinity in the Gaden Monastery, and, after the Dalai Lama, is regarded as the next highest lama in this part of Thibet. He does not at present appear to have much interest in temporal matters in the Assembly, but the Nepalese Representative says that once his position as Regent was secure, and if he could be sure of our support, he would be a very powerful Ruler, for he is greatly esteemed on account of his religious attainments and popular among the people. During his interview with me he showed himself to be extremely courteous and amiable, and he talked more reasonably than any Thibetan in authority I have yet met.

11. That the Dalai Lama has now the intention to fly to Russia is considered certain by many, and there is no reason why such a climax need disturb us. His deposition must in that case be a certainty, and both the Chinese and the Thibetans themselves would take very good care to insure that he never came back here. This would end all Thibetan dealings with Russia. The mass of the Thibetans have no desire for dealings with the Russians ; it was only the Dalai Lama who, instigated by Dorjieff, had taken the idea in the belief that Russia was quite close and very powerful, while we were distant and weak ; and the Thibetans generally are greatly displeased with him for having dealings which have only brought such trouble on the country. But that the Dalai Lama has sought protection from Russia and Russia has thought of according that protection we have ample evidence. I have been shown the copy of a draft Treaty between Russia and China now in the office of the Thibetan Executive Council. By this draft Treaty Russia and China were to agree to protect Thibet, and Russia was to provide drill-instructors for the Thibetans. No such drill-instructors, at any rate of purely Russian origin, came, but numbers of Russian rifles (which, however, the Amban tells me, were nearly all useless and have been left in the stores because they have become rusty through not being properly kept) were sent, and Dorjieff, who was originally a servant to quite a small official, was able after his last return from Russia to present the big monasteries with 4 or 5 lakhs of rupees. We know, too, that the Dalai Lama has sent at least two separate Envoys to Russia since the Mission arrived at Khamba Jong last year.

12. The Russians had thus acquired a considerable influence in Thibet and had anticipated acquiring still more, and the extent of the danger which has been averted

is only now being realized as we see what a rich country Thibet is. Though native explorers have reported upon it, I, at any rate, had not in the least expected to find such fertile valleys and evidence of such wealth and comfort among the Thibetans. The Gyantse-Shigatse Valley, the Brahmaputra Valley, this valley and the next valley to the north of this are all 3 or 4 miles wide and richly cultivated, with many rich side valleys running into them. Magnificent crops are seen all round here, and though no trees grow on hill-sides, the valley bottoms are dotted over with groves round the villages and larger residences; and I have seen bamboos, roses, peaches, and nasturtiums grow in one garden. What is chiefly noticeable, though, is the affluence of the upper classes. The house I am living in now is sufficiently large to provide separate rooms for each officer of my staff as well as six officers of the escort and four clerks. There are, in addition, two mess-rooms and two Durbar halls and two companies of infantry, and all the Mission establishment are in rooms in the court-yard of the same house. All the best rooms have glass windows and are richly painted and gilded, and some have silk ceilings. This particular house is an exceptionally good one, but there are many others scattered over these valleys hardly less luxurious, all filled with rich clothing, silks, and European and Chinese knick-knacks. And, while there is all this evidence of wealth in private houses, there is, of course, still greater wealth in the temples, which are full of gold utensils and jewelled images.

13. Thibet, then, must not be judged by the barren plateaux which is all that the Thibetans have allowed recent European travellers to see, but by these luxuriant valleys in the south. With its gold-mines and gold-washings and evidence of still further mineral wealth, with its rich grazing lands, where millions of sheep could be pastured; with its fertile valleys, and with its flow of offerings from outside, Thibet must no longer be regarded as a poor and worthless country which might be safely left alone. On the contrary, it is rich enough to form an excellent *pied à terre* alongside our frontier for a Power stretching down from the north, and if we had left it alone and allowed the Russians to establish the Protectorate they had anticipated establishing here and have drilled and armed the Thibetans, we should have had a powerful neighbour year by year consolidating his position alongside Nepal and Bhutan, taxing the loyalty of these States and forming an increasing menace to our own possession in Bengal.

14. As it is, Russian influence is driven back for the time at all events, and one of the most satisfactory features in the whole situation is the fact that both the Representative of Nepal and the Chief of Bhutan himself are working zealously with me here to effect a settlement with the Thibetans. His Majesty's Government had, at one time, feared that action in Thibet might prejudice our good relations with Nepal. A year ago we had almost no relations at all with Bhutan. Now, far from our present action being resented by Nepal, I find that the Nepalese Representative here has received the most emphatic orders from his Government to assist me in every possible way. He visits me daily. He brings me the most valuable information, and he has been instrumental in bringing me into personal touch with the most highly respected, after the Dalai Lama, of all the lamas in this part of Thibet. While the Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan was the means of getting me into first contact with the Thibetan Government, and is now endeavouring to bring them to reason. Both these men have been impressed, not only with the evidence of our strength, but with our moderation and consideration, and whatever else may be the result of the present Mission, we shall, at any rate, have bound Nepal and Bhutan more closely to us than they ever were before, for they will have felt that they have worked together with the great suzerain Power in an enterprise which, if it should fall short of complete success, will do so only on account of an excess of moderation in the hour of victory.

Inclosure 7 in No. 7.

Deputy Commissioner Garrett to Government of Bengal.

(Confidential.)

Darjeeling, August 29, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my Confidential Report for the week ending on Saturday, the 27th August, 1904.

2. Under the instructions of the Commission, I have been making inquiries as to the general feelings in Nepal as regards the Thibet Mission. I gather that the

people generally are not in favour of the present policy of their Government, the chief reason being that they are averse to the opening up and improvement of the trade routes between Thibet and India on the ground that this will tend to seriously impair the trade between Thibet and Nepal, in which a very large number of Nepalese are interested.

3. The number of Waloongpa traders visiting the district this year is considerably larger than usual, the reason being that trade with Thibet is almost entirely blocked.

4. A Chinese trader has arrived here from China on his way to Thibet. He informed my agent that he had heard in Peking that the Chinese Emperor had issued orders to the Lhassa Amban to help in every way towards the opening up of trade between Thibet and India.

5. I have nothing further to report for this week.

Inclosure 8 in No. 7.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Gyantse, September 9, 1904.

LHASSA, 4th September.

Ti Rimpuchi, who has to-day been definitely recognized by National Assembly as Regent, and with Amban's consent commenced using seal left by Dalai Lama, visited me with Tongsa Penlop and Nepalese Representative this morning. He said Thibetan Government were prepared to accept our terms, but begged that the indemnity might be paid in annual instalment of one lakh each. I pointed out that amount in that case ought to be considerably increased; but eventually, as time is pressing, and Amban's consent will yet have to be obtained, I agreed, in anticipation of sanction from Government. I trust my action will be upheld. Regent then affixed his private seal to a Thibetan translation of draft Convention, worded precisely as forwarded with your letter dated the 5th August, and I have informed Regent that Convention itself will be signed in the Potala. I may have some little trouble yet, for Amban this afternoon presented me with a long letter from National Assembly making minor objections, but as far as Thibetans are concerned, matter is practically settled; and as feeling of Thibetans has distinctly improved, I think we shall be able materially to reduce garrison proposed for Gyantse, but on this point I will make definite suggestions by next dak after consulting Macdonald.

No. 8.

[Nil.]

No. 9.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 4, 1904.

IN reply to Mr. Campbell's letter of the 1st October last, on the subject of the adhesion of the Chinese Government to the Thibetan Agreement, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to say that he concurs in Lord Lansdowne's proposal to inform Sir E. Satow that the Adhesion Agreement should be signed at Peking, *mutatis mutandis,* by him and the Wai-wu Pu.

I am also to inclose a copy of a telegram sent by Mr. Brodrick to the Viceroy on the 1st October.*

The reply of the Government of India with regard to the addition, and the possible reservation as to Article IX, will be communicated to Lord Lansdowne as soon as it is received.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

* Already printed.

No. 10.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 3rd instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 5, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October 3, 1904.*

THIBET.

Colonel Younghusband has carried out the instructions of His Majesty's Government as to the Treaty in a manner which enables them to give their general approval to the Convention he has negotiated; but in regard to the indemnity, his Convention has been framed in defiance of express instructions. These were that the indemnity should be limited to a sum which the Thibetans could pay within three years, and that our occupation of the Chumbi Valley should terminate when the indemnity had been paid and the trade marts opened effectually for three years. But Colonel Younghusband, by accepting the proposal made by the Thibetans for the payment of indemnity by instalments spread over a long period, has contravened our instructions in a most important particular.

The policy of His Majesty's Government, which, since the 6th November, 1903, has been repeated impressed upon your Government, is to avoid interference in the internal affairs of Thibet, and to deal with the situation, which the breaches of the old Treaty by the Thibetans have created, in the manner best calculated to attain that object. The question of what should be done with regard to the indemnity has been the subject of our most careful consideration. You were authorized by my telegram of 16th September to reduce the amount from 75,00,000 rupees to 25,00,000 rupees, 5 lakhs of which were to be paid before the Chumbi Valley should be evacuated. This mode of payment might have been insisted on had our instructions been carried out, but the opportunity has now unfortunately been lost owing to Colonel Younghusband's departure from Lhassa. His Majesty's Government, however, do not propose on that account to modify the cardinal principles of their policy, and they altogether decline to sanction any stipulations being made which would necessitate our occupation of the Chumbi Valley for a longer period than that which was indicated in my telegram of the 26th July. When the Convention is ratified, it must therefore be amended so as to give effect to the decision of His Majesty's Government.

In the event of the Thibetans breaking the Treaty at some future date, either by refusing to pay the annual instalments of the indemnity or in any other way, it will be necessary to reconsider the situation; but, in the meanwhile, we cannot accept the situation created for us by our Representative's disobedience to orders.

This telegram should be repeated by you to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

No. 11.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 215.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, October 5, 1904.*

YOUR Lordship's telegrams Nos. 142 and 144.

The interview which I had to-day with Prince Ch'ing had been arranged for before I heard that Younghusband had left Lhassa, and as I had not received any reply to my telegram No. 213, I was obliged to confine myself chiefly to the discrepancies between his instructions to the Resident (see my telegram No. 207) and his language to me, as reported in my telegram No. 206.

I told him that His Majesty's Government would certainly not consent to any change being made in the Agreement with the Thibetans, and gave him the explanations contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 142, paragraph 3. I said that His Majesty's Government might possibly agree to some kind of reservation as to Article IX, on the lines mentioned in your Lordship's telegram No. 144, and that they are willing to allow recognition of China's suzerainty to be inserted in the Adhesion Agreement.

Pointed remarks, the Prince told me, had been made by the German, American, Italian, and French Ministers as to the result of China giving her sanction to the Agreement. He said that the danger was of France demanding similar stipulations regarding Yünnan, Germany as to Shantung, and Japan with regard to Fuhkien. These remarks, I suggested, would lose their point if we dispensed with China's signature—an idea which the Prince repelled with horror.

I then dwelt on the fact that the trade marts would be open to all foreign goods without distinction, pointed out the fundamental difference between the eighteen provinces of China and an autonomous state under their suzerainty, and referred to China's special arrangements with us respecting Burmah trade.

I explained that His Majesty's Government had not yet heard of Younghusband's departure from Lhassa when they sent me my instructions. It seemed to me practically impossible that Younghusband and the Amban could now be the signatories of the Adhesion Agreement.

In reply the Prince said that he expected in a day or two the arrival of the official mentioned in my telegram No. 208, who would proceed to Calcutta as soon as he had received his instructions, in order to negotiate with the Indian Government. Before starting he would be sent round to see me, and it would therefore be useful if your Lordship would instruct me as to what line I should take with him.

The Chinese Government fear that foreign Powers might found on Article IX similar claims to predominance in parts of China proper, and it is evidently their paramount idea to induce His Majesty's Government to explain away the Article in such a manner as to provide them with a complete answer to such pretensions.

I am unable to say whether the form of reservation mentioned in your Lordship's telegram No. 144 would be regarded as sufficient by the Chinese Government, though I think it ought to satisfy the Powers. The Chinese attitude gives me the impression that they were disagreeably surprised by the news of the signature of the Agreement with the Thibetans alone.

It is evident that the negotiations must now be transferred to Calcutta, Peking, or London, and I would suggest that the first place would be preferable under all the circumstances. An additional advantage would be that the choice of this place would coincide with the wishes of the Chinese.

(Repeated to Simla.)

No. 12.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 145.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 5, 1904.

THIBETAN Agreement.

Please refer to your telegram No. 213 of 1st October.

You should request the Government of India to supply you with the text of the Adhesion Agreement which will eventually have to be signed by you and Chinese Government at Peking, *mutatis mutandis*.

You should, however, take no further steps as regards signature unless you receive further instructions on the subject (see the telegram dispatched on the 3rd October to the Viceroy).

No. 13.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Hardinge.

(No. 354.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 5, 1904.

I HAD a long conversation to-day with the Russian Ambassador on the subject of the Thibetan Agreement, which I had discussed on the 27th ultimo with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires.

His Excellency said that my statements to M. Sazanow had been reported to Count Lamsdorff, who regarded my explanation as not without weight (" appréciable "). The Russian Government was, however, still somewhat uneasy. They understood that we were asking the Thibetans for the payment of a large sum by way of indemnity, and that, as it might not be easy to find so much money, our occupation might be indefinitely prolonged.

Again, Article IX, in the published version, seemed to them to imply the establishment of a British Protectorate, and to be inconsistent with our declared desire to respect the policy of the "open door." Count Lamsdorff's anxiety was, however, due, not so much to his misgivings as to the effects which the Convention might produce as to his fear that any apparent departure by His Majesty's Government from the assurances which we had given would place those who, like himself, were in favour of a *rapprochement* with this country, in a difficult position, and thus form a bad precedent for future negotiations. This was especially the case, because, as I would remember, the prompt assent given by the Russian Government to the Egyptian Khedivial Decree had been largely due to the assurances which we had given in regard to Thibet.

I told his Excellency that I fully realized the force of Count Lamsdorff's argument, and that he would find no disposition on the part of His Majesty's Government to depart, either in the letter or the spirit, from the policy which we had announced. The situation at this moment was as follows: Colonel Younghusband, who had been instructed to come to terms with the Thibetans, and then to return to India as soon as possible, had concluded a Convention with them. It would, however, have to be ratified by the Government of India, and its terms were still subject to revision. I called his Excellency's attention to the statement upon this point, which had appeared in this morning's newspapers. He asked me whether he might regard it as official, and I replied that it certainly had that character. I went on to say that amongst the provisions still unsettled were those which concerned the amount of the indemnity and the length of the period over which its payment was to be spread. As to the amount, I preferred not to mention the sum which we had in our minds, but his Excellency might take it from me that it would be a moderate one, and we had no idea of stipulating that its payment was to be spread over a long term of years, during which we were to remain in occupation of Thibetan territory. Colonel Younghusband had, I believed, agreed to make the term a long one in deference to the desire of the Thibetans themselves, who naturally wished that the annual instalments should be as small as possible; we should, however, I felt no doubt, curtail both the sum and the period of occupation considerably. It seemed to me, however, perfectly reasonable that we should remain in occupation of Thibetan territory for a time. We had gone to Lhassa for the purpose of exacting reparation and the fulfilment of Treaty obligations which had been wantonly disregarded. In dealing with such people it was impossible to be content with mere promises, and we must therefore retain some kind of security until the Thibetans took steps to satisfy us that they intended to carry out the provisions of the Treaty. As for our policy, its key-note was non-intervention in the internal affairs of Thibet. We demanded free access for our own trade, but there was no idea of excluding the lawful trade of other countries, although, as I had more than once pointed out to his Excellency, our geographical position made it absolutely necessary that if any Power were given a privileged position in regard to Thibet, that Power should be Great Britain: it was therefore quite true that we had stipulated that, in all matters involving the external relations of Thibet, we should have a predominating voice.

As for the Agents who were to have charge of our commercial interests at the new trade marts, I might point out that a provision of this kind was to be found in the Regulations agreed to in the year 1893 in pursuance of the Convention of 1890, which had been entered into while I was in charge of the Government of India.

His Excellency seemed much reassured by my statement, and asked me particularly whether he might inform the Russian Government that we had no desire to close the door to the trade of other countries. I replied that he might certainly do so. I added that I did not offer at this moment to communicate to his Excellency the actual terms of the proposed Agreement, as these were still liable to revision. It was, however, as well that he should know that the versions published in the newspapers here, although they were in the main not unfaithful reproductions of the Agreement into which Colonel Younghusband had entered, contained several inaccurate and misleading passages.

At the close of the conversation I said that the Acting Viceroy was to have a conference with Colonel Younghusband as soon as the latter returned to India. I understood that their meeting would take place about ten days' hence, and I did not think it likely that anything would be finally decided until after that date.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 14.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 146.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1904.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

An official announcement has been published that the Thibetan Agreement still awaits ratification by the Viceroy of India, and that the terms are not yet finally settled.

This step has been taken in view of the statements which have been telegraphed from India as to the general scope of the Agreement.

No. 15.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1904.

PLEASE see telegram from Government of India of the 29th September on the subject of the Thibetan Agreement.

India Office point out that right of limitrophe States to have, independently of their suzerain power, diplomatic relations with one another can hardly be urged with expediency by His Majesty's Government, in view of the position in regard to the foreign relations of Afghanistan which we claim.

These considerations should be borne in mind, in addition to those to which attention was called in my telegram No. 144 of the 1st October.

No. 16.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1904.

THIBETAN Agreement.

Your language to Prince Ch'ing, as reported in your telegram No. 215 of the 5th October, is approved.

You are authorized to speak to Tang in same sense; information contained in telegram to Viceroy from Secretary of State for India of the 3rd October should, however, be borne in mind.

The India Office is being consulted as to where it will be advisable to conduct the negotiations for the revision of the Convention.

No. 17.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 6, 1904.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* giving an account of an interview

* No. 11.

which took place yesterday between him and Prince Ch'ing relative to the Agreement with Thibet.

I am at the same time to forward a copy of a telegram which has been addressed to Sir E. Satow approving the language which he used on that occasion,* and authorizing him to speak in a similar sense to Tang, the Chinese official whom the Chinese Government propose to send to Calcutta.

With reference to the last paragraph of Sir E. Satow's telegram, I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that as Colonel Younghusband is expected to arrive at Simla in a few days, it would be desirable that the amendments required in the Agreement with Thibet as regards the amount of the indemnity, and the period over which payment is to be spread, should be negotiated in India, but that the negotiations with regard to the Adhesion Agreement should be conducted at Peking, and that its signature should take place there.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 18.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 6, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 6, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 1st October. Text of formal notes exchanged between Younghusband and Amban not yet received here; Younghusband has been asked to furnish them. See, however, his letter of the 30th August last (sent home on the 22nd ultimo). Should you see no objection, we would prefer to postpone giving our views, as requested by you, until we are in possession of the notes above referred to, and until Colonel Younghusband reaches Simla.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 19.

Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 500.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 7, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship translations of two leading articles which appeared in the "Novoe Vremya" and the "Russ" of yesterday, relating to the Convention recently concluded with Thibet, of which the alleged text was sent to the "Times" by the correspondent of that journal at Peking.†

I venture to point out to your Lordship that there is a considerable analogy between the text of Article IX of the Convention as reported in the "Times" and the

* No. 16.

† Not printed.

Russo-Persian Railway Convention of 1890, which is believed to be still in force,* by which the Persian Government is precluded from granting any concession for a railway in Persia without the consent of the Russian Government. This restriction applies not merely to foreigners but even to Persian subjects.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES HARDINGE.

No. 20.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 22nd September, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 10, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 20.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 22, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday, after handing me over silks to the value of 5,000 rupees as fine for the assault on two British officers, the acting Regent (the Ta Rimbochi) asked those Thibetans who had come with him to withdraw, and he, the Tongsa Penlop and the Nepalese Representative then proceeded to talk over the general situation. The Ta Rimbochi said that he himself had no objection to our terms except in regard to the indemnity, which he thought was too heavy, as Thibet was a poor country. He pointed out the difficulty which the Thibetans had found in paying up the small fine I had imposed on them, and asked how they could be expected to pay the sum of 50,000 rupees a-day which I was demanding. He said of course we thought ourselves in the right in this quarrel, but it was difficult for him to make the Assembly acquiesce in this view and it might be well if I would impress our views upon them.

2. I said that if only a sensible and reasonable man like him had been sent to meet me in the beginning all this trouble would have been saved; there would have

* *Russian Railway Agreement, communicated by the Amin-us-Sultan.*

(Translation.) *November*, 1890.

As the Ministers of the Government of His Most Sacred Majesty the Shah stated that there are difficulties in their way in carrying out their engagement of Rajab 1306 regarding the construction of railways by the Russian Company in Persian territory, therefore the Ministers of the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Provinces of Russia have agreed to alter the above-mentioned engagement in the following manner: and his Excellency M. de Bützow, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Imperial Majesty the Most Great Emperor of All the Provinces of Russia, and His Highness the Amin-us-Sultan, the Grand Vizir of the Government of His Most Sacred, Sublime, and Absolute Shah of All the Provinces of Persia, empowered by their respective Governments, have drawn up the detailed conditions:—

1. The Persian Government engages for the space of ten years, beginning from the date of signature of this Agreement, neither to construct a railway in Persian territory, nor to permit nor grant a concession for the construction of railways to a Company or other persons; and after the expiration of ten years the renewal of the prolongation shall be immediately discussed between the two Parties.

2. By railway lines is to be understood all lines upon which steam or any other motive power is used, and all such lines are included in this Agreement.

3. Tramway lines which are drawn by horses and which are situated in towns or in places near towns are not included in this Agreement.

4. A railway line from Tehran to Shemran, where are situated the summer residences of His Most Sacred, Sublime Majesty, the most distant of which is 2 farsakhs from Tehran, is excluded from this Agreement and engagement.

5. After the signature of this Agreement as much of the document of the month of Rajab 1306 as concerns railways becomes null and void.

This Agreement in duplicate has been sealed and signed at Tehran the 27th day of the month of Rabi-ul-Awal, 1308 (11th November, 1890).

been no war and no indemnity would have been asked. We had not wished for war, and I had gone with Captain O'Connor without any escort into their camp at Guru in January to reason quietly with the leaders there and ask them to report my views to Lhassa. If we had wanted war I would never have done that. That I did it was proof that we wished for peace. But they refused to report my words to Lhassa, and hence this trouble. The Ta Rimbochi here interpolated that they were afraid to report anything to the Dalai Lama. I went on to say that it was not fair to expect the poor Indian peasants to pay all the cost of a war brought on by the foolishness of the Thibetan Rulers, so we had to ask that the Thibetans should pay part of the sum. Yet even now we were not asking for more than half of the whole cost. I was demanding 50,000 rupees a-day from the date of the attack on the Mission till a month after the date on which the Convention is signed. The Ta Rimbochi would note that I was not asking payment from the date of the Guru fight because that fight might have been due to mere foolishness on the part of the leaders, but from the date when the Thibetans deliberately attacked the Mission at Gyantse after I had repeatedly notified that I had come to negotiate, and there could be no doubt that they meant war. From that date, therefore, we expected them to contribute to the cost of military operations. The Ta Rimbochi had said that the Thibetans had very little cash. If that was so I was prepared to consider the question of extending the period in which the payment of the indemnity could be made. I would also consider whether some of it could not be paid in kind to the trade agent in Gyantse and the Officer Commanding in Chumbi.

3. The Ta Rimbochi said he wished the settlement with us to be fully completed now so that we could have it over and be friends, but if the Thibetans had to go on paying us an indemnity for some years after, the row would be kept up and friendship would be difficult.

4. I replied that if they would now at once pay the indemnity we should be only too glad. But in any case we would not on our side harbour any ill-feelings towards the Thibetans with whom we had no other desire than to live on terms of friendship.

5. The Tongsa Penlop then said that Thibet, Nepal, and Bhutan were bound together by the same religion and all bordered on India. They ought, therefore, to look on England as their friend and leader. The English had no wish to interfere with them, but did not like any one else interfering. They ought to stand together, therefore, for if one was hurt all were hurt. They could rely, however, on their big neighbour, England, to help them in time of trouble if they kept on good terms with her.

6. The Nepalese Representative agreed with the Tongsa Penlop that all four countries should be on terms of friendship with one another and that Thibet, Nepal, and Bhutan should always preserve good relations with their neighbour, England.

7. The Ta Rimbochi said he trusted that when this settlement was made Thibet and England would always be on terms of friendship. The Thibetans had no wish to have relations with any other Power and desired now to keep on good terms with England.

8. I replied that we had been on perfectly good terms with Thibet for more than a century up till the time of the Sikkim war, and I hoped that when the present settlement was made we would be friends for ever.

Inclosure 2 in No. 20.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 23, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, English translation of the amendments proposed by the Amban to the draft Convention and copy of a letter from Mr. Wilton describing an interview he had with the Amban on the subject.

Inclosure 3 in No. 20.

Suggested Amendments made by the Amban to the Draft Convention, and handed by him to Colonel Younghusband on August 21, 1904.

Amendment 1.—Referring to the clause stating that no Thibetan territory is to be ceded, &c., to any foreign Power. Thibet has been a dependency of China for more than two centuries. If it is decided that Thibet must consult with England in all these matters, hereafter this may be to China's detriment. It is suggested, therefore, that this clause may include that China, being the Suzerain of Thibet, she is not included in the term "foreign Power" and may be at liberty to construct roads and railways, and open mines, &c.

Amendment 2.—Referring to the clause demanding an indemnity. In 1888 the Chinese Commissioner, Shang, opposed the demand for an indemnity on the ground that the Thibetans had not invaded Indian territory, but Sikkim, which country had been a grant made by the Dalai Lama. In this particular instance both parties have incurred war expenses. The British have sent troops into Thibet to Gyantse where the Thibetans suffered losses. The Thibetans did not invade Indian territory. Thibetan property, houses, and monasteries, have been destroyed.

Consideration to the Thibetan request for a small indemnity is therefore asked for.

Amendment 3.—Referring to the razing of fortified positions between Lhassa and the frontier of India.

The Tongsa Penlop of Bhutan, in his copy of the draft Convention sent to the Thibetans, only asked for the razing of Sangars and walls. These could be razed, but Jongs are official residences rather than forts and might be exempt from destruction.

Amendment 4.—Referring to the opening of trade marts.

It is requested that Chinese traders, equally with British and Thibetan, may be allowed free access to Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok. It is to be feared that the Thibetans cannot agree to keep up the roads as the distances are very great and the physical difficulties enormous. For, should they evade their responsibilities, trouble with England would be the result. In judicial matters British subjects should be judged by British officials, Chinese by Chinese, and Thibetans by Thibetans. Both Chinese and Thibetan officials to be under the supervision of the Amban. In regard to the proposed correspondence and visits of the British Agent to Lhassa, there is no objection to his coming to Lhassa provided that the object of his visit is purely commercial and not political.

Amendment 5.—Referring to retention of Chumbi Valley.

It is requested that during the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley for three years' payments be duly made for food-stuffs and other articles, and also hire of houses. British merchants are only to rent and not purchase houses. Neither are Thibetan subjects, nor is the Thibetan religion to be interfered with. Thibetan women are not to be taken as mistresses, nor are they to be seduced.

These amendments are suggested and can be altered after mutual discussion if so desired.

Inclosure 4 in No. 20.

Mr. Wilton to Colonel Younghusband.

Lhassa, August 22, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I visited the Amban to-day and discussed with him the clauses of the draft Convention. I inclose a Memorandum of our conversation.

After the discussion, our conversation turned on the flight from Lhassa and the subsequent behaviour of the Dalai Lama. The Amban assured me that so late as the 24th July the Dalai Lama was absolutely irreconcilable, and that he secretly fled from Lhassa without even notifying his intention to him.

The Amban characterized the Dalai Lama's conduct in this respect as a very grave breach of the trust reposed in the Dalai Lama by the Emperor of China. The

Amban also appeared to believe that the Dalai Lama would make for Urga and await there the issue of events. Wherever he might subsequently go, the Amban did not think it would be to Peking.

The Amban was cordial in his manner and begged me to convey to you his assurances of sincerity and friendship.

I took the opportunity of referring to the question of the demand for an indemnity from the Thibetan Government, and informed the Amban that so long as the Thibetans continued their present dilatory, unfriendly, and obstructive tactics, it would be quite impossible for you to even consider the slightest abatement in the amount now demanded.

Inclosure 5 in No. 20.

Note of Interview between the Amban and Mr. Wilton at the Amban's Yemen, August 22, 1904.

UNDER instructions from the British Commissioner Mr. Wilton proceeded to the Amban's Yemen to convey Colonel Younghusband's views on the proposed amendments made by the Amban to the draft Convention.

Clause I.—The Amban agreed to this clause *in toto.*

Clause II.—The Amban agreed to this clause, suggesting, however, that Chinese subjects should, equally with British and Thibetan subjects, have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

Mr. Wilton said that Colonel Younghusband had no objection to the Amban's request, as he had taken it as a matter of course that the Amban, in his capacity of Representative of the Suzerain Power, could have arranged with the Thibetans that Chinese subjects might have free access to the above-named places.

The Amban replied that the Thibetans had strong objections to opening Gartok as a trade mart, but that their objection could be met if we concurred in his insisting that Chinese subjects could proceed thither and trade without hindrance.

The Amban had no objections to make as regards paragraphs 2 and 3 of Clause II, but he pointed out that the Thibetans were opposing "the question of establishing fresh trade-marts under similar conditions if development of trade require it." He characterised their opposition in this respect as foolish and narrow-minded and expressed his hopes that he would overcome their opposition.

Clause III.—Mr. Wilton did not discuss this clause with the Amban.

Clause IV.—The Amban agreed to this *in toto.*

Clause V.—In his written amendments handed to Colonel Younghusband on the 21st August, the Amban represented at some length the strong objection on the part of the Thibetans to be responsible for repairing trade roads. Mr. Wilton explained that Colonel Younghusband had not intended to convey that anything more was meant than that the Thibetans should undertake to keep the road from Gyantse to the frontier of India in as good repair as it might be when the Commission retired from Thibet, and that the obligation imposed upon the Thibetan Government was not heavy as it really only meant that they should maintain the road so as to allow of merchandize freely passing to and fro. The Amban concurred that Colonel Younghusband's views were quite reasonable, but he asked that, in view of the very strong Thibetan opposition on the point, the words "and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade" might be excised.

Mr. Wilton replied that he would convey the Amban's request to Colonel Younghusband.

No objection was raised by the Amban to the rest of this clause.

Clause VI.—In his written amendments of the 21st August the Amban referred to the discussion of 1888 prior to the conclusion of the Yatung Convention. The Amban asserted that it was on official record that the Chinese Commissioner Shang had opposed the claim for war indemnity on the ground that the Thibetans had not invaded actual British territory, and that such claim had been withdrawn. In the present instance the fighting had been carried on in Thibet, houses burnt, monasteries

destroyed, and the Thibetans had suffered heavily. The Amban, therefore, criticized adversely the British demand, and asked for consideration of the Thibetan request that a small indemnity only be demanded.

Mr. Wilton referred the Amban to official records in which the Viceroy of India had instructed the British Commissioner (16th November, 1888) not to insist on the payment of any war indemnity, though the misconduct of the Thibetans had fairly exposed them to such a demand. Also that the Chinese Commissioner Shang had engaged to obtain the formal assent of the Lhassa Government to any agreement he might make. Mr. Wilton reminded the Amban that Shang had entirely failed to carry out his engagement, and that this failure had contributed in no small degree to the necessity for the dispatch of the present Commission. Mr. Wilton also referred to the present Amban's written promise to be at Gyantse without fail on the 12th May at the latest, and to bring at the same time suitable Thibetan negotiators. The Commission camp was attacked by the Thibetans on the 5th May, and it was quite likely that had the Amban carried out his promise to leave Lhassa for Gyantse with suitable Thibetan negotiators the attack on the camp might never have taken place, and there would then have been no demand for an indemnity for war expenses which was being claimed only from the date of the attack on the British camp on the 5th May. Mr. Wilton also pointed out to the Amban that any destruction of Thibetan property took place after the unprovoked attack on the camp and was only done in self-defence. The Amban, in reply, stated that he would make no objections to the British indemnity whatever the amount might be.

Clause VII.—The Amban, in his written amendments, referred to the various Thibetan minor objections. He now declared that these objections were either trifling or frivolous, and he would take no count of them.

Clause VIII.—In his written amendments the Amban agreed to the razing of Sangars and walls, but urged on behalf of the Thibetans that the Jongs were official residences rather than forts. The Amban agreed to the compromise that Jongs need not be razed but should be entirely vacated. He also agreed to the British occupation of the Gyantse Jong until such time as it should be considered expedient to withdraw the British garrison.

Clause IX.—In his written amendments the Amban stated that Thibet had been a dependency of China for 200 years, and that, therefore, China should be exempted from the restrictions placed on foreign Powers.

Mr. Wilton said he was authorized by Colonel Younghusband to assure the Amban that there had been no intention to deprive China of any of her powers and rights in Thibet. If the Amban would refer to IX (*b*) and (*c*) he would see that the words "foreign Power" could not be intended to apply to China. However, should the Amban desire it, Colonel Younghusband was prepared to give him a written guarantee that China was not included in the words "any foreign Power." Colonel Younghubsand also hoped that the Amban on his part would engage that China and Chinese subjects would in no sense act on behalf of any foreign Power or the subjects of any foreign Power so as to directly or indirectly transgress in any way the terms of this clause.

The Amban expressed his great satisfaction at the proposal of Colonel Younghusband, which he readily accepted, and he expressed himself as perfectly willing to give the engagement which Colonel Younghusband requested.

After the discussion of the nine clauses had taken place, the Amban asked that an amended copy of the draft Convention embodying the exact terms might be given him.

Mr. Wilton said he would report this to Colonel Younghusband, but Colonel Younghusband had instructed him to ask the Amban to press the Thibetans to give the Amban and Colonel Younghusband a written guarantee that they accepted Clause IX. On receipt of this guarantee Colonel Younghusband proposed to proceed thus clause by clause, and he hoped to receive the Amban's support.

The Amban, after some discussion, agreed that Colonel Younghusband's method was sound, and promised to use his utmost endeavours to make the Thibetans agree to all the clauses of the draft Convention.

Inclosure 6 in No. 20.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 19, 1904.

THE Amban visited me to-day and handed to me the second reply of the Thibetan Government to his letter forwarding to them the terms of the settlement we now wish to make with them. The first reply he had been unable to forward to me as it was too impudent. This second reply, he said, I would find on perusal, was more satisfactory, though it still fell short of what he would expect the Thibetans to agree to. A translation of the reply I have now the honour to forward for the information of the Government of India.

2. I told the Amban that I found it difficult to make the Thibetans realize that the main points in the settlement we should expect them to agree to without question. The period in which the indemnity was to be paid might be a matter for discussion, but there was no question as to its having to be paid sometime. Similarly, they must agree to having marts at Gyantse and Gartok.

3. The Amban said that the Thibetans would agree to nothing without pressure. Words were of no use but must be followed by acts, and he was prepared to act when occasion arose.

4. I remarked that I had all along been of opinion that nothing could be got out of these Thibetans except by pressure, and I was fully prepared to act. At the same time it would be much more satisfactory if the needful pressure could be put on by the Amban as I had no wish to take more action unless absolutely compelled to. I went on to say that I thought the Shapes and others who had to make the settlement were afraid to agree to our terms in the absence of the Dalai Lama, fearing that if he returned he would punish them for having given way. The sooner, therefore, that it was decided one way or other whether he was to come back or whether he was to be kept away for good, the better.

5. The Amban replied that if the Dalai Lama returned he would have to affix his seal to the Convention, and if he afterwards attempted to punish the Thibetans who had conducted the negotiations he would use the means he possessed to protect them.

6. I remarked that a difficulty I experienced in dealing with the Thibetans was in talking with so many Representatives at the same time. Half-a-dozen Delegates would come to me and each one insist upon having his say, and no responsible head was recognized. The Amban said that he too had had this difficulty, but that he had recognized the Regent as the principal in these negotiations, and from now on he intended to negotiate with him alone; he was the best man among the leading Thibetans and came next after the Dalai Lama in the Lhassa Province. I said this seemed to me a wise course, for I had found the Regent a sensible man and he was much respected by the people.

7. I then asked the Amban now that he had had time to consider the Adhesion Agreement if he had any objection to signing such a document. He replied that he proposed to discuss it when the Thibetan Convention had been settled. On being pressed he admitted that he was apprehensive that Chinese interests might suffer owing to the omission of any special reference to China in the clause referring to non-intervention by foreign Powers. I replied that China was, of course, not included in the term "foreign Powers," and I was prepared to give him an assurance on this point. This appeared to relieve him, and he explained that he had feared the Wai-wu Pu would have raised this point. To the form of the Adhesion Agreement he made no objection.

8. As regards the Convention itself, the Amban said he would have to discuss the clause regarding trade marts with me. I said I was prepared to talk the matter over, but we should have to insist upon establishing trade marts at Gyantse and Gartok, and I did not understand the Thibetan objections to the establishment of a mart at Gyantse, for we had the right more than a century ago to have one even at Shigatse. This right had not been exercised for a great number of years, but at one time Indian traders visited Shigatse regularly.

Inclosure 7 in No. 20.

Revised Draft of Treaty drawn by the National Assembly with greatest care, as ordered by the Amban.

THAT the draft of Treaty containing eight Articles sent recently to the Amban by the British officials which has been forwarded to us under sealed cover on the evening of the 4th of the 7th month in the Wood Dragon year, in the thirtieth year of the reign of Kwangsu, stating that although we, the National Assembly, have talked over the matters with due consideration, yet no mention has been made by you Thibetans in assembly in Article I, on an important part of the subject, in which no property can be sold or leased out to any other Power. Further, Thibet has been protected by the Chinese Emperor for more than 200 years with great kindness, and an Amban has been appointed for conducting business in Thibet, and as the Chinese Government is not mentioned clearly in the terms of this Treaty, you were going to talk it over with the British officials regarding the Ist Article.

That although it is well known to all the powers of the four directions that from the beginning the great Emperor of China "appointed by heaven" is the dispenser of gifts since the former incarnation of his Holiness the Dalai Lama, and that he (the Emperor) is the protector of Thibet, no mention is made about him in the Treaty drawn by the British, and we thank you that you are going to talk it over again with the British officials.

We, the Thibetans, have held no friendly intercourse or taken in any other Power whose religion is heretical and does not agree with ours, and we have never leased out or sold any property until now. In future, regarding the present Treaty, if the British Government will not dishearten the Thibetan Government, and with an earnest desire for peace, will abide by the Treaty so that no dispute may arise hereafter and fault be found; and in the same manner the Thibetan Government will not hold friendly intercourse, lease out or sell to any other heretical Power having a different religion from ours, except the great Emperor of China out of gratitude, and will abide by the same.

ARTICLE II.

That as regards the two men of Lachung, who are to be given back by the Thibetan Government, the great Amban has given clear instructions to both the Thibetans and the British, and by mutual consent the aforesaid two men have been delivered over to the British officials without any injury to their bodies and organs of sense by the Acting Kalon and the Representatives of the National Assembly at 10 A.M. on the 5th day of the 7th month.

ARTICLE III.

That as regards the payment of war indemnity to the British by the Thibetans and concerning the universal law of paying back military expenses to the victorious Power by the vanquished Power, the British have picked up a quarrel and entered into Thibetan territory, thus causing war, and if one looks at the loss and damage done to the land of Thibet, it is impossible to pay back the war indemnity to the British, but Thibet being a religious country, and having no military drilling, it was unable to protect the land; and if any war indemnity is to be paid to the British according to the universal law, it is to be considered that great damage has been done by the destruction of jongs, monasteries, villages, images, property, and harvest. Thibet has no income like other countries, and whatever wealth is obtained, it is spent solely on performing religious ceremony for the great Emperor of China. As it is quite impossible to pay a big amonnt, be good enough to explain it to the British; but the real state of the case is that in the event of the same boundary remaining in our possession as before, we shall consider the repayment of a small portion of the indemnity if necessary.

ARTICLE IV.

That as regards the destruction of the "hill-jongs" between Gyantse and the frontier, we agree that all the newly-built fortifications are to be destroyed.

ARTICLE V.

That as regards the establishment of trade marts in three different places, namely, at Yatung, Gyantse, and Katakhe, Yatung mart is to remain under the existing conditions. It is not necessary to establish new trade marts at Katakhe, which appear to be the name of Tögar, and at Gyantse. A trade mart can be established at any convenient place below Phari. The officers are to be established in the marts under the same conditions as at Yatung. Regarding the delivery of the letters, the telegraph wire erected recently inside the frontier is to be taken away, and Thibetan officials will undertake to receive letters and deliver them.

Desirable traders shall have free access by mutual consent between the frontier and the mart.

Although benefit may be derived by both the parties by the establishment of fresh trade marts in the event of development of trade, but as the establishment of new trade marts will do harm to Thibet in future, please explain the matter so that it may not be necessary to make any promise.

ARTICLE VI.

The boundary between Sikkim and Tomo (Chumbi Valley) should be Jelap, and the boundary between Khamba and Sikkim should be according to the boundary pillars erected by Ngao-po.

ARTICLE VII.

That as for not increasing the customs fixed in the Treaty of the sixteenth year of the reign, no alteration will be made accordingly. Regarding the gate customs, although we have made a request that the same may be given to the Thibetan Government, but the Emperor of China collects it in his Treasury and takes the same. If it cannot be given to the Thibetan Government we will raise no dispute, and can remain as it is, but if it is necessary to pay a small war indemnity to the English, please keep it in mind to move the Chinese Emperor in the matter.

ARTICLE VIII.

Regarding the occupation of Chumbi Valley by the British troops till the war indemnity is paid and the trade mart is effectually established, if it is necessary to keep the troops at Chumbi for fear that the Thibetans may change their minds and until the trade mart is established, there will be an income for the use of the grass, water and fuel. Please take active measures so that the prices may be paid without delay at the current rates.

On the decision of the above terms of the Treaty by mutual consent of both the parties, the British traders can only hire houses on due payment of the house rent, but they will not be permitted to purchase houses or to keep Thibetans with them by deceitful means, or to cause their religion to prosper, or to marry Thibetan women, or to take things by force or on credit—the due prices must be given at once in cash —or to take houses and land on mortgage. Especially after completing the terms of the present Treaty, no British officials, big or small, will ever be allowed to come into Thibet beyond the trade mart. We therefore beg you, the great and best Amban, to do an act of virtue towards the doctrine of Thibet, and to do your very best to have these points inserted in the terms of the Treaty.

This is sent by the National Assembly of Thibet on the day of the month of the Wood Dragon year, in the thirtieth year of the reign of Kwangsu.

Inclosure 8 in No. 20.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Camp, Lhassa, August 21, 1904.

I VISITED the Amban this afternoon, and told him I had perused the Thibetan reply to him which he handed to me at our last meeting. It was more satisfactory than the first reply, and there were some points which the Thibetans would now evidently agree to. I proposed, then, that we should get these points settled first and out of the way, so as to make a start, and then work on to the more contentious clauses.

2. The Amban had handed me a note which he said contained some suggestions of his which he wished me to consider, and, if I had any objections to his suggestions, inform him frankly.

3. I thanked him for his suggestions, which I said would be of great value to me, and which I would consider carefully and discuss with him at our next interview.

4. I then remarked that I had heard the Dalai Lama had, without any doubt whatever, fled the country. The Amban said this was true, and he was evidently not flying to China, but to the North—possibly to join the Great Lama at Urga. I said he would hardly be flying to China, for he would surely have obtained the Amban's permission to proceed to Peking—or at least have informed him of his intention. The Amban replied that he had gone off without any warning, and he had now definitely decided to denounce him to the Emperor, and would to-day or to-morrow send me a telegram, which he would ask me to have dispatched to Peking as quickly as possible.

5. I said I would gladly do this service for him, and I considered he was acting with great wisdom in denouncing the Dalai Lama, for it was he who had brought all this trouble upon his country and he deserved to suffer for it. I was not surprised, however, at so young a Ruler coming to grief, for our experience in India was that a young Chief, even when he only had temporal authority in his hands, was very liable to get into the power of unscrupulous and designing men, and rush off in a headstrong way on a foolish course. For a young Dalai Lama, who had not only temporal but also supreme spiritual power, the tendency to go wrong must have been almost irresistible and inevitable. The Amban said this certainly had been the case with the present Dalai Lama, who had always been headstrong and obstinate and had never followed good advice.

6. I then remarked to the Amban that the Dalai Lama had taken with him the official seal. It was quite possible he might affix it to some Agreement with a foreign Power, and I asked the Amban if in that case the Agreement would be binding upon the people of Thibet. The Amban said if he was denounced the affixing the seal would have no more value than the affixing of his own official seal would be when affixed after he had been deprived of office. The fact of the Dalai Lama being denounced would take away all value from the affixing to a document of this seal he had with him. I remarked that he might affix the seal to an Agreement before he was actually denounced. The Amban said that, even in that case, the Agreement would have no validity unless it was ratified by the Emperor of China.

7. The Amban then went on to inveigh against the Dalai Lama for his gross disrespect to the Chinese. There was a portrait of the Emperor of China in the Potala Palace which it was the Dalai Lama's duty to guard, but he had gone away and left the portrait without a guardian. I remarked that that, indeed, was a serious offence, and it surprised me that any Thibetan should be guilty of such ingratitude and disrespect to the Chinese Emperor, for the Chinese had for centuries protected and helped the Thibetans whenever they were in trouble.

8. Referring then to the formalities which had to be gone through in the present negotiations, I said that of course the Agreement I entered into with him and the Thibetans would have to be ratified, and I asked him whether he had power from his Government to sign the Adhesion Agreement on behalf of the Chinese Government. He replied that he had.

9. Soon after my return after the visit the Amban sent me a telegram for dispatch by Gyantse to Peking, which he said contained the recommendation to the Emperor to denounce the Dalai Lama.

Inclosure 9 in No. 20.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Nepal, August 27, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 24th August, 1904, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translations of three letters, one dated the 27th July, and the other two dated the 4th August, 1904, received by the Prime Minister from the Nepalese Representative at Lhassa, regarding Thibetan affairs.

Inclosure 10 in No. 20.

Translation of a Letter in cypher received from the Representative at Lhassa.

WITH due respect I beg to suggest that Thirringpochhay Lama, who is here at present, told me that he had gone to Gulden Gumba as he had to offer prayers and worship there, when he was called back by the Kasyal office on the plea that he was wanted by the Potala Lama there; that to-day he came back from Gulden and was told that the Potala Lama was not at Norbulinka, but had gone to the Potala Palace, where he went accordingly, but could not find the Potala Lama there, but was informed by Sipon Khemba, the personal attendant of the Potala Lama that he (Thirringpochhay) was to conduct business for the Potala Lama, taking charge of the seal of the Potala Lama, and that he(Thirringpochhay) should not give out to the public that the Potala Lama had gone towards the north; that he (Thirringpochhay) sought to find out who had accompanied the Potala Lama, and where the Potala Lama had gone to, and gathered that probably or perhaps the Potala Lama had gone to proceed to Russia with the Dhami of Nechang, Yejung Keshang, the personal attendant and khendechhega; that as the Potala Lama had shifted the whole burden on his (Thirringpochhay's) head when matters had gone all wrong, and had left the kingdom hoping for things impossible, and besides had been doing what would ruin him, so he (Thirringpochhay) should have to write to the Potala Lama to say that he would do his level best to settle matters with the British Government, and that the Potala Lama should not run after hopes impossible of attainment, but should take his quarters at Retung or Digung Gumba; that, should the Potala Lama persist in going his way, the Kingdom of Thibet would surely come to an end, and when Thibet was lost whatever the Potala Lama did would be of no avail; that further he (Thirringpochhay) would represent to the Chinese Amban that he, the Amban, was aware that although men were sent to stop the progress of the British because their entrance was against the religious tenets of the country, and although that resulted in hand to hand fight and matters had since then reached a crisis, still the hope of the Thibetans rested in the Amban; that as the country belonged to the Chinese Emperor, so though matters had proceeded that far, yet he (the Amban) should do what would be to the benefit of all the Thibetans; that they (the Thibetans) would not blame him (the Amban) for what he might do for them.

The said Thirringpochhay, then addressing me, said that he expected me to do what would be to the advantage of all concerned; that the news of the departure of Potala Lama was not known to any of the outsiders; that he would cause the report of Potala Lama being in the Gupha (cave) to be believed; that I should not betray confidence outside. I replied to him that the Potala Lama, who paid no heed to counsels given to him since a long time, and who had earned such a bad reputation for himself, should never have gone out hoping against hope for things impossible of attainment, and there seemed to be no benefit that could be derived from his act which was the result of inexperience, and that now that the full control had devolved upon him (Thirringpochhay) who was devout, wise, old and experienced, he (Thirringpochhay) would surely settle matters amicably (without resorting to arms) by writing to the Potala Lama what was proper, representing what was necessary to the Amban, and coming to an unanimous conclusion by holding a counsel amongst themselves. He (Thirringpochhay) then said that what I told him was reasonable, that the master being inexperienced and not having passed through the ordeal of life matters had taken a turn like that; that the Council should be called in that very day, and the Thibetans and the shrines should be protected to the best of

their ability by reconciling matters with the British Government; that I should also do what would be good for all (Thibetans). I told him that I should do my best in this affair.

Now that the obstacles are removed far away I expect a settlement may be arrived at; I further told the said Thirringpochhay Lama that he should at once write to the Potala Lama and stop his further advance, that he should in an amicable manner do whatever was necessary to settle matters with the British Government, that should the Potala Lama, egged on by low and mean fellows to hopes which could never be realised, go to Sopusthan towards Russia, then the vague doubts of former times that the Potala Lama was deliberately intriguing with Russia would be confirmed, and the Thibetan Kingdom would be lost, that the above was clear to him, that for those reasons such big men like him should consult carefully, and should send the Amban with detailed instructions, and thus secure the friendship of the British Government, also should save Thibet by taking care of the people.

He replied that what I told him was quite reasonable, and that he would that day consult with others and write to the Potala Lama requesting him not to proceed on as that would lead to such ruinous result, and arrange for sending the Amban to the British camp.

After he had delivered as above he went away to Lobrang.

I shall send in the details in my next letter of how far the Potala Lama was proceeding to, to ascertain which I am to-day dispatching a man to the north.

Dated the 13th Sravan, Wednesday, 1961, corresponding to the 27th July, 1904.

P.S.—The Potala Lama fled away to-day, the 13th of Sravan, Wednesday, at about 10 or 12 gharries ($2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 hours) before sunrise.

Inclosure 11 in No. 20.

Translation of a Letter in cypher from the Representative at Lhassa.

Your Highness,

ON the 20th of Sravan, Wednesday, when the British forces arrived at a place called Kinchalupating, about a mile from the Potala of Lhassa, I went over to the Kasyal and told the Kazis that as friendly relations similar to those with the Thibetan Government existed between our and the British Governments, and as the officers of such a great Power had arrived so close to Lhassa, it was right and proper or customary with us to send our men to pay respects, and I should also have to go to interview them to-morrow or the day after with presents of provisions (eatables, &c.) and my going there would in no way be injurious to your interests; on the contrary, it would be rather to your advantage, and if I would maintain friendly relations with them at the present time your interest would subsequently be served as far as possible. The Kazis replied, saying that what I was proposing to do was right and proper, and it was incumbent upon me to do so, and it was believed that thereby I would further their interests. I then asked them the whereabouts of the Potala Lama at that time, to which the Kazis replied: In spite of our utmost remonstrances with the Potala Lama according to what I had represented to them the other day, dissuading him from not leaving Lhassa, the latter had left it, disregarding the same, and they further said that it was not definitely known where the Potala Lama then was.

Returning home, I sent my Ditha and Subadar to Kinchalupateng on the plea of paying respects with a message to the British officers that the Thibetan forces were stationed at such and such places, and that although the Amban and myself had succeeded in dissuading them from laying violent hands upon the British, still as the Thibetans were a treacherous race, it was hoped that the British would surely take every precaution during their stay. The British officers were pleased with this and asked our Subadar how such and such places were and where the Potala Lama was. He (the Subadar) gave them all the necessary information but could say nothing about the Potala Lama.

To-day I went to see the British officers with some presents of provisions for them from our side.

I have sent this letter through the British post to your Highness. I shall detail in my next letter to your Highness all that transpired at this interview with the British officers as well as the information regarding the Potala Lama to be given to them and what would transpire then.

Dated the 21st Sravan, Thursday, 1961, corresponding to the 4th August, 1904.

Inclosure 12 in No. 20.

Translation of a Letter from the Representative at Lhassa.

Your Highness,

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness the following news for your Highness' information :—

The Tongsa Penlop of Dewa Dharma arrived at Lhassa on the 19th Sravan, Tuesday last. The Tain Kalin Gumba has been assigned by the Thibetan Government as his quarters, where he is now putting up.

About 3,000 levies—the survivors of the late war—and inhabitants of the villages of Kungo, Khamba, Chhyamdo, Dhaya, Ghumdui, have come to Lhassa in a body.

I told Thirmuchhay and the Kasyal Kazis the following :—

"You have fallen into such great difficulties or straits as you took to war disregarding our advice. Now it must have become clear to your understanding that it is incapable of being decided by war-like methods or measures. Such being the case, it is evident that your capital Lhassa can be preserved only if you submissively seek the protection of the British Government. Again, now that you propose to settle your differences or affairs by civil or peaceful means, you ought to remember that a man can never cross a river in two boats with a foot in each. Moreover, it is not at all to your interest now to keep here these soldiers belonging to different places; on the other hand, if these untrained men of yours are kept or detained here, it is quite possible that as they are in large numbers they may create disturbance and thus bring calamity upon the country.

"Therefore, as no advantage is to be derived from keeping here these soldiers, they should be sent back to their respective homes, and this would facilitate the conduct of business."

To the above, the Kazis replied :—

"As the sending away of all these soldiers at once and in a body, would entail much suffering and hardship upon our people, we will gradually send them away in batches."

Although they have given assurances that their people would never lay violent hands upon the British forces, and although the levies are not stationed at Lhassa, still they appear to be detained secretly in the surrounding villages close to Lhassa.

As these Thibetans are a foolish and uncivilized nation, it cannot be said with certainty what may happen.

The Amban himself went to the British camp on the 20th Sravan, Wednesday, with sixty sheep and fifty yaks and a quantity of flour and other provisions, and had an interview with the British officers.

The Kasyal are also arranging to send presents and firewood to the British troops.

Dated the 21st Sravan, Thursday, 1961, corresponding to the 4th August, 1904.

Inclosure 13 in No. 20.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Nepal, August* 24, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 17th instant, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translations of three

letters, one dated the 8th July, and the other two dated the 9th July, 1904, received by the Prime Minister from the Nepalese Representative at Lhassa regarding Thibetan affairs.

Inclosure 14 in No. 20.

Translation of a Letter from the Representative at Lhassa to the Prime Minister of Nepal.

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines the news for your Highness' information :—

News has arrived here that the levies of Dhaya, while on their way to Lhassa, have been plundering and pillaging everything that they could find on the road, as well as the goods belonging to those who had gone to them with their horses and supplies. The inhabitants of Lhassa say that the last time they came here during the late war, they were remarked for their excessive robbing propensities, and so everybody has become alarmed. As the Nousyal Office gave orders to the landlords of houses, Lhassa assembled together in a body that the Dhayali Khambalis were coming to Lhassa, that it was left to the option of their tenants to have any business relations with the said Khambalis or not, and that if the latter robbed anybody no complaints would be entertained. So I went to the Kasyal Office on Thursday, the 19th day of Asbar last, and told the Kazis all that I had picked up regarding the Khambalis, and which is detailed above, and remonstrated with them that if such high-handedness were to be allowed it could in no way be beneficial to the Government. It was also reported that the Khambalis of Chhyaudo, who left the capital the other day, had robbed many Thibetan women of their woollen wrappers. They had also returned the goods that they had purchased from our merchants and traders. If such improper behaviour was tolerated, it was natural that complications would arise on all sides; and what a scene would Lhassa present if, owing to your inability to settle matters quickly or promptly and amicably by peaceful means the whole market were closed? To the above the Kazis replied as follows :—" The Khambalis are a barbarous race, and know nothing of civilized ways and manners. We hear that they have misbehaved themselves occasionally in certain places. We are therefore very anxious for how they will treat our people. Of course we shall try our best to prevent the repetition of such acts here and shall issue strict orders on the subject to the officers of the Khambalis, having called them to us. But as they are an uncivilized people, it is difficult to be positive on the matter (that they will not misbehave here.) It was also hoped that you will try your best to see that insignificant matters will not magnify into serious ones. It would also be a kind act if you issued orders to your merchants and traders that so long as the Khambalis are here say, three to four days, they should particularly avoid quarrels and brawls." I then said, " If you cannot make the necessary arrangements for the peace and safety of the town, even now it is quite plain that that would lead to political complications. Please take prompt steps."

Now with reference to the Khambalis of Dhaya who are expected here shortly, and men in your position have become so much alarmed I think (if you have the interest of the town at heart) that when the Khambalis are here if a certain number of Chinese, Gorkhali, Thibetan and Khambali officers were to go round the city three or four times in twenty-four hours, no bad characters belonging to any of these races would dare to misbehave themselves. Again, if you apprehend that they (the Khambalis) would most likely indulge in plundering (should they plunder our people, I would remind you that a fresh series of complications would surely arise with our Government) it would have done to have Gurkhali soldiers stationed at different points, but the paucity of their number precludes that plan from being acted upon, then would it not be advisable if all our merchants and other people were to be collected at the Maru Gomba under the care and protection of my men; because in that case all men being in one place and under the supervision of my servants and soldiers, the chance of quarrels would be minimized; or, if you do not agree to my proposal and insist that things shall remain as before. I was here interrupted by the Kazies, who said what you have suggested is very proper. We shall also try our best to make good arrangements, and this was a matter which concerned the well-being of not one or two men, but of the whole body of men. You will please also see that things were not magnified or exaggerated beyond their proper proportions. I said,

of course, I shall try my best to help you. But the capital is yours. You should bring to an end the war with the British, which is the root of all ruin. Minor matters will not press you then. You know that a small fire may become great, and that a matter of disproportionate dimensions may, through clever management, become tractable. It is no time to sit idle. Be up and doing, please. With these words I returned home.

Dated the 25th day of Asar, Friday, 1961, corresponding with the 8th July, 1904.

Inclosure 15 in No. 20.

Translation of a Letter from the Representative at Lhassa to the Prime Minister of Nepal.

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines the news for your Highness' information.

One of the recently arrived Dhayali Khambalese took away by force the overcoat of a Chinaman on Saturday last the 26th day of Ashar. On which a quarrel ensued and the Chinaman stabbing the Khambali, the latter died. The next day at about 4 or 5 gharies before sunset, the Khambalese went in a body to the gate of the Yamun with a view to pick a quarrel with the gate-keepers by annoying them. The Khambalis threw stones at the Chinese there, who seized one of them and dragged him to the Amban, who ordered them to release him, and not to molest him, and as they were a stupid set of people, who was thereupon released. After this, other Khambalese came to annoy them, and they were also released in their turn. After this a Khambalese, who looked like their leader, accompanied by other Khambalese, came to the Yamun and said that he had something to say to the Amban. The Chinese, carried away by the idea that they had come there to create a disturbance, fired upon them and killed four or five of them, and wounded some eight or nine persons. It is also said that some four Chinamen have been killed by the Khambalis, and seven or eight wounded by their long pointed knives and guns wherever they, the Khambalis, could find them. I heard the reports of the guns at the Yamun, and one Norbu Chhiring, a Kharidar in the service of the Chinese, also came to tell me that he had been asked by the Amban's khajanchi (treasurer) to inform me that the Amban had requested me to come to the Yamun with all available arms and ammunition with me, as fighting was taking place at the Yamun between the Khambalis and the Chinese there.

I told him that since it was the Amban's order, I would come at once. But I also told him that the Amban was like their parent, and if any of his subordinates should happen to behave improperly, he ought to have the latter amicably or peacefully settled. It would be better if such brawls did not occur or break out amongst their own people or themselves. I told him that I would at once send word to the Kazies at Norpulinka to say that matters had become serious, and that their presence was instantly required in order to restore order; as also to the Memon. I then immediately dispatched Jamya with instructions to make possible haste from my own house to the Kasis with the news that such and such events had taken place, and also requested them to come at once; and also that if such disturbances took place, how could they expect prosperity or betterment. He (Jamya, the interpreter) was also asked to accompany the Kazis at once to my place. I was about to send my Subadar to the Yamun to see what was going on, when the aforesaid Kharidar Norbu Chhiring came back, without having been allowed to reach the Yamun, to tell me that while he was going to the Yamun with my message, the Khambalis may be mistaking him for a Chinaman, as he was dressed like one, had inflicted wounds on his hand and various other places, which he had come to show to me. As things had taken such a turn, and as I understood that the Khambalis, having collected in groups in different places, were committing wanton outrages; and as there was every probability of a scuffle taking place with us, in case our men sent to the Yamun; and thinking that if it was (once) suspected that we were inclined to the side of the Amban, my fellow subjects would be completely ruined, I and my other people dared not proceed to the Yamun. The firing commenced at about two gharies* before sunset and lasted till half-ghari after it; the bullets strayed even to

* 1 hour = 2½ gharies.

the roofs of the Nepali residency. The man who had taken my message to the Kazis met them near the Norpulinka, and told them that he had been sent by me and that I had asked them to go with all speed to the scene of disturbance at the Yamun at Lhassa. On the Kazis inquiry of him if anything had happened to any of our people, he said that, till then, no harm had befallen to the Gurkha merchants and bankers.

Thence the Kazies, having come with all speed, by the road behind the Potala (palace), having held a meeting at the Kasyal and having sent for the leaders of the Dhayali Khambalis, had the Khambali soldiers dispersed and withdrawn. The firing then abated. I had also issued strict orders to the officers and men at my place for the safety of the place. At midnight three men came from the Chharung Kazi with the message that it was a good and timely thing that I had sent the news of the disturbance, that they had also held a hasty sitting of the Kasyal office, sent for the Khambali leaders and told them that it was very wrong of the Khambali Sepoys to act in that way, and having given strict orders they had gone to the Amban's place and with great difficulty had dissuaded him from taking steps in the matter, and thus nipped this growing trouble in the bud. They thought that I must have been very anxious, but that there was no reason for further anxiety. Then the Phopone sent two men to tell that he had to see me on some business the next day. I replied that he would be welcome. The next morning two Chinamen came to my place to say that I had been requested to send all the guns and ammunition there at his place and that I was also requested to go there. I sent a message through my Chinese Kharidar, called Lopesay, that I had twelve or fourteen guns with me and that I also required them. I could spare three or four; but though they were useful, if however this matter of exchange or conveyance of arms got talked about, it would become harmful to the Amban. If the Burra Amban where then to make preparations among themselves for fighting, when yesterday's fire had but been extinguished, it would lead to the ruin of Thibet. He was therefore earnestly requested not to kindle the smouldering fire. It was well known that when one's clothes were soiled by one's child, the clothes should be rinsed and washed and cleaned and the child should not be killed. I asked the said Lopesay to give my best compliments to the Amban and to explain what I had to say fully and impressively. I thought that they were fools to think of fighting among themselves at that time. I then sent my Subadar to the Kasyal with the message, that their non-acceptance of my advice before had brought about that deplorable state of things, and if instead of attending to or having shelved the important question of settling matters with the British Government, they allowed such outrages to be committed to those who had been appointed by His Majesty the Emperor of China and was to be regarded and respected by them, what would become of them (the Kazis)? They should take such conciliatory steps immediately as to prevent the spread of and put an end to these civil strifes. If anything undesirable were to happen to our merchants and bankers in a disorganized country like Thibet, there would be two or three Governments with whom they would have to settle their accounts, and it would be to their injury or harm ultimately. The Maru Gomba had been held in respect by my people from time immemorial. I would take all my fellow-subjects and merchants there. If the people remained together and were not scattered there would be no quarrels or troubles, and when there were no quarrels there would be no differences between the two Governments, and when it was so it would be for their good. To that message of mine they sent a reply saying that they were doing all that lay in their power to settle matter concerning the Amban and his people; and as to my proposal to take all my countrymen to the Maru Gomba in order to avoid future complications they would issue the requisite orders so that we might remove there; and as the two Governments had always lived in amity and fraternal relations it would be to their advantage if no differences arose between them; and I was also requested to see kindly that the people while at the Gomba should behave in such a way as not to produce any complications or to avoid dissensions. I have now removed to the Maru Gomba with my people and the bankers and merchants, and have set apart rooms for our as well as their respective uses; I have also had all the cash put in bags with seals of shellac and have also sealed the outer door of the strong room with shellac, and have arranged that the bankers and merchants should sleep and transact their ordinary business or carry on conversation in the room adjoining to the above room. All their other goods have been left at their respective residences under the charge of their own men, so that when these have come to an end they may carry on their business there as usual. The Khambalis are still here; the Amban is also here with 1,000 men all under arms. Should there be a recrudescence

of these troubles in the future, I shall have those men in charge of the goods and as much of the goods as possible removed to this Gomba. As I had to deal with foreigners who are foolish and have no idea of business, I pray your Highness to overlook my faults of omission and commission with a lenient eye.

The matter relating to the killing of the Chinaman and Khambalis has not yet been settled.

Dated the 26th day of Asar, Saturday, 1961, corresponding with the 9th July, 1904.

Inclosure 16 in No. 20.

Translation of a Letter from the Representative at Lhassa to the Prime Minister of Nepal.

WITH due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines for your Highness' information.

Some 700 and odd Khambali levies of Dhaya arrived here on the 24th Ashar, Thursday. As soon as they arrived here all the business places of the Chinese, Thibetan, and Nepali traders and all the shops were closed. The Dhayalis after they came here went to have a look at the market-place, &c., but found the shops closed and the places deserted. They complained that they could not make their purchases as the places were all deserted, and as they were to stop there only for two or three days. Unless the shops, &c., were opened, they would ask to be allowed to remain there for a few days more. Such remarks were said to have been made by the Dhayalis themselves.

It is said that the new Amban (Assistant) who has arrived at Thinden is said to have prayed to the Emperor of China to be relieved of his duties on account of his advancing years and his failing eye-sight. The Lopesay Kharidar surmises that the above must have been prompted by the present unsettled state of things in Thibet.

Six Thibetans, of Gyantse, supposed to be engaged in the work of espionage on the part of the English and a servant of the Chinese officer stationed at Gyantse, deputed by the Amban, have been arrested by the Thibetans and are being detained in custody and cross-examined.

The interpreter attached to the Teep Arsenal reports that two old cannons that have been lately repaired and put in order, together with their necessary ammunition, &c., were dispatched towards Gyantse the other day. I said to the Chharung Kazi: "If a settlement is arrived at between your Government and the British Government, it will not be so hard upon you. Has a letter on that subject been dispatched to our Maharajah or not? What is the latest news from the Gyantse side?" He replied, "It has given us very great pleasure to see you try heart and soul to prevent mutual strife and dissensions from taking place. We have also done our best, and will continue to do our best in the same direction. These Khambalis are foolish and barbarous, so they act sometimes in quite an unaccountable manner. The other day they asked to be allowed to visit the shrines and the different parts of the city in small numbers. As they had come from a great distance the permission was granted. We shall issue orders to-morrow to the officers of the Dhayalis that they should not be allowed to go beyond the limits of their camp outside Lhassa, and that they shall not be allowed to enter Lhassa without business. I said, "As you failed to carry out the instructions on the late Kazis, you missed an opportunity, and you know that it is on account of their neglecting to take advantage of that opportunity that all these troubles have overtaken you. And I should further advise you to write to his Highness the Maharajah at once a detailed and explicit letter written in all sincerity and a transparent mind, withholding nothing and describing everything that you want him to do (bearing in mind the disinterested instructions and advice given by him, and taking them in their proper spirit), I am sure that his Highness would give such advice and instructions as would necessarily do you good or be for your benefit, and such as would be conformable to reason and would be practicable." The Kazi said, "His Highness seems to be (inspired with a desire to serve us in the best manner possible) anxious to find out the best way how to be useful or serviceable to us."

He then asked me what I understood to be his Highness' views regarding them. I replied: "Before these complications arose, his Highness was of opinion that it

would be unjust and improper to repudiate certain Treaties and Conventions, and to accept others entered on your behalf by your suzerain the Emperor of China, whom you have respected all along; and to insist on those grounds which were quite untenable with a Power which was so much mightier than yourselves would be to court ruin. It was impolitic to disregard or condemn the great; and although there might be no intimate relations with each other, yet those that were great should be treated with due regard and consideration, because they, for the sake of their own good faith, good name, and prestige were sure to carry their point at any cost, so it were better to avoid such complications. His Highness was also of opinion that no settlement would be arrived at unless something definite came out of it, and his Highness has foreseen that if this matter were not amicably settled dire complication would arise and Thibet was sure to be ruined. His Highness was further of opinion that it were better than this imminent ruin that a settlement or Treaty on the lines of the one existing between Nepal and the British Government should be made, and the sufferings of the people of Thibet averted. If the Government of Thibet were carried on in the manner in which the Government of Nepal was carried on, it would be an everlasting benefit to the country. His Highness has lightly touched or referred to this subject in his Highness' letter to you, which is already with you. I have also repeatedly discussed this subject with you, and have always asked you if you had anything to say to it or regarding it. Now that matters have gone to such lengths, and millions of money have been spent on both sides, and now that the British have even occupied Gyantse and have seen the nakedness of the land, those matters, though small in the beginning, have now assumed enormous dimensions and bear no resemblance to what they are at present (*i.e.*, differ from each other like the earth from the sky).

Dated the 26th Ashar, Saturday, 1961, corresponding with the 9th July, 1904.

Inclosure 17 in No. 20.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, August 28, 1904.

THE Ti Rimpochi, the Yutok Shape, and the Tsarong Shape, accompanied by the Tongsa Penlop, called upon me to-day. They commenced by asking what the Amban had told me as to their views regarding the settlement. I said he had communicated to me their second reply to him. They then announced that they had been deputed by the National Assembly to discuss the settlement direct with me, as they thought there was delay in dealing through the Amban. I remarked that I understood they were fairly well agreed to accede to all our terms except in regard to the indemnity. They asked me whom I had heard this from. I replied that I gathered it from the general tenor of their second reply to the Amban.

2. They then became very excited, and said this was too bad; and it transpired that some days ago they had written to the Amban, saying definitely that they would agree to all the terms except that regarding the payment of an indemnity, and except in regard to opening further marts in future. They accused the Amban of not acting fairly by them in not telling me of this; they were evidently very much annoyed, and expressed a wish to make the settlement directly with me, and when we had agreed upon it, then they would communicate the result to the Amban.

3. I am most anxious to prevent their thinking that there is, or that they can make, any dissension between the Amban and me, so I said that it was some days now since I had visited the Amban, and probably when I last saw him he had not yet received the document to which they referred. During the last few days the Amban and I had been corresponding on a point which was very important to him. This referred to Clause IX of the draft Convention. The Amban feared that China might be included as a foreign Power, and that we might have some intention of claiming suzerain rights in Thibet. I had, however, been able to assure him that we did not include China in the term "foreign Power," and had no wish to interfere with the suzerain rights of China, which, indeed, we recognized by asking the Amban to sign an Adhesion Agreement. I added, to the Thibetans, that our Emperor and the Emperor of China were on terms of perfect friendship, and the Amban and I were in thorough accord. They could see from the draft terms that we had no desire to establish an Amban of our own here, and fully recognize China as the suzerain Power. At the same time I would be ready to receive them

whenever they wished to discuss matters with me. What I should tell them and what I should tell the Amban would be exactly the same, but if they liked to hear my views from me direct I would gladly receive them.

4. They then again announced that they were ready to agree to all our terms but one —the indemnity they could not pay. Thibet was a poor country, and the Thibetans had already suffered heavily during the war; many had been killed, their houses had been burnt, jongs and monasteries had been destroyed; and in addition to all this evil it was impossible for them to pay an indemnity as well. The little money they had was spent in religious services in support of the monasteries, in buying vessels for the temples and butter to burn before the gods. The peasants had to supply transport for officials in addition, and there were no means whatever for paying the heavy indemnity we were demanding.

5. I replied that the war in Sikkim had cost us 1,000,000*l.*, and the present war would cost us another 1,000,000*l.* After the Sikkim war we had written to the Amban to say that we were perfectly justified in asking an indemnity, and would refrain from making this demand if the Thibetans agreed to our terms regarding the boundary and trade. The Thibetans had repudiated the Treaty which the Amban then made, and we might very justifiably now ask for an indemnity for the Sikkim war as well as for this. We were, however, making no such demand, and were only asking from Thibet half the cost of the present war. The other half would have to be paid by the Indian peasants. I knew, of course, that Thibet had suffered from the present war, but no such suffering need have occurred if they had negotiated with me at Khamba Jong last year. And while they had suffered, we also had not escaped without trouble. Captain O'Conor had himself been wounded, and what we looked upon as extremely serious in this matter was that the Representative of the British Government should have been attacked. If they attacked the Amban here they knew well how angry the Emperor of China would be. In like manner we were angry that the British Representative should have been fired on. Our Emperor had, too, to consider the interests of his Indian subjects. This was a matter between India and Thibet. We were even now only asking that Thibet should pay half of the expense of the war. What the Thibetans were now asking was that India should pay the whole. This would not be fair on the Indian peasant, and the Emperor would never allow such injustice to be done to his subjects. I quite recognized, however, the difficulty they had in paying the indemnity in cash within three years. I would, therefore, be prepared to receive proposals from them as to modifications in the manner of payment. If, for instance, they thought it impossible to pay the whole indemnity in three years, and would like the term extended to five, I would submit such a proposal for the orders of the Viceroy. Or, again, if they would prefer to pay the indemnity at the rate of a lakh of rupees a year for a long term of years, I would ask Government if the difficulty might be met in that way.

6. They expressed their disappointment at this answer, as they had hoped that when they had agreed to all our terms except this one I would have given way on it and excused them paying the indemnity, and they trusted I would not send them back to the National Assembly with so disheartening an answer. In most cases of bargaining, if one party got half the things he had asked he would be satisfied. I had got all the points except one, and still was not satisfied. If I could not agree to that myself would I not refer it to the Viceroy? If I did this they had great hopes the Viceroy would excuse them the indemnity.

7. I replied that a reference to the Viceroy would be of no use, for it happened that the Viceroy had wished to demand even severer terms than the present, and the terms I was now asking were modifications ordered by His Majesty the King-Emperor.

8. The Ti Rimpochi said that if the Emperor had been lenient once he might be lenient again, and asked me to put their Petition before His Majesty. I replied that the Emperor had considered this matter most carefully, and consulted all his great officers of State before issuing his commands, so if I now dared to suggest that one of them should not be carried out I should be immediately dismissed from my post. I was prepared, as I had said, to submit proposals for alternative methods of payment of the indemnity, and I would be also prepared to submit proposals for privileges or concessions in Thibet which might be taken in lieu of part of the indemnity. But the indemnity, in some manner or other, would have to be paid.

9. The Tsareng Depon said we were accustomed to fish in the ocean, and did not understand that there were not so many fish to be got out of a well as could be caught from the sea. A field could only yield according to its size and the amount put

into it. A poor peasant got only just enough from his field to support himself and his family, with a very little over for religious offerings. It was hard, therefore, that we should demand so much from Thibet, and the National Assembly would be very much disheartened at the result of this interview.

10. I replied that what they had agreed to was what cost them nothing, and what was indeed to their advantage. The opening of trade marts would in reality prove of much more benefit to them than to us. The only thing that really cost them anything they were consistently refusing. Even on that point I was prepared to make it as easy for them in carrying out as possible, and I could not acknowledge that they had any cause for complaint.

11. The Tongsa Penlop then said that he hoped I would take into consideration the sufferings the Thibetans had already gone through, and, if I could lay the matter before his Excellency the Viceroy.

12. I told the Tongsa Penlop that I was always glad to hear suggestions from one who had proved himself so staunch a friend of the British Government, and if he could think of some way which would save the Indian peasants from being saddled with the cost of this war, and at the same time not weigh too heavily upon the Thibetans, he would be doing a service which would be appreciated by both the Government of India and the Thibetans.

Inclosure 18 in No. 20.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, August 30, 1904.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 28th August, I have the honour to forward, for information of the Government of India, a Report by Mr. Wilton on an informal visit he paid to the Amban on the 28th August.

Inclosure 19 in No. 20.

Mr. Wilton to Colonel Younghusband.

August 28, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I visited the Amban this afternoon. I began the conversation by referring to some remarks which had passed at the interview with the Thibetans to-day. I informed the Amban that you had instructed me to inform him that the Ti Rimpoche and two Shapes had stated that they had sent a written acceptance of all the clauses of the draft Convention, except the one referring to the indemnity, to the Amban four or five days ago, and that they appeared to be incensed against him when you replied that he had not communicated to you that they had accepted all, save one, the clauses of the draft Convention. They had also declared that the Amban had only yesterday forwarded to them your copy of Clause IX, and they had the same day written to him accepting this clause. I said that you had informed the Thibetans in reply that Great Britain and China were friendly nations, and that you and the Amban were working together to effect a settlement. You had not seen the Amban for some days, and you presumed, therefore, that this might be the reason for his delay in forwarding their acceptance.

The Amban denied that he had received any Thibetan document explicitly accepting the clauses, except one, of the draft Convention. He had forwarded our copy of Clause IX, in Thibetan, to the Thibetan Government the day before yesterday, and had received their reply yesterday. He had returned this reply, remarking that they must send a brief and prompt acceptance, without being verbose, to you and to him. The Amban readily consented to give me a copy of this correspondence, and offered to let me take away the Chinese and Thibetan originals.

I brought these documents away with me at the conclusion of the interview.

The Amban stated that possibly the Thibetans, or some other persons, were trying to make mischief between you and him.

I assured the Amban that you might hear, but would not heed, stories circulated against him as long as you remained in your present opinion that he was working in unison with you, and that you considered this matter could not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion unless there was this co-operation.

The Amban begged me to convey his assurances of sincerity to you, and said the Thibetans had inundated him with correspondence, but it had been impossible for him to do more than formulate some remarks on their behalf evolved out of their vaguely-worded and lengthy Petitions. These remarks he had handed to you in his Yemen on the 22nd August.

The Amban also referred to his Memorandum of the 25th August, and expressed his regret at having imposed this, perhaps, unnecessary document upon you. He offered to withdraw it, and quite agreed that the addition of the two sentences in your letter to him of to-day would quite cover any outside matter so far as China and Great Britain were concerned.

I explained to the Amban that you had no desire to claim suzerainty over Thibet for Great Britain, but that you wished him to clearly understand that, as China claimed to be the sole suzerain of Thibet, China must bear alone the responsibilities thereby entailed. I then suggested to the Amban that, in view of the misunderstanding which appeared to have arisen regarding his action it might, perhaps, be possible for him to bring the Ti Rimpoche and the two Councillors, who had visited you to-day, the next time he called to see you.

The Amban agreed to do so, either to-morrow or the next day, and added that he would also produce all the correspondence which had passed between him and Thibetans on this subject. He believed you would then see that his actions had been quite consistent with his assurances of sincerity. It was necessary, he said, to pin the Thibetans down hard and fast to the course to be pursued, otherwise it was certain they would evade the point, and never arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.

I took the opportunity of referring to the indemnity clause. The Thibetans, I said, were complaining that they could not pay the amount, which seemed to them intolerably excessive. It should, however, be remembered that the Thibetans had brought their difficulties upon themselves, inasmuch as they had not fulfilled their obligations. The amount now demanded was dated only from the 5th May, when the British Commissioner was attacked in his camp at Gyantse. The amount, too, only represented a portion of our actual expenses, and it would be quite impossible to reduce it unless the Thibetans offered some equivalent.

The Amban inquired what equivalent would prove satisfactory.

I said I thought another trade mart might be accepted in lieu of a fraction of the sum now demanded, but Colonel Younghusband had instructed me that he was prepared to lay any reasonable proposal before the Government of India.

The Amban had no objection to the suggestion of another trade mart, as it would be an advantage to China that her merchants could go and trade there.

The Amban then referred to our proposed Treaty with the Thibetans. It would be necessary for him, he said, to telegraph the final wording to the Wai-wu Pu at Peking, and obtain their sanction, before he could accept it.

I pointed out that the Treaty appears to contain nothing unfavourable, and a great deal favourable, to China. There should, therefore, be no undue delay, as in that case it would undoubtedly be necessary for measures to be taken to expedite matters.

The Amban begged me to convey to you his earnest desire to have matters settled quickly and satisfactorily.

I told the Amban that you had instructed me to inform him that you were most anxious to work with him, and would not let the Thibetans see that you and he had any difference of opinion. You expected him, however, also to work with you.

In conclusion, I would state that the Amban received me quite privately, and it was not until the interview was well in progress that he permitted his confidential deputy, Mr. Lin, to attend. He instructed Mr. Lin to call to-morrow and bring with him copies of correspondence which had passed between himself and the Thibetan Government.

No. 21.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 10.)

India Office, October 10, 1904.

Sir,

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Campbell's letter of the 6th instant, forwarding telegrams from and to Sir E. Satow relative to his interview with Prince Ching regarding the Anglo-Thibetan Agreement.

Lord Lansdowne suggests that it would be desirable to negotiate the amendments required by His Majesty's Government in the Thibetan Agreement in India, and Mr. Brodrick presumes that it is meant that these negotiations should be conducted with Tong, the Chinese official, who is about to proceed to Thibet viâ Calcutta.

It will be seen from the Viceroy's telegram of the 6th October, that the Government of India propose to await Colonel Younghusband's arrival at Simla before telegraphing their views on the situation. To this proposal Mr. Brodrick has agreed; and until he has received these views, he is not in a position to express any final opinion.

In the meantime, however, it appears to him that Colonel Younghusband, having left Lhassa, it is impossible to alter the text of the Agreement signed by the Thibetan Representatives. The amendments to be made, being merely a remission of conditions imposed upon the Thibetans and already agreed to by them, might, he thinks, be settled by a supplementary note to be attached to the Agreement on its ratification by the Viceroy, as suggested in his telegram of the 14th September. If so, no negotiation would appear to be necessary, unless it were intended to demand some *quid pro quo* from the Thibetans. On this point it will be noted that, in their telegram of the 14th September, the Government of India did not contemplate that the concessions which they proposed to ask for in return for the partial remission of the indemnity should be included in the Agreement, but they regarded them as a matter for separate arrangement. In any case, it seems to Mr. Brodrick to be very doubtful whether it would be expedient, after our experience in 1890 and 1893, to negotiate any amendment of the Thibetan Agreement with a Chinese official, more especially in the absence of Thibetan Representatives.

With regard to the Adhesion Agreement, Mr. Brodrick concurs in Lord Lansdowne's view that the negotiations should be conducted at Peking, and that the signature should take place there when the terms of the Arrangement with the Thibetans have been finally settled.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 22.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 7th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy has been sent to the Director Military Operations.

India Office, October 10, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 22.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

October 7, 1904.

(Telegraphic.)

THIBET. First Lhassa column arrived at Gyantse the 5th October; second column arrives there to-day, when all posts beyond Gyantse will have been withdrawn.

No. 23.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 10th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 10, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 10, 1904.

PLEASE refer to Satow's telegram No. 215 of the 5th instant. Thibet. His Majesty's Government has approved his language to Prince Ching, and he has been authorized to address Tang in similar terms. As regards the Adhesion Agreement, it is proposed to instruct him that it should be negotiated at Peking and signed there. I have agreed to this course. It has further been suggested by the Foreign Office that negotiations in connection with amendments in Agreement should be carried out in India. To this I have replied that the procedure indicated in your telegram of the 14th September will probably be sufficient, and that it is not anticipated that negotiations will be necessary. I have pointed out, moreover, that in any case it would be inexpedient to negotiate with Chinese official in the absence of Thibetan Representative. But before expressing a final opinion I will await the receipt of your views.

No. 24.

[Nil.]

No. 25.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 11.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 11, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 25.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 10, 1904.

THIBET. Satow's telegram of the 5th instant and yours of the 1st and 3rd instant.

Pending the receipt of our mature opinions, which we propose to give after learning Younghusband's explanations, we would suggest that the question of proposed reservation to the effect that Article 9 should not be so interpreted as to deprive other Powers of their rights under existing Treaties should not be further mentioned to the Chinese Government.

As Chinese Treaties do not affect Thibet, we cannot admit that such rights exist. But it seems to us that there is a grave risk of a contention being advanced by other Powers enjoying most-favoured-nation rights that they became entitled by such a reservation to all rights in Thibet which under the Convention are claimed by us, including the right to post trade agents, for instance. We would prefer to dispense with Chinese adhesion rather than risk a result of this nature.

The alarm shown by Prince Ching when a suggestion to this effect was made seems to imply that, to avoid being ignored, China may be glad to adhere without inconvenient stipulations; whilst, rather than run the risk of our asserting our predominance in Thibet in a more definite manner, the objecting Powers may be content to acquiesce in our terms.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 26.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 220.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, October* 12, 1904.

THIBET. Indian Government telegram of the 10th October and my telegram No. 215.

I have received a visit from the Chinese official appointed to Thibet. Agreement was not discussed, and all reference to the proposed reservation as to Article 9 was avoided by me.

The question as to whether the Indian Government would agree to treat with him seemed to be what chiefly preoccupied my visitor.

I replied that that point was not likely to be settled until the Indian Government had had an opportunity of seeing Younghusband, and had had all the documents laid before them. I could give him no answer at present.

No. 27.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 13.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 13, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 27.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 12, 1904.

THIBET. Writing from Lhassa Nepalese Representative states that all is quiet at that place, and people are still well disposed towards us, but trouble with Chinese is anticipated. He also reports that a merchant recently arrived from Nagchuka says that he met the Dalai Lama travelling north, and that it is probable he has reached Urga.

No. 28.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 13th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 14, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 28.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 13, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 10th instant. As regards place of negotiations and signature, we would, for the following reasons, strongly urge Calcutta :—

1. Negotiations in India are favoured by precedent of Agreements of 1890 and 1893 (of which the present Agreement is to be supplementary).

2. If Peking is chosen, foreign Powers will be enabled to obstruct, owing to perpetual leakage.

3. Both the Chinese Government and His Majesty's Minister at Peking are in favour of Calcutta.

As regards amendments to Thibetan Agreement, we propose to consult with Colonel Younghusband on this point in the first instance, and to reply later on.

As regards reservation of foreign rights, please see my telegram of the 10th instant.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 29.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of inclosures in

a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 29th ultimo, relative to Thibet affairs.

(Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.)

India Office, October 17, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, August 31, 1904.

AS it was clear that the Thibetans were trying to make dissension between the Amban and myself, I asked the Amban when he next came to see me to bring the Thibetan Members of Council with him. He came to-day, accompanied by the Acting Regent and three Members of Council.

2. I told the Amban that we had had some misunderstanding with the Thibetans as to what precisely they did and did not agree to. They had informed me on a previous occasion that they had sent the Amban a written Agreement to accept all our terms except that regarding the indemnity, but on inquiry from him it proved that they had done nothing of the sort. I proposed, therefore, on this occasion, to ascertain from them precisely what they did agree to, point by point.

3. I then addressed the Thibetans in regard to clause IX, which was the one, I understood, they had least objection to. I explained to them that by it we had not the least desire to supplant China in the suzerainty of Thibet. The Chinese suzerainty was fully recognized in the Adhesion Agreement, and China was not included in the term "foreign Power." We were not placing a British Resident here at Lhassa, and we were not asking for any railway or other Concessions. What we asked in this clause was merely what was in accordance with their traditional policy. Did they agree to the clause?

4. They replied that the Chinese had always protected them, and they did not want to have anything to do with foreign Powers. They would therefore agree to the clause.

5. The clause regarding the razing of fortifications was then discussed, and they began to raise objections; but I cut them short by observing that all the fortifications named were in our hands, and would be destroyed whether they agree or not. The clause had been drafted by Government before the fortifications were in our possession. Their agreement was, therefore, merely a formality. They said that in that case they would agree.

6. We then discussed at length the clauses relating to the opening of new trade marts. They had an idea we wished them to make a road from Gyantse to Gartok, and to make big roads by blasting, as we did. I assured them that all we wanted was that the roads from the frontier to Gyantse and from the frontier to Gartok should be kept in repair. We did not expect new roads to be constructed by them, but existing roads kept suitable for trade purposes. The sentence regarding the opening of more trade marts in future they very strongly objected to. I pointed out, however, that we were merely asking them to consider this and not to now decide on it. I said we might reasonably have now demanded a mart here at Lhassa itself, and in half a dozen other places, and I could not permit them to refuse merely considering the question of future extension. The Amban added that their objections were frivolous, and trade marts were to their advantage.

7. To the establishment of marts at Gyantse and Gartok they agreed; and the discussion having now lasted two hours, and I having told the Amban that we had done about as much as it was possible to do in one day, he peremptorily dismissed them.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 1, 1904

I HAVE the honour to report that the acting Regent (the Té Rimpochi), the Tongsa Penlop, and the Nepalese Representative came to see me yesterday. The Té Rimpochi commenced by asking me if we believed in reincarnations. I replied that we

believed our souls did not return to earth after death, but went to heaven. He asked me where our bad people went to. I replied we were all good! He laughed and said that we ought all to work as good men during these negotiations, so that we English might get a good place in heaven and they Thibetans might have good reincarnations.

2. He then went on to say that there was a good deal of opposition to the clause regarding opening other trade marts in future. The Thibetans did not wish to be bound by anything in regard to the future. I said it was really the least important sentence in the whole Convention. It secured nothing definite for us. It did not say, for instance, that after ten years a third trade mart should be opened; but merely that the matter should be considered. If the Té Rimpochi had come to me earlier and privately told me of the objection, I would have expunged the sentence before the matter came up for discussion, for it was probably only put in to satisfy our merchants that Government was doing something for them. They would have to bear half the cost of the present military operations, and they naturally expected Government to do the best they could for them. Now, however, that the matter had, in the last official interview with the Amban, been put forward in official discussion by the Thibetan Council, I was bound to maintain the sentence, for, if I now gave way, the Thibetans would at some future time maintain that they had on this occasion resisted our request for the opening of future trade marts. While I did not expect that they should now accede to the future opening of trade marts, I could not accept their refusal to open them. The matter must remain, as stated in the draft Convention, one for future consideration.

3. The Té Rimpochi then again dwelt upon the impossibility of paying what he considered so heavy an indemnity. He said, laughing, that we must remember the losses which not only we, but their own troops had inflicted on the country. I repeated my old arguments as to the unfairness of saddling the poor Indian peasants with the whole cost of a war necessitated by the folly and stupidity of Thibetans. It was bad enough to impose on them half the cost, but anything more than that would be a great injustice. The Té Rimpochi said that we were putting on the donkey a greater load than it could possibly carry. I replied, using an argument suggested by Mr. Mitter, that I was not asking the donkey to carry the whole load in one journey. It could go backwards and forwards many times, carrying a light load each journey. The Té Rimpochi laughed again and asked what would happen if the donkey died. I said I should ask the Amban to see that the donkey was properly treated, so that there should be no fear of its dying.

4. Dropping metaphor, I told the acting Regent that I was really quite prepared to receive proposals as to easier methods of paying the indemnity. If, for instance, they could not pay the full amount in three years, I would receive proposals as to paying in a larger number of years; or any other reasonable proposal I would be glad to consider. The Té Rimpochi replied that the Thibetans disliked the idea of prolonging the time during which they would be under obligation to us. They wanted to settle the business up at once and have done with it. I asked him if, in that case, he had any other suggestions to make. He made none, but the Tongsa Penlop suggested to him that the Thibetans should let us collect the customs duties at the new trade marts and get the amount of the indemnity from that source. The Té Rimpochi said he was afraid the Chinese would object to such a course. He added that he had many people to fear—the Chinese, the Russians, and ourselves—and it was difficult to strike a line that would please everybody; and while he personally saw the wisdom of agreeing to our terms, he could not persuade the National Assembly to be reasonable.

5. I said I quite saw that he was more sensible than the National Assembly, and that he was doing his best to bring them to reason. When, therefore, I used hard words and employed threats he must consider them as directed at the stupid obstructive people, and not at himself personally.

Inclosure 3 in No. 29.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 2, 1904.

TWO days ago I intimated to the Amban that I would call on him on the 1st September to present the final full draft of the Convention, and I asked him to have the Shapés present on the occasion. The result of the interview which took place I have the honour to now report, for the information of the Government of India.

2. After some general conversation I intimated to the Amban that I would proceed to business. He thereupon summoned the Shapés. They were received by him with much condescension and "hauteur" and seated on stools in the centre of the room. Most of the members of the National Assembly now sitting were also present and were huddled into corners of the room.

3. I then rose and presented the Amban with the full and final draft of the Convention (as forwarded to me in your letter dated the 5th August) in English, Chinese, and Thibetan. The Amban handed the Thibetan copy to the Shapés, and when all were seated again I asked the Amban's permission to address a few words to the Thibetans in regard to the Convention.

The Amban having assented, I said that as this was the first opportunity I had had of addressing members of the National Assembly, I wished to take advantage of it to let them know that if they had negotiated with me at Khamba Jong, or even at Gyantse when I first arrived there, the terms would not have been as severe as those we were now asking. We would merely have arranged trade and boundary questions, and there would have been no demand for an indemnity. By following the advice the Amban had given them they might have been saved all the trouble which had now come upon them. They had chosen to fight, and had been defeated, and had to pay the consequence. Yet even now we were not demanding the whole, but only half the cost of the military operations. The other half would have to fall upon the poor Indian peasants. The sum we were now asking would, if the Convention were signed the next day, be 75 lakhs of rupees, calculated at the rate of 50,000 rupees a-day from the date on which I was attacked at Gyantse till one month after date of signature of the Convention. If they signed it on the 3rd September the amount would be 75½ lakhs; if on the 4th September 76 lakhs, and so on.

I was prepared to explain any point in the final draft which they did not understand, but I could not further discuss the terms. They had been especially framed with moderation. They embodied the commands of the King-Emperor, and would have to be accepted. I would give them another week within which they might receive explanation and think matters over; but I could not give them any longer time for which they were punishing themselves by adding day by day to the amount of the indemnity; they were also punishing the natives of India, who had to pay the other half of the cost. I had already been here a month, and if after seven days more our terms were not agreed to, I should take measures to compel their compliance to them, and should inform General MacDonald of the measures which I had thought desirable.

4. The Thibetans said they thought it very unfair to threaten them with a renewal of hostilities, for when they had met me at Nagartse I had said we would not fight and would make a settlement, and they had consequently withdrawn their troops and were at our mercy.

I said I was quite aware that when they found that fighting us did not pay—when all their soldiers had run away and they had no further levies to call upon to fight against us—they were anxious to make a settlement, and what I had said at Nagartse was still true. I would be ready for a week longer to make a settlement. But if they on their side would not agree, then they must not be surprised if hostilities were recommenced.

5. They then asked to be allowed to take away the final draft and consider it. I said that as long as they did not mind paying 50,000 rupees a-day and did not take more than seven days, they might consider it and come to me or my Secretary for explanations; but if by the eighth day they had not agreed to the terms, I should take any action I thought fit.

They then made an appeal to the Amban to intercede with me on their behalf. The Amban merely acknowledged their request, and then, after asking me if I had anything further to say to them, brusquely dismissed them.

6. When they were gone I said to the Amban that I was sorry to have to speak to them as I had done, but my experience had been that soft words and reasoning had no effect on their obstinate natures. It was only by force and threats of force that I had made the least advance with them. That morning the Té Rimpochi had likened Thibet to a donkey, and I thought the comparison a very apt one. The Amban said that if the Té Rimpochi was comparing it to a well-trained donkey the comparison was inappropriate, but if he was comparing Thibet to a stubborn beast who did nothing but kick and bite, it was thoroughly apt.

7. I then said that the Thibetans were agreeing to all the terms which did not hurt them in the least, and were indeed advantageous, but were refusing the indemnity, the only one of the terms which cost them anything. Excluding foreigners was in accordance

with their traditional policy, and was therefore no sacrifice. As to opening trade marts, that was to their advantage. They were born traders and bargainers, as we were finding to our cost, for they were extorting extravagant prices from us for the articles they brought for sale.

The Amban and his staff laughed heartily over this, and said that trade marts were, of course, to their advantage.

8. As to the indemnity, I said I had had some experience of native States, and, comparing Thibet with them, I should say Thibet was quite able to pay the amount we were asking. If, however, the Thibetans could not pay the whole amount within three years, I was quite prepared, as I had informed them, to receive proposals for the extension of the period of payment. The Amban thought this reasonable, but made no further remark.

9. I then observed that the draft Convention which I had received from Government was made out between me and the Dalai Lama. Was there any chance of the Dalai Lama returning in time to conclude the Convention with me? The Amban said there was not. I thereupon asked with whom, in that case, I should conclude the Treaty. He said that the Té Rimpochi would act as Regent, and would use the seal which the Dalai Lama had left with him, and this seal would be supported by the seal of the National Assembly, the Council, and the three great monasteries. If there was time and his proposal to Peking were accepted, he would also summon the Tashi Lama from Shigatsi. I asked whether, in the event of the Dalai Lama leaving the country permanently, the Tashi Lama would take his place. The Amban replied that the Tashi Lama would not take his place as Dalai Lama, but would, in the Dalai Lama's absence, be regarded as the head of the Buddhist Church in Thibet. In the event of the Dalai Lama's deposition, the Tashi Lama would not be regarded as an incarnate Dalai Lama, but would be acknowledged as the head of the Thibetan Church.

10. Turning then to the question of mutual guarantees in regard to the term "foreign Power," in clause IX, I said that the reason why I, while assuring him that China was not included in the term, was anxious to obtain a guarantee that Chinese would not secure concessions in their name for the subjects of foreign Powers was because we had heard that a Russian subject had tried to obtain concessions for a railway and mining rights in Thibet.

Knowing the prejudices of the Thibetans, we were not ourselves asking for such concessions, and we did not desire that others should obtain them without our previous consent and unless we had a chance of obtaining similar privileges. A Chinese subject might, however, in the name of a foreign Power, obtain some such concession, and it was to guard against this eventuality that I was asking from him a guarantee.

The Amban acknowledged the justice of my view, and promised to give me the guarantee I asked. He added that if ever we heard of the subject of a foreign Power attempting to acquire a concession through a Chinese subject, he would be glad if he would let him or his successor know. He also said, in confidence, that he had heard that a Russian had tried to get concessions through a Lama for telegraphs, railways, and mines in Thibet, but that, in view of the present Thibetan temper, he did not think such concessions were likely to be given.

No. 30.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 18.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 17, 1904.

WITH reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the Thibet Agreement, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to request that you will draw the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the Viceroy's telegrams of the 10th* and 13th† October.

With regard to the former of these telegrams, it appears to Mr. Brodrick that the suggested reservation is designed merely to safeguard the position of China with regard to Article IX in relation to foreign Powers with whom she has most-favoured-nation engagements. The grave risk to which the Government of India refer is not caused by the reservation (the possible necessity for which has arisen from action already taken by four of the Powers), but is caused by the policy which has been

* Copy sent to Foreign Office, October 11, 1904.
† Copy sent to Foreign Office, October 14, 1904.

deliberately adopted by His Majesty's Government of making China a party to the Convention.

Mr. Brodrick understands that Lord Lansdowne is prepared to maintain that the privileges secured to Great Britain by the Convention do not involve any violation of the rights secured to other Powers by their Treaties with China.

Turning to the telegram of the 13th October, Mr. Brodrick adheres to the view that the negotiation of the Adhesion Agreement should take place at Peking, and not at Calcutta. The circumstances of the negotiations of 1890 and 1893 appear to him to have been essentially different from those of the present negotiations. In the former case detailed Agreements, which were at the time regarded as being merely of local interest, were negotiated by the Government of India with the Government of China, and the proceedings did not attract the notice of foreign Powers. In the present case the detailed Convention has already been negotiated between the Indian and the Thibetan Governments; what remains is to secure the adhesion of China, either to the whole of the Convention or with a reservation as to some part of it, notwithstanding the opposition which has been already, and may be in future, offered by foreign Representatives at Peking. It appears to Mr. Brodrick that this could be more effectually and quickly arranged by His Majesty's Minister at Peking dealing direct with the Chinese Government.

Mr. Brodrick is not aware of the reasons which led Sir E. Satow to prefer Calcutta, but he gathers that the wishes of the Chinese Government were an important factor in forming his opinion.

Mr. Brodrick considers it not improbable that the Chinese Government would prefer to send a negotiator to Calcutta in order to give them opportunities for deferring a decision; but he considers that it would on all grounds be preferable that the matter should be arranged with the Chinese Government direct, without any intermediary.

Mr. Brodrick proposes, therefore, with Lord Lansdowne's concurrence, to inform the Government of India that upon this point the decision of His Majesty's Government is final.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 31.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 220.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1904.

THE German Ambassador, in the course of conversation to-day, asked me whether I had noticed the statements which had appeared in the English newspapers to the effect that Germany was opposing our Thibetan Convention at Peking. I said that I had noticed these statements, which had attracted a good deal of attention. There seemed to be no doubt that the agitation against the Convention had been led by a Chinese newspaper which was notoriously in close relations with the German Legation. The "Times" correspondent was usually well-informed as to events in Peking, and his statements naturally carried much weight. Count Metternich said that he had personally no knowledge of the matter, and had received no instructions to make any statement with regard to it. It seemed to him, however, that the other Powers, including Germany, might well take an interest in the Thibetan Convention, and particularly in that part of it which gave Great Britain a privileged position in Thibet. He should, however, be very unwilling to believe that any mischief had been made by the German Legation.

I told his Excellency that the terms of the Convention, which were subject to ratification and revision by the Government of India, had not yet been settled. Our general idea was, however, that Thibet should be left to manage its own affairs with as little intervention from outside as possible. If, however, any foreign Power was to intervene, it was clear that, owing to the geographical conditions, that Power must be Great Britain. In claiming a preferential position of this kind we were well within our rights, and it was not difficult to point to precedents affording ample justification for our conduct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 32.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy has been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 32.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 7, 1904.

THIBET. I have no objection to your deferring expression of your views, as proposed in your telegram of the 6th October.

No. 33.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 20, 1904.

I AM desired by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant upon the subject of the Thibet Convention.

Lord Lansdowne has carefully considered Mr. Brodrick's observations with regard to the proposal that His Majesty's Government should accept a reservation to the effect that Article IX of the Convention shall not be so interpreted as to deprive other Powers of their rights under existing Treaties. This reservation was, Lord Lansdowne believes, first suggested by himself as a convenient means of disarming the opposition of the other Powers. Having regard, however, to the correspondence which has since taken place, his Lordship is, upon the whole, inclined to think that it might be preferable to accede to the view expressed by the Government of India in their telegram of the 10th October, and to decide that no further mention of the reservation should be made to the Chinese Government until the Government of India has had a full opportunity of discussing the whole question with Colonel Younghusband, and laying before the Secretary of State their mature opinions upon the subject.

Lord Lansdowne thinks it quite possible to maintain in a general way that the privileges secured to Great Britain by the Convention do not in fact involve any denial of the rights secured to other Powers by their Treaties with China. But the extent of those rights and their existence, so far as Thibet is concerned, is open to question, and Mr. Brodrick will probably agree with his Lordship in thinking that a discussion upon the subject is to be deprecated at the present time. There is, however, no doubt that Germany and other Powers are entitled to most-favoured-nation treatment in China, and His Majesty's Government have repeatedly admitted that Thibet is a dependency of China. Their demand for the adhesion of the Chinese Government to the Agreement affords in itself evidence that this has been their position, and they are therefore precluded from now using any arguments founded upon a contrary hypothesis.

It would, in these circumstances, probably be better to defend the Agreement on the ground that the only special privileges which it secures for Great Britain are those which she has a right to claim as the Power whose geographical position entitles her to a preponderating political influence in Thibet, and that the exercise of these privileges, as described in the draft Convention, is not likely to have results injurious to other Powers.

In Lord Lansdowne's opinion, it would be safer to adopt this line of argument rather than to offer the suggested reservation with regard to the Treaty rights of other Powers. The evidence available seems to show that, in point of fact, the

Treaties which have hitherto been executed by China with foreign Powers have not been operative in Thibet, and it might therefore be inadvisable to admit, even by implication, that such Powers at this moment possess any rights in that country in virtue of their Treaties with China. Such an admission would not improbably lead, as the Government of India apprehends, to a claim on the part of the Powers to be given the right of appointing Agents in Thibet with a position corresponding to that of the British Agents who will be appointed to watch over British interests in the Thibetan marts.

With regard to the negotiations for obtaining the adhesion of China to the Agreement, Lord Lansdowne remains of opinion that these should take place at Peking, and he suggests, for Mr. Brodrick's consideration, that it would not be advisable to proceed with them until the terms of the Agreement between the Government of India and Thibet have been finally settled.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 34.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 154.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 21, 1904.

ALLEGED interference by German Legation at Peking in Thibetan question.

Story telegraphed by "Times" correspondent at Peking is described by German Government as a pure invention from beginning to end.

No. 35.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 14th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 22, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 35.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 14, 1904.

THIBET. Please state reason for retention at Gyantse of the three companies of infantry, as reported in your telegram of the 13th October; state also for what length of time it is proposed that they should remain.

No. 36.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of three telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 21st October, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, October 22, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 21, 1904.

QUESTION of amendment of the Lhassa Convention has been discussed with Colonel Younghusband and in Council here. We propose that Convention should be ratified in the usual manner, and that a declaration should be appended to the effect that, having ratified the Convention (of which a full description would be given), the Viceroy and Governor-General is pleased to direct, as an act of grace, the reduction of the indemnity from 75 to 25 lakhs of rupees, and to declare that after three annual instalments of the said indemnity have been duly paid the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall terminate, provided that the terms of the Convention shall in the meantime have been faithfully carried out by the Thibetans.

I would propose to write a friendly letter to the Thibetan Government apprising them of this decision, should our proposal be approved by His Majesty's Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 21, 1904.

THIBET. Party proceeding to Gartok left Shigatse on the 17th October; all well. Party was accompanied to Shigatse by Captain O'Connor, who visited Tashi Lama and met with a most cordial reception. Reference was made by Tashi Lama to the friendly relations formerly existing between the Indian Government and his predecessor.

Inclosure 3 in No. 36.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 21, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 14th.

Three weak companies of infantry were left temporarily at Gyantse pending our final decision as to strength of escort required by Trade Agent there. All but fifty men will be withdrawn to Chumbi at an early date, as we have now come to the conclusion that an escort of fifty rifles will suffice.

No. 37.

Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, October* 22, 1904.

THE recent statements published in the "Times" with regard to the alleged action of the German Minister at Peking in connection with the Thibetan Treaty were referred to in conversation by Baron von Richthofen to-day, and his Excellency has begged me to call your Lordship's serious attention to the very bad effect which has been produced here.

Baron von Richthofen states that the article has aroused great irritation, and has made the task of the Government, who sincerely desire to maintain most friendly relations between the two countries, more difficult. The German Minister at Peking, according to his Excellency, has explained matters to Sir E. Satow and his colleagues, who merely laughed at the statements in the "Times," but he doubted whether the "Times" correspondent would rectify his previous statement in spite of his half promise to do so.

Baron von Richthofen regrets the very unfavourable impression which these untrue statements have created here, and begs me to impress on your Lordship the importance attached in Germany to what appears in the "Times."

No. 38.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received October* 22.)

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, October* 22,1904.

THIBET: Your Lordship's telegram No. 154.

The German Minister's first statement was reported in my telegram No. 203.

In a conversation with me on the 20th October he said that he understood, from something that Morrison let drop, that Morrison believed that he had told the Chinese Government that if the Agreement were sanctioned Germany would claim equal rights under the most-favoured-nation clause. He supposed that this would be telegraphed to the "Times" by Morrison; he stated that all he really did was to inquire of the Wai-wu Pu officials as to the authenticity of the text published in the newspapers, adding that in such a remote part of the world he did not know what interest Germany could possibly have.

He again repeated to me his remark of the 20th September, that under the most-favoured-nation clause Germany would, of course, have equal rights with us.

If Baron Mumm had no intention of suggesting anything to our disadvantage it seems to me that it was quite unnecessary for him to interrogate the Wai-wu Pu.

The way in which he admits that he mentioned the matter to the Wai-wu Pu would in itself be taken by them as a hint that if they ratified Article 9 Germany would give trouble.

I have seen the telegram of which the German Government complain, and their denial is far too absolute.

Inference is perhaps responsible for a good deal of it, but wide sources of information among Chinese and Japanese are opento the "Times" correspondent.

No. 39.

Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received October* 24.)

(No. 227.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October* 21, 1904.

THE accusations put forward by the "Times" against German diplomacy in Peking for endeavouring to hinder the ratification of the Anglo-Thibetan Treaty have produced a series of protesting articles in the German press.

I need not trouble your Lordship with these indignant refutations, but will confine myself to quoting the paragraph which appeared this morning from an undoubtedly official source in the "North German Gazette."

"German diplomacy has taken no steps, officially or confidentially, with regard to the question of Thibet, either with Chinese or with Russia, or in any other quarter. The Treaty between England and Thibet was made known in Peking through publication in a newspaper without the German Minister having any knowledge either concerning the text of the Treaty or its publication. The paper is supposed to have obtained the text of the Treaty from a Chinese source. From the German Legation it could have received no information on the subject. After the publication the German Minister made a verbal inquiry at the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to ascertain if the text announced in the press was authentic. The Minister at the same time expressly emphasized the fact that Germany took no sort of interest in the matter. That is all."

I believe the above paragraph to have emanated direct from the Imperial Foreign Office, as it was published in a column exclusively dedicated to official utterances, and should, therefore, in that character effectually dispose of the "Times'" accusation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANK C. LASCELLES.

No. 40.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 23rd October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 24, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 40.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 23, 1904.

THIBET. Report received from our Trade Agent at Gyantse states that most friendly spirit with regard to opening of mart is being shown by Thibetan trade official at that place, who declares that post huts will be erected between Gyantse and Phari by the Thibetan Government.

Small posts on route have fortunately already been constructed by us, and these will serve for the post and traders, as contemplated in the 1893 Regulations, Article 2.

The establishment of really friendly relations with the Thibetans will, we may hope, prove to be Colonel Younghusband's greatest achievement. So far everything indicates a most satisfactory disposition on the part of the Thibetans.

No. 41.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Lascelles.

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 24, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram No. 23 of the 22nd October.

German Minister at Peking has explained to Sir E. Satow that, when the text of the Agreement was published in the Press, he inquired of Chinese Government whether it was accurate and, however, guardedly the inquiry was made, Chinese Government probably seized upon it as a pretext to withhold their adhesion.

His Majesty's Government are in no way responsible for what appears in the "Times," and German Government are, of course, aware of that.

No. 42.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 25.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 24, 1904.

I AM directed to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Campbell's letter of the 20th instant, on the subject of the Thibet Convention, and, in reply, to state that Mr. Secretary Brodrick concurs in the opinion of the Marquess of Lansdowne that no further mention of the suggested reservation as to Article IX should be made to the Chinese Government until the views arrived at by the Government of India, after consultation with Colonel Younghusband, have been considered.

Mr. Brodrick also agrees generally in Lord Lansdowne's views as to the line of argument on which the Convention should be defended, and he has communicated them to the Viceroy in the telegram of which a copy is inclosed.

As regards the Adhesion Agreement, Mr. Brodrick concurs with Lord Lansdowne in thinking that the negotiations must take place at Peking, but that they should not be proceeded with pending the final settlement of the amendments to be made in the Convention between the Government of India and Thibet.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 42.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, October* 24, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegrams dated the 10th and 13th October.

His Majesty's Government adhere to the view that negotiations as to Adhesion Agreement must be conducted at Peking. They will not, however, be proceeded with until amendments to Convention with Thibet have been settled. Reservation as to Article IX will not again be mentioned to the Chinese Government until we have received and considered opinion you may express after consulting Younghusband. It is possible to maintain in a general way that privileges which we secure under Convention do not, in fact, involve any denial of Treaty rights of other Powers. It is not, however, desirable that discussion on subject should take place at present, existence and extent of such rights as regards Thibet being open to question. Dependence of Thibet on China has been admitted by His Majesty's Government, who are thus precluded from using arguments based upon a contrary hypothesis. It is therefore considered preferable that Convention should be defended on the ground that, as the Power entitled by virtue of geographical position to preponderating political influence in Thibet, we have a right to claim the special privileges which the Convention confers upon us, and that no injury to other Powers is likely to result from our exercising these privileges. Moreover, as indicated by you, it seems unadvisable to admit, even by implication, that foreign Powers now possess any rights in Thibet by virtue of their Treaties with China, which Treaties, the evidence available seems to show, have not hitherto been operative in Thibet.

No. 43.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 5th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director Military Operations.

India Office, October 24, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 4, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Ti-Rimpochi and a Secretary of Council accompanied by the Tong-sa Pen-lop and the Nepalese Representative called upon me to-day and announced that the Thibetan Government was ready to conclude the Convention with me. They only asked that the term for the payment of the indemnity might be extended, and that it might be paid in seventy-five annual instalments of 1 lakh of rupees each. I pointed out to them that such a concession was a very great deal more than it appeared to them. Seventy-five lakhs paid in seventy-five years was only equal to a very much smaller sum paid within three years. In view, however, of the representations which had been made to me as to the difficulty of raising the money, and in order to show that we wished to be on friendly terms in future, I would make the concession. They must, however, clearly understand that under the terms of the Treaty we should retain the right to continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley till the full amount of the indemnity was paid.

2. They said they understood this.

3. I then remarked that the amount due to us was to-day 76 lakhs, not 75 lakhs, as two more days had elapsed since I gave them the ultimatum, and for each of those days 50,000 rupees was chargeable. The Tong-sa Pen-lop, however, asked that this extra lakh might be remitted, and to this I assented.

4. The Thibetans then asked that the amount might be paid in kind, in ponies for instance. I replied that as the amount was so small it would be better to pay it in cash, for if it were paid in ponies or other articles there would be constant disputes between us as to the value of the articles proffered, and our good relations might be jeopardized.

5. Finally, they asked that it might be paid in tangas, the local Thibetan coin. I replied that in the draft of the Convention which had been sent by Government only sovereigns, our gold coin, were mentioned. I had, however, entered rupees in the Convention as a concession to them, and with that they must be content.

6. The Ti-Rimpochi eventually affixed his private seal to the draft Convention.

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 6, 1904.

I YESTERDAY arranged with the Amban that he should visit me to-day with the principal men of the Thibetan Government to arrange final details and formalities regarding the signing of the Convention. They visited me this morning, and I have now the honour to report the conversation which then took place.

2. I commenced by asking the Amban whose name I should enter in the Convention in the place of the Dalai Lama's name. The whereabouts of the Ruler of Thibet were, I understood, not at present known. The Amban replied that I might enter the name of the Ti-Rimpochi, with whom the Dalai Lama had left his seal, and Representatives of the Council, of the three great monasteries, and of the National Assembly would also affix their seals. To this the Thibetans assented.

3. I then said the next point to settle was the time and place for signature. There could be only one place, namely, the Potala Palace, and I was ready to sign as soon as the final copies of the Convention had been prepared.

4. The Amban said that he had no objection to the Convention being signed in the Potala as long as the room, in which the sacred portrait of the Emperor Kien-lung was, was not used. He then informed the Thibetans of our decision. The Thibetans objected strongly, but without advancing any reasons except that they did not wish it. I informed them that they had at Khamba Jong and Gyantse grossly insulted the British Representative, and I now insisted that I should be shown the fullest respect. I had been prepared to show, and had shown, the utmost consideration for their religion and sacred buildings, but I expected that they, on their part, should show the fullest respect to the Emperor's Representative.

5. They suggested that the Convention should be signed in the Amban's Yamen, but I said I would be content with no other place than that in which the Dalai Lama would have received me, if he had himself been here to sign the Convention with me. The utmost respect it was within their capacity to show I expected should on this occasion be accorded me. They began murmuring other objections, but the Amban told them the matter was settled and did not admit of further discussion.

6. The question of the exact room in the Palace was then discussed, and a certain room was suggested. I told the Amban that I would send officers this afternoon to inspect the Palace and satisfy themselves that the room suggested was the most appropriate one, and I asked him to have Chinese and Thibetan officials deputed to accompany my officers. To this he agreed.

7. The date for the ceremony of signing was then fixed for to-morrow.

8. The Amban said he would himself be present, though he would be unable to agree to the Convention till he had heard from Peking. I reminded him that it was some weeks since I had given him the outlines of the terms of the Convention, and though I could understand that he could not formally sign the Adhesion Agreement till the formal assent of the Wai-wu Pu had been obtained, yet he might reasonably assume that if the Wai-wu Pu had had any strong objections to the principles of the Agreement both he and I would have heard of it before now. The Amban replied that he personally had no objection to raise to the Convention, and only awaited the formal orders of his Government to sign the Adhesion Agreement.

9. Messrs. White and Wilton and Captain O'Connor, and Majors Iggulden and Beyon from General Macdonald's staff, went over the Potala this afternoon, and reported that the hall suggested by the Thibetans was the most suitable one in the Palace.

Inclosure 3 in No. 43.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 9, 1904.

AS it was desirable, in view of the extremely limited time at my disposal, for the purpose of concluding a Convention with Thibet and an Adhesion Agreement with the Amban, to put before the Thibetans a full draft of our terms at as early a date as possible, as the Government of India had already proposed to the Secretary of State that I should ask for permission for the Trade Agent at Gyantse to proceed to Lhassa, and as it would be most difficult to insert such a clause into the terms after I had once given them out, I inserted this provision in the draft terms which I presented to the Thibetans. Subsequently I received instructions not to ask for permission for the Gyantse Agent to proceed to Lhassa. I did not, however, at once withdraw the clause from the list of terms, because in the course of negotiations it might prove useful as a point on which I could, if necessary, make concessions to the Thibetans. But when I found the Thibetans raised no special objection to the clause, provided only the Trade Agent came here on commercial, and not political, business, and only after he had found it impossible to get this commercial business disposed of by correspondence or by personal conference with the Thibetan Agent at Gyantse, I thought there would be no objection to taking an agreement from the Thibetans to this effect, for, under such limitations and provisions, there could be no grounds for assuming that, in coming here, the Trade Agent at Gyantse would be taking upon himself any political functions, or adopting the character of a Political Resident.

2. This Agreement, being of a less formal character than the rest of the Convention, I had drawn up separately. I have now the honour to forward it for the information of the Government of India. It will at least prove a useful spur to the Thibetans to transact business with the Trade Agent at Gyantse with dispatch.

The Government of Thibet agrees to permit the British Agent, who will reside at Gyantse to watch the conditions of British trade, to visit Lhassa, when it is necessary, to consult with high Chinese and Thibetan officials on such commercial matters of importance as he has found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or by personal conference with the Thibetan Agent.

Sealed and signed at Lhassa, the 7th September, 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the 27th day of the 7th month of the Wood Dragon year.

(Seal)	F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel*, *British Commissioner*.
(Seal)	Seal of Dalai Lama affixed by the Ti-Rimpochi.
(Seal)	Seal of the Council.
(Seal)	Seal of the Drepung Monastery.
(Seal)	Seal of the Sera Monastery.
(Seal)	Seal of the Gaden Monastery.
(Seal)	Seal of the Tsong du (National Assembly).

No. 44.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 27.)

Sir, *India Office, October* 25, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to request that you will invite the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 21st instant as to the modifications to be made in the Thibet Convention on its ratification.

In the telegram to the Viceroy of the 16th ultimo his Excellency was authorized to reduce the indemnity to 25 lakhs of rupees, to be charged on the security of the customs, and to provide, subject to 5 lakhs of the indemnity having been paid, that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley should cease after the customs arrangement and the marts had been effectively working for a period of three years. And in the telegram to the Viceroy of the 3rd instant his Excellency was informed that His Majesty's Government altogether declined to make any stipulations requiring the occupation of the Chumbi Valley for more than the period named in the telegram to the Viceroy of the 26th July, viz., till the indemnity had been paid and until the marts had been effectively opened for three years, whichever might be the later.

The effect of the modifications now proposed will be to reduce the indemnity to 25 lakhs, as authorized by His Majesty's Government; to omit the condition that it is to be on the security of the customs, and to determine the occupation of the Chumbi Valley on the payment of the third of the annual instalments of 1 lakh by which the indemnity is to be paid, provided that, in the meantime, the Thibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the Convention. This last provision modifies the stipulation in Clause VII of the Convention, as signed, that the occupation is to continue till trade-marts have been effectively opened for three years. It was stated in the telegram from the Viceroy of the 12th ultimo that the first annual instalment of the indemnity is payable under Article VI of the Convention on the 1st January, 1906.

Mr. Brodrick is inclined, in the circumstances, to agree to the modifications now proposed by the Viceroy; but before expressing a final opinion he would be glad to be favoured with Lord Lansdowne's views on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 45.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received October* 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 26th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 26, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 26, 1904.

THIBET. Captain O'Conor left Shigatse on the 23rd for Gyantse, which he hoped to reach on the 26th. Telegraphic report received from him, dated Shigatse, the 22nd October, states that on the 18th he had a private interview with the Tashi Lama. Latter entirely approves of the Convention, but hopes that indemnity may be reduced. As regards Amban's summons to him to proceed to Lhassa, he is in doubt whether to obey, and proposes to wait and watch events. He thinks Dalai Lama has certainly gone to Mongolia, but he does not know where he now is. Satisfactory interview took place between O'Connor and Chinese official(s) and trader(s). Very friendly relations have been established.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 46.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 198. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1904.

THE Italian Ambassador called at this Office to-day and stated that, according to a telegram which had been received from the Italian Minister at Peking, the information which had appeared in the "Times" of the 22nd instant, respecting his action with regard to the Thibetan Agreement, had been published in the Chinese newspapers a few days previously, and, as far as he was concerned, was altogether imaginary.

I inclose copies of the statements in the "Times" on the subject.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) LANSDOWNE.

No. 47.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 28, 1904.

I LAID before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 25th instant, inviting attention to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 21st October, as to the modifications to be made in the Thibet Convention on its ratification.

Lord Lansdowne concurs with Mr. Brodrick in thinking that the modifications now proposed by the Viceroy should be agreed to.

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 48.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 29, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 28, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 1st instant.

Following is substance of the notes exchanged between Younghusband and Amban:—

Younghusband informed Amban that China is not covered by the term "Foreign Power," in Article IX, and further that, speaking for himself, there is no objection to Chinese subjects proceeding to the marts, specified in Article II, for purposes of trade.

Amban stated to Younghusband—

(*a*) That, as regards Article IX of the Convention, he had maintained throughout that the restrictions therein mentioned are not binding upon Thibet, the latter being a Chinese Dependency;

(*b*) But that the Chinese Government would not, without obtaining the prior consent of the British Government, hypothecate, directly or indirectly, or in any way transfer to others, anything in the sense of Article IX;

* Not printed.

(*c*) That he (the Amban) agreed to the British Trade Agent at Gyantse visiting Lhassa, whenever occasion should arise, for the purpose of discussing commercial matters with the Chinese Amban and the Thibetan authorities.

Amban's communication is an official despatch to which is affixed his official seal. Text of both notes was forwarded with Secretary's letter of the 26th instant. Although sent by Younghusband on the 13th September, they did not reach us; inquiry is being made as to the cause of this.

We see no objection to adding words in sense of the above notes to Adhesion Agreement, except that the reference to visit of our Trade Agent to Lhassa should, we think, be omitted, as to which all that is required is permission of Thibetan authorities. We deprecate, however, sacrifice of any of substantial advantages which Convention and these subsidiary notes have gained for us, for the sake of obtaining adhesion of the Chinese Government.

Main objects of Chinese adhesion are (1) that charge of ignoring suzerainty of China may be avoided, and this we have already attained by consulting her throughout, and by inviting her to adhere, and (2) that introduction of foreign influence through Chinese instrumentality may be prevented;—and with regard to this our position is considerably strengthened by the formal note received from the Amban, who was specially deputed to negotiate with the British Commissioner, even if it remains unratified by the Chinese Government.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 49.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 31.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of two telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 30th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, October 31, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 49.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 30, 1904.

THIBET. Ho Kwangsi, the late Chinese Commissioner, has reached Darjeeling on his way back to China. He reports that Amban's action in keeping a Thibetan prostitute has caused disturbance at Lhassa, during which about five Chinese and fifteen Thibetans were killed. There is consequently, it is said, great ill-feeling between the Chinese and Thibetans, and some Chinese traders have left Lhassa.

Report received from Captain Rawling, in charge of the party proceeding to Gartok, states that on the 22nd October the party reached Poonchaling, a point 70 miles west of Shigatse, all well. They had met with a good reception.

(Repeated to Peking.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 49.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 30, 1904.

THIBET. With reference to my telegram of the 10th October, we have now received Colonel Younghusband's explanations. Copies were forwarded to you on the 20th October with Secretary's letter. We have also sent, by mail of the 27th October advance copy of despatch on the subject, of which following are the main points:—

Reference is invited to our despatch dated the 6th October as regards defence o Colonel Younghusband's action with regard to provisions as to indemnity in Article VI of Convention. As regards his action in leaving Lhassa without carrying out the

wishes of His Majesty's Government, following pleas are put forward in explanation and have, in our opinion, much force:—

1. Anxiety of military authorities that Mission should leave before cold weather sets in.

2. Danger that, in view of assurance given to Thibetans as to our departure, their suspicion would have been excited by continuance of negotiations.

3. Difficulty of effecting a complete change of plans at last moment.

4. Fruitlessness at that time of attempting to undertake further negotiations.

5. Friendly feeling which Thibetan authorities have since displayed, thus proving that departure of Mission was well timed.

6. General latitude to which, having regard to the difficult circumstances of the case, the British Commissioner was entitled.

Reference is also invited to the following correspondence: Your telegrams of the 12th and 13th September; my telegram of the 14th September; your telegram of the 16th September (especially penultimate sentence from words "in no circumstances" down to "already agreed to"); and your telegram of the 18th September, the purport of which evidently was, not an instruction that Colonel Younghusband should remain at Lhassa, but a concession to our views. These bring out considerations which, in our opinion, point even more than the pleas already mentioned to the criticisms in your telegram of the 3rd October being undeserved.

In the light of the above telegrams, Colonel Younghusband had considerable justification for thinking that he was not expected to remain at Lhassa for modification of agreement to be carried out. His departure rendered it impossible for the compensatory advantages which we had suggested to be secured, and this we regret; but we feel bound to accept Younghusband's opinion that it was impossible to carry through these negotiations without impairing the friendly relations which had been established. It is important to bear in mind that he had no authority to reduce indemnity without compensation, which, in his judgment, as the man on the spot, it was impossible to obtain. Colonel Younghusband's one error of judgment, which, involving as it did the occupation of the Chumbi Valley for seventy-five years, in contravention of the undertaking of His Majesty's Government, was admittedly serious, was committed in circumstances admitting of generous condonation, and we trust that His Majesty's Government, recognizing the full merits of his achievement, will not condemn him for it.

No. 50.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 1.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 31st ultimo, relative to Thibet affairs.

(Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.)

India Office, November 1, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *October* 31, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 24th instant.

I would suggest that, as it has been decided that Adhesion Agreement should be negotiated at Peking, Wilton should at once proceed there. Sir E. Satow will find his services most valuable.

With regard to Article IX of the Convention, and the inapplicability of Treaties between China and other Powers to Thibet, we see no reason, after consultation with Younghusband, for altering opinion expressed in our previous telegrams.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 51.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 235.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 1, 1904.

THIBET: Telegram of the 13th October from India and last sentence of telegram of the 24th October from Secretary of State for India.

I am entirely at one with the Indian Government in the view that Calcutta should be the scene of the negotiations, both for the reasons that they advance and for the following reason, which appears to me to be an even stronger one:—

If we consent to the Chinese Delegate proceeding to Calcutta to negotiate, our position will be the advantageous one of the party of whom a favour in the shape of a declaration or gloss on Article 9 is desired.

If, on the other hand, Peking is to be the scene of the negotiations the disadvantage will be on our side, for we shall be the applicants for China's adhesion and proposals will have to come from us. The result of discussion at Calcutta cannot fail to be more to our advantage than that of discussion here.

(Repeated to Viceroy of India.)

No. 52.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 236.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 1, 1904.

I HAVE good grounds for believing that the Chinese Government are contemplating what to them probably seems a clever stroke of policy with regard to Thibet. They are believed to be considering whether they could not cut the Gordian knot by declaring that dependency a province, and so an integral part of the Empire of China, on the occasion of the birthday of the Empress Dowager on the 16th November.

(Repeated to Viceroy of India.)

No. 53.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 13th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, October 31, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 53.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 8, 1904.

IN continuation of my telegram of yesterday's date, I have the honour to make the following report of the circumstances under which the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet was signed.

2. Half an-hour before the time fixed for the ceremony, the whole of the route leading up to the Potala and the passages as well were lined with troops, and soon after 3 P.M. General Macdonald and I, accompanied by the members of the Mission and the military staff, reached the Potala. We were received in the Durbar hall by the Amban, who had arrived there more than an hour previously to guard the sacred portrait of the Emperor Kein Lung.

3. The hall was the one in which the Dalai Lama holds Durbars, and was large enough to hold about 200 of our troops (some of whom were formed up as an escort, while others had been allowed to attend as spectators), about 100 Chinese, and over 100 Thibetans. The scene, as we entered, was extremely picturesque. On the left were all the British and Indian officers and men; on the right were the mass of Thibetans, the Councillors in bright yellow silk robes, and many others in brilliant clothing, together with the Bhutanese in bright dresses and quaint head-gear; and in front the Amban and all his staff in their fullest official dress advanced to meet me, with the Acting Regent by him in the severely simple garb of a lama. The pillars and cross-beams of the roof of the hall were richly painted. An immense silk curtain was hung immediately behind the chair to be occupied by the Amban and myself. And the whole scene was rendered curiously soft and hazy by the light entering, not through windows at the sides, but through an immense skylight in the centre of the hall which was covered over with coloured canvas. A plan of the Durbar, which I had arranged beforehand, is appended. The Ti-Rimpochi (the Acting Regent) sat next to the Amban on his left.

4. As soon as we were seated Thibetan servants brought in tea and handed cups to all the British and Chinese officials. Low tables of dried fruits were then set before the two rows of officials. When these were all cleared away, I said to the Amban that with his permission I would proceed to business. I first had the Convention read in Thibetan and then asked the Thibetan officials if they were prepared to sign it. They answered in the affirmative, and the immense roll of paper, on which the Convention is written in three parallel columns in English, Chinese, and Thibetan, according to their custom of having Treaties in different languages inscribed on the same sheet of paper, was produced. I asked the Thibetans to affix their seals first, and the long process began. When the seals of the Council, the monasteries, and the National Assembly had been affixed, I rose and with the Ti-Rimpochi advanced to the table, the Amban and the whole Durbar rising at the same time. The Ti-Rimpochi then affixed the Dalai Lama's seal, and finally I sealed and signed the Convention. Having done this, I handed the document to the Ti-Rimpochi and said a peace had now been made which I hoped would never be broken again.

5. The same ceremonial was followed in the case of the copies in the three languages for the Amban, which, having been signed and sealed, I handed to him.

6. The three copies each in three languages for the British Government were then signed and sealed, the whole operation lasting nearly an hour and a-half.

7. When the whole ceremony was concluded I addressed a speech, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy, to the Thibetans. This was translated sentence by sentence by Captain O'Connor, and the Amban's interpreter translated it sentence by sentence to the Amban. At its conclusion the members of Council said that the Treaty had been made by the whole people and would never be broken. We would see in future that they really intended to observe it.

8. I then turned to the Amban and thanked him for the help he had given me in making the Convention. He said he was glad he and I had been able to work together, and he hoped and thought the Thibetans would keep the Treaty.

9. A copy of the Convention, as signed, is appended. The three original copies I will bring back to India with me.

10. The Thibetans throughout showed perfect good temper and the fullest respect. They often laughed over the operations of sealing, and when we left they all came crowding up to shake hands with every British officer they could make their way to.

11. The Amban was very courteous, and showed special pleasure when my words regarding the continued suzerainty being recognized were translated to him.

12. Altogether I should say the ceremonial very deeply impressed the Thibetans, who, without being humiliated in a way which caused resentment, have now learned to accord us the respect which is our due.

13. At the conclusion of the Durbar I had the lamas of the Potala presented with 1,000 rupees.

14. In regard to the Convention itself, it is necessary to say that in the Thibetan translation the Chumbi Valley is defined as running up to the Tangla Pass, for the Thibetans do not regard Phari as being in the Chumbi Valley as we do. In deference to the wish of the Amban, I did not insert the words "Regent of Thibet" after Ti-Rimpochi, as he has not yet been officially recognized as such by the Chinese Emperor. He has, however, been so recognized both by the Dalai Lama and the National Assembly, and the seals which were affixed in support of the seal of the Dalai Lama used by the Ti-Rimpochi render the Agreement absolutely binding.

Inclosure 2 in No. 53.

Speech delivered by Colonel Younghusband on the Signing of the Convention, Lhassa, September 7, 1904.

THE Convention has been signed. We are now at peace. The misunderstandings of the past are over, and a basis has been laid for mutual good relations in future. In the Convention the British Government have been careful to avoid interfering in the smallest degree with your religion. They have annexed no part of your country. They have made no attempt to interfere in your internal affairs. They fully recognize the continued suzerainty of the Chinese Government. They have merely sought to insure that you abide by the Treaty made on your behalf by the Amban in 1890; that trade relations between India and Thibet, which are no less advantageous to you than to us, should be established as they have been with every other country in the world, except Thibet; that British Representatives should be treated with respect in future; and that you should not depart from your traditional policy in regard to relations with other countries.

The Treaty now made I promise, on behalf of the British Government, we will rigidly observe. But I must also warn you we will as rigidly enforce it. Any infringement will surely be punished; any obstruction to trade, any disrespect or injury to British subjects will be noticed and requitement exacted. We treat you well when you come to India. We take not a single rupee in customs duty from your merchants. We allow Thibetans to travel or reside whenever they will. We preserve the ancient buildings of the Buddhist faith. But we expect when we come to Thibet that we should be treated with no less consideration and respect than we show to you in India.

You have found us bad enemies when you have not observed Treaty obligations and shown disrespect to the British Representative. You will find us equally good friends if you keep the present Treaty and show civility.

I trust that the peace which has this moment been established will last for ever, and that we may never again be forced to treat you as enemies.

As a first token of peace I will ask General Macdonald to release all prisoners of war, and I shall expect that you will set at liberty all those imprisoned on account of dealings with us.

Inclosure 3 in No. 53.

Convention between Great Britain and Thibet.

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Thibet:—

I.

The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully-authorized Delegates to negotiate with Representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhassa, to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 500,000*l.*, equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees, to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time, after due notice, indicate whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of 1 lakh of rupees each on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhassa.

IX.

The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government :—

(*a.*) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power ;

(*b.*) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs ;

(*c.*) No Representatives or Agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet ;

(*d.*) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British Government ;

(*e.*) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhassa, this 7th day of September, in the year of our Lord 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the 27th day of the 7th month of the Wood Dragon year.

Thibet Frontier Commission,
(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel,*
British Commissioner.

(Seal of British Commissioner.)

(Seal of Dalai Lama.)

(Seal of Council.)
(Seal of Dre-pung Monastery.)
(Seal of Se-ra Monastery.)
(Seal of Ga-den Monastery.)
(Seal of Tsongdu (National Assembly).)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the Representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

Thibet Frontier Commission,
(Signed) F. E YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel,*
British Commissioner.

(Seal of British Commissioner.)

(Seal of Dalai Lama.)

(Seal of Council.)
(Seal of Dre-pung Monastery.)
(Seal of Se-ra Monastery.)
(Seal of Ga-den Monastery.)
(Seal of Tsongdu (National Assembly).)

Inclosure 4 in No. 53.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 8, 1904.

TWO Shapes arrived at noon to-day, and I informed them that General Macdonald had agreed to my request to release all prisoners of war. These were paraded in front of the house, and General Macdonald sent a Staff officer to order their release and to give each man 5 rupees for work he had done.

2. The Shapes then produced two men who had been imprisoned owing to assistance they had given to Sarat Chandra Das and two men who had been imprisoned for helping the Japanese traveller, Kawaguchi, one of whom was a trader from Darjeeling. The two first men had been in chains for nineteen years, and showed signs of terrible suffering. All were in abject fear of the Thibetans, bowing double before them. Their cheeks were sunken and their eyes glazed and staring. Their release is entirely due to the exertions of Captain O'Connor. I thanked the Shapes for their action, which I looked upon as a sign that they really wished to live on friendly terms with us. I trusted they would never again imprison men whose only offence was friendliness to British subjects.

3. I then returned to the Shapes the sum of 5,000 rupees which I had exacted from them and released the hostages I had demanded on the occasion of the attack by a fanatical lama on two British officers last month. But I demanded back the sum of 1,000 rupees on account of the murder of one and the brutal torture of another servant of the Mission caught in the town of Gyantse on the night of the attack on the Mission. I said we did not mind fair and square fighting between men whose business it was to fight, but the murder and torture of harmless and defenceless servants was pure barbarity. The Shapes acknowledged that what I said was just, but said they were not present and knew nothing of it. 1,000 rupees was therefore retained to be paid in compensation to the servants' families.

4. I then remarked that we had now had a general settling up of all accounts between us and could start fair. The Shapes said they hoped now we would always be on friendly terms, and they certainly meant to observe the Treaty.

Inclosure 5 in No. 53.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 15, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a notice posted by the Chinese Amban in Lhassa denouncing the Dalai Lama.

Inclosure 6 in No. 53.

Translation of a Notice posted by the Amban in Lhassa, September 10, 1904.

THIS notice is posted by Yu Amban (&c.), on receipt of a reply to his telegram dated the 25th of the 7th month (5th September). The rank of the Dalai Lama is temporarily confiscated, and in his place is appointed the Tashi Lama. In accordance with instructions received notice to this effect has been sent to the Tashi Lama. For more than 200 years Thibet has been a feudatory of China, and the Dalai Lama has received much kindness from this great kingdom, but in return for this kindness he did not remain to guard his kingdom. On account of his not regarding the interests of the faith, the gods and guardian spirits became angry, and he also allowed his subjects to act as they pleased. Moreover, he gave no orders to his subjects to settle the question of the Indian–Thibetan boundary which had been outstanding for more than ten years. Although orders were given to him to settle the matter quickly, he paid no attention to them, but collected soldiers from various parts and made war, and then, being defeated, and great trouble having arisen, he, instead of protecting his subjects and country, ran away to a distant place in an unknown country. In the war thousands and tens of thousands of Thibetans were slain, and those who ran away, being unable to fight, were reproached by him for not carrying out his orders. The teacher of the Dalai Lama (the late Regent) and Him Amban had desired a peaceful solution of the frontier difficulties, but the present Dalai Lama, out of jealousy, not considering properly the correct view of the case, caused the death of many people, and thus caused much grief to the people of Thibet, and, listening to bad advice, he heavily punished the Regent. In the case of the Shape Pal-jar Dorje the Dalai Lama wrote to the Amban requesting him to report the Shape to the Emperor for bad conduct, and the Amban having reported the matter, the Shape was deposed and punished. As to the other Shapes, if they had to be punished, it should have been done in accordance with the custom of nations; but the Dalai Lama, although he had sent a representation to the Amban, and the Amban had himself inquired minutely into the case, and was awaiting a reply from the Emperor, nevertheless became

angry one day, and of his own accord punished them severely. Again, one day, his anger being appeased, he set them free. From this it appears that he paid no regard to the Emperor nor to law and justice. These various crimes show that he is not a man who should not be punished. So being a man of evil mind, and having oppressed all his subjects and robbed them, it appears that his Ministers cannot hold him in much regard. As he has transgressed the laws of the Buddhist faith, and thus caused disturbance amongst the Great Powers, he has been denounced, and so reaped the fruits of his ill-doing, and all men will thus receive satisfaction. In order that you may all thoroughly understand this matter I have posted this notice, and you should all, Chinese and Thibetan officials, soldiers, peasants, laymen, and monks, take it to heart. In future, Thibet being a feudatory of China, the Dalai Lama will be responsible for the Yellow-cap faith and monks, and will only be concerned slightly in the official matters, while the Amban will conduct all Thibetan affairs with the Thibetan officials, and important matters will be referred to the Emperor. The Dalai Lama will not be permitted of his own free will to intervene in affairs. You must all understand this and act accordingly, so that no punishment may befall you, and must not transgress my orders.

Dated the 1st of the 8th month of the 30th year of the Emperor Kwang Shu (10th September, 1904).

Inclosure 7 in No. 53.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 15, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a despatch I to-day addressed to the Chinese Amban.

Inclosure 8 in No. 53.

Colonel Younghusband to Chinese Imperial Resident, Lhassa.

September 15, 1904.

I WAS yesterday informed by your Excellency that the Wai-wu Pu had directed you not to sign the Adhesion Agreement, a draft copy of which I had the honour to present to you more than a month ago. The Thibetans have already signed the Convention with me. The responsibility for any future misunderstandings which may arise therefore rests with the Chinese Government, and I propose to so inform the Thibetans.

I must also reserve for my Government the right to demand from the Chinese Government the cost of the detention of troops in Thibet since the Convention with the Thibetans was signed.

Inclosure 9 in No. 53.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Nepal, September* 26, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of a letter addressed by the Prime Minister of Nepal to the four Kazies at Lhassa.

2. The letter has been written in the hope that it may assist in the due observance of the terms of the Treaty recently signed between the British Government and Thibet, and the spirit and intention which has prompted it will, I trust, be appreciated by the Government of India.

3. A copy has also been sent to Colonel Younghusband, for information.

Inclosure 10 in No. 53.

The Prime Minister and Marshal of Nepal to the four Kazies of Lhassa.

(After compliments.) *Katmandu, September* 26, 1904.

SINCE the time it came to my knowledge that there has been some misunderstanding between the British Government and your own, and still more since 1901 heard that your Government have been allowing matters to drift, regardless of the consequences which it might lead to, it has been a source of continual anxiety to me as to what might be the ultimate result of all this. In the course of events, I have had occasions to send repeated warnings to your Government in a way as befits the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments, proffering words of what I considered to be the best advice under the circumstances. You are very well aware how ardently desirous I was all the time to hear of the conclusion of the pending dispute in an amicable manner, and the establishment of a friendly understanding with our powerful neighbour, the British Government. Apprehensive as I was for the fate of your country, it was with a sense of no small relief that I heard that you had at last discussed matters in a friendly spirit with the British Commissioner, and, having come to an understanding, concluded and signed a Treaty with him. Although at the present moment I have not had any official communication on the subject, yet I suppose I can safely say that the terms agreed upon must have been such as were agreeable to both the parties, and such as would lead to the maintenance and strengthening of peaceful and friendly relations between the two Governments. I congratulate you all and your country with my whole heart at the successful conclusion of such a difficult business, and the ending of a matter which at one time threatened to be a serious calamity ruinous to the country which you so dearly love.

I shall not tell you here how the serious losses and sufferings entailed by the late proceedings on the people and the Government might have been averted by the smallest exercise of forethought and imagination in the beginning. However, all is well that ends well. Now that the political atmosphere has cleared there, and things have assumed their normal attitude; now that peace has been restored, and the people and the Government have been free to return to their proper avocation; now that the stirring events and the disturbing causes of the past year and a-half have vanished, and saner and wiser counsels have prevailed at last, and would, I hope, continue to be on the ascendent in the future, I may tell you that the news of the satisfactory settlement of the disputes has been most welcome to me, and I trust you will believe me when I say that the conclusion of the matter would not have given greater pleasure to the Government and the people of Thibet than to me and to my countrymen. I should not rake up the past were it not to bring home to you, and to impress upon your mind clearly, the utter futility of your attempts to try conclusions with the British Power. The bitter experience of the past should have on you a salutary and sobering effect. Now I exhort you with all by heart to be true to the words solemnly recorded by you in the open Durbar with the British Government. It is a matter of great moment. A solemn promise is a sacred thing which must be fulfilled at any cost. The national honour of Thibet and her prosperity and peace are involved in the faithful observance of the terms of the Treaty. I am glad to see that, as I had predicted in the beginning of this unfortunate controversy, the British have left your country entire, and shall not interfere with the internal administration of your country, and this they have done in spite of all the provocations offered to them, and of the fact of their having penetrated into the very heart of your country. Let me tell you here again what I have told you in the past, that a friendly understanding and maintenance of an amicable relation with the British Government would be nothing but beneficial to you.

I shall now end by saying that you must not forget that the very existence of Thibet as a separate nation depends upon your religiously carrying out the terms of the Treaty, and scrupulously avoiding any occasion of friction with the British Power, and you should not forget the duties and responsibilities attaching to your position, and the sanctity of a promise, and the honour involved in keeping one's plighted troth unbroken. The experience of the past should act as a guide for the future, and I have every hope that the future of Thibet, when undisturbed by extraneous circumstances, will be as bright as ever.

Inclosure 11 in No. 53.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 14, 1904.

THE Amban visited me to-day and presented me with copies of two telegrams he had received from the Wai-wu Pu. A translation of these I have the honour to forward for the information of the Government of India. The Amban said that the Wai-wu Pu considered that we had not sufficiently recognized the suzerainty of China.

2. I expressed surprise at such a view being taken by the Wai-wu Pu, for both in the body of the Convention with Thibet and by the mere fact that we were asking the Amban to sign an Adhesion Agreement we recognized the suzerainty of China. And I thought it unwise of the Wai-wu Pu to further raise the question of suzerainty, for if they pressed the right of suzerainty to an extreme degree, then they must not be surprised if we insisted with equal force upon their accepting the fullest responsibility of a suzerain. The Thibetans had in practice showed little recognition of China's suzerain rights. We had for years awaited evidence of China's capacity to make the Thibetans observe the Treaty made by China on their behalf. We had also tried to negotiate an amended Treaty at Khamba Jong. But the Chinese had been unable to make their vassal either observe the original Treaty or assist in negotiating a new one. Whatever, therefore, they might consider their suzerain rights to be, their practical control was of the slightest, and the degree of suzerainty which that amount of control betokened was more than recognized by us. I had, indeed, in full Durbar, in his own presence, on the very important occasion of the signing of the Convention in the Potala, expressly declared that we recognized the continued suzerainty of China, and I was quite prepared to give him this extract of my speech in writing. But if the Wai-wu Pu pressed for any further recognition and declined to let him sign the Adhesion Agreement, they must expect that we should lay upon the Chinese fuller responsibility than we had hitherto contemplated for the acts of the Thibetans. The military operations which had been entailed by the disobedience of the Thibetans to the orders of their suzerain had cost us 1,000,000*l.*, and for this China was, strictly speaking, responsible. If the Chinese Government did not wish us to press this claim, it would be advisable for them not to claim any larger degree of suzerainty than we had already recognized.

3. The Amban replied that he personally considered China had no cause to complain, and he said his presence at the signature of the Convention was sufficient proof of his sincerity in making this statement. He had now merely put before me the views of his Government.

4. I asked him to represent to the Wai-wu Pu what I had said. To raise a difficulty over the question of suzerainty and to have any cause of dissension between us seemed to me the height of unwisdom. It had been the Viceroy's wish, which I had endeavoured to carry out, that the Amban and I should work together. I had indeed this very day received a telegram from the Viceroy, in which his Excellency had asked me to express to him his appreciation of the high value of the assistance he had given me in effecting a settlement with the Thibetans. Thibetans were a stubborn and difficult people to deal with, and if we and the Chinese had dissensions, the Thibetans and not either of us would reap the advantage. If we worked together, as he and I had so far done, we could keep them in order. I did not wish to conceal from him the fact that I considered our interests lay in preserving the closest relations with the Chinese in Thibet. Whatever the Chinese might think of their own interests, I certainly thought that as this populated part of Thibet was near to India but far from China and we could put such physical pressure on the Thibetans as the Chinese never could, while on the other hand the Chinese had an established position in the capital and could put on a moral pressure which we could never exercise, for we had no intention of leaving a permanent Political Agent here, our interests lay in working hand and glove with the Chinese in Thibet. Such a policy would, I thought, be advantageous to the Chinese too. However that might be, I certainly thought it would benefit us; but only so long as the Chinese worked with us. If they raised dissensions, our interests clearly lay in dealing more directly with the Thibetans.

5. The Amban assured me he had no other wish than to preserve most intimate relations with us, and would make a representation to the Wai-wu Pu, but he feared to give offence to them by putting the case as forcibly as I had put it, and suggested that the British Minister at Peking should represent our view to them. I said I would propose this to the Viceroy, but I hoped he also would put the matter clearly before the Chinese Government.

Inclosure 12 in No. 53.

Translation of Telegram from the Wai-wu Pu to the Amban, received September 12, 1904.

YOUR telegram forwarding the Convention of ten clauses sent to you by the British official has been duly read.

The Convention robs China of her suzerainty, and you are on no account to sign it. Discuss this point, and send us a telegraphic reply.

Inclosure 13 in No. 53.

Translation of Telegram from the Wai-wu Pu to the Amban, received September 13, 1904.

THIBET is a dependency of China. The two Treaties concluded in 1890 and 1893 respectively were concluded between Great Britain and China after negotiations had been carried on by officers appointed by those countries. In the present instance the Treaty should be between Great Britain and China, and the Thibetan Government instructed to agree and sign.

Great Britain should not conclude a Treaty direct with Thibet, as by that China loses her suzerainty, and that lost, her admonitions to the Thibetans will be of no avail. This is the important idea throughout; explain this point carefully to the British official. If he agrees to this point, then the Treaty can be discussed. Send a speedy telegraphic reply.

No. 54.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 237.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 2, 1904.

THIBETAN Affairs.

See fifth paragraph of my telegram No. 215 of the 5th October, your Lordship's telegram No. 149 of the 6th October, and my telegram No. 220 of the 12th October.

I am informed by Prince Ch'ing that Tang will shortly proceed to his post viâ India. The Prince asked me to let him know should I receive a reply from His Majesty's Government within the next few days stating at what place in India the high officials appointed by Great Britain to negotiate with Tang will meet him.

Not having received any definite instructions from your Lordship as to the locality of the negotiations, I have so far not mentioned this point.

(Repeated to the Viceroy of India.)

No. 55.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 2, 1904.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking,* stating that there are good grounds to believe that the Chinese Government are considering the question of declaring Thibet to be a province, and therefore an integral part, of the Chinese Empire.

I am to suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State, that Sir E. Satow should be authorized, if he thinks it desirable, to warn the Chinese that such action on their part would not be regarded as modifying the situation or calling for any departure from the policy which His Majesty's Government have announced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

* No. 52.

No. 56.

India Office to Foreign Office—(*Received November* 8.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 5th November, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copy will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 7, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 5, 1904.

PLEASE refer to the telegram dated the 1st November from His Majesty's Minister at Peking as to the reported intention to declare Thibet a Chinese province.

If China does take action as suggested, it will afford a clear indication that Thibet was not previously an integral part of China proper, and that consequently existing Treaties between China and other Powers cannot be applicable to Thibet.

On the other hand, Treaties already made with the latter, *e.g.*, by Bhutan, Nepal, Kashmir, and India, could not be affected by the proposed change in the status of Thibet. It might be desirable to be prepared to make an intimation in this sense to the Chinese Government.

It might also be well, if there is any liklihood of China taking action as suggested, for us to ratify the Convention with Thibet before the date mentioned, although Convention would not be invalidated, so far as regards Thibet, by the fact that it is still unratified, inasmuch as it is only subject to unilateral ratification.

(Repeated to Peking.)

No. 57.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 163.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 8, 1904.

I HAVE received your telegram No. 236 of the 1st instant, reporting that there are good grounds for believing that the Chinese Government have under consideration the question whether they could not declare Thibet a province, and so an integral part of the Chinese Empire. His Majesty's Government would not regard such action on the part of the Chinese Government as modifying the situation, nor would they consider that it called for any departure from the policy which His Majesty's Government have announced.

You may warn Chinese Government to that effect, if you think desirable.

No. 58.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 9.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 20th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 7, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 58.

Memorandum.

ON my return to India I find that I am held by His Majesty's Government to have acted in defiance of express instructions in accepting the Thibetan proposal regarding the mode of payment of the indemnity, and to have disobeyed orders in leaving Lhassa without making an attempt to alter the Convention I had signed. I desire, therefore, to explain the reasons for my action, and to offer suggestions as to the best method of carrying out the wishes of His Majesty's Government for modifying the terms I settled with the Thibetans.

I would, in the first place, remark that the despatch from the Secretary of State, dated the 5th August, specifically laying down that the amount of indemnity I was to ask was not to be more than the Thibetans could pay within three years, did not reach me till after I had accepted the Thibetan proposal. The terms of the draft Convention certainly implied that the amount should be paid in three years, but a certain amount of latitude was left to me in the matter of the indemnity, and though I admit that my action was not covered by my instructions, I regret that His Majesty's Government should consider that it was in defiance of them.

For what was my position in the early days of September? I had before me the telegram of the Secretary of State, dated the 16th August, in which it was definitely laid down that the troops were to start back on a day to be named by the military authorities in communication with me. General Macdonald had consulted his medical officers and his commanding officers of regiments, and had informed me, on the 31st August, that the 15th September was the latest date he could remain, and that, unless he received orders to the contrary from Government, he intended to leave on that date. I had at the time every reason to suppose that the date named by General Macdonald would be accepted by Government. Throughout the latter part of my Mission very great importance had been attached to military considerations, and I had, indeed, been reprimanded in June for asking for fuller time for my negotiations than General Macdonald had advised could be given. I could not count, then, upon having any longer period than up to the 15th September at my disposal for negotiations.

I accordingly arranged that on the 1st September the whole of the Council and the principal members of the National Assembly should meet me in the presence of the Amban, and I then presented them with the draft Convention in its final form, which, I said, I expected them to sign within a week. As the amount of the indemnity, I had inserted the sum of 500,000*l.* or 75 lakhs of rupees, this being calculated at the rate suggested by the Government of India to the Secretary of State, viz., 100,000*l.* a-month from the date of the attack on the Mission to a month after the Convention should have been signed. The period of payment I placed at three years.

On the 4th September the Regent came to me saying the Thibetans were ready to agree to all our terms except that regarding the indemnity, and he begged me that the amount might be paid in annual instalments of 1 lakh each for seventy-five years. I had not then received the telegram from the Government of India, dated the 2nd September, saying I could remain till the 15th October. I was under the impression I would have to leave on the 15th September. Time was exceedingly pressing. It was all important that I should get the Convention through before I left Lhassa. It was in every way desirable, also, that the Convention I should make should be such that it was possible for the Thibetans to keep, and not one which would leave with it the sting of resentment. The Dalai Lama might return at any time. The Thibetan Government I had to deal with was composed of quite new men. If I had forced a too distasteful condition upon them the Dalai Lama's faction would have ousted them as soon as I left Lhassa, and our Convention would have been torn up. The country could well afford to pay 75 lakhs, which is not more than a year's revenue of a State like Indore, in India. But in Thibet there is almost no cash, and the smallest amount of revenue reaches the Central Government, nearly the whole being paid in kind to local officials and to the monasteries. To pay even a lakh of rupees a year in cash would cause some difficulty to the Central Government, and if I had insisted on only the 25 lakhs, which the Secretary of State now considers sufficient, being paid within three years, I should have left behind me a row in Lhassa. The amount would not have been paid, and we would have been involved in those very complications in the future which it is the object of His Majesty's Government to avoid, and which in my opinion have been avoided by the arrangement I made.

I had one other consideration in my mind. Under Article VI of the Convention the indemnity to be fixed was to be for—

1. The expense incurred in military operations; and
2. For insults to, and attacks upon, the British Commissioner.

However much we might reduce the amount afterwards, it was, I considered, politically desirable to make the Thibetans acknowledge that for the above no small amount of satisfaction was due to us; 25 lakhs of rupees is only 166,000*l.*, which is a small amount to enter in a Treaty as satisfaction for insults and attacks upon the British Representative.

I had, then, in the end to act upon my own responsibility in the matter of extending the period for the payment of the indemnity; but I trust Government will not consider I acted hastily, for in my telegram of the 15th July I referred to the possibility of having to increase the number of years in which payment of the indemnity might have to be made, and suggested that in this respect we might suit the convenience of the Thibetans.

I should, of course, have preferred to have been able to carry out the letter of the instructions of His Majesty's Government, but I should have incurred a very heavy responsibility in refusing the Thibetan proposal. It was quite possible that, if I had refused, the Regent would have fled from Lhassa rather than sign the Convention, and, in any case, I would have left him there in a very precarious position, whereas, by accepting the proposal, I satisfied the Thibetans. I also satisfied one, at least, of the cardinal principles of the policy of His Majesty's Government, viz., the securing of the maximum of reparation with the minimum of future liability. And I was able to leave Lhassa, feeling that I had effected what I am sure His Majesty's Government must consider of far more importance than the conclusion of a paper Convention, viz., the establishment of our relations with the Thibetans on a footing of mutual goodwill.

I have now to explain why I refrained from altering the Convention I had made. When it was decided that the Mission could not winter at Lhassa, but must get through its work in a period shorter than I suppose has ever before been allowed for the conclusion of an important Treaty, I laid down my course of action, and told the Thibetans time after time that, directly the Treaty was signed, we would leave Lhassa. To impress this idea upon them I often made use of the expression: "If you sign the Treaty to-morrow, I will go away the next day." The Thibetans are exceedingly suspicious people. The Dalai Lama had written to them to be especially cautious against the "craftiness" of the English. The mere fact of my remaining would, therefore, have aroused suspicion; and if, in addition, I had asked to alter the Convention only just signed with so much ceremony, I should in an instant have lost all the confidence I had so hardly won. I understood from the telegrams of the Secretary of State that he had no wish to prejudice the Convention already made, and neither I nor a single member of my staff had a doubt that the attempt to alter it would have most seriously prejudiced it. By persuasion I could never have induced them to alter it now it was once arranged; and though I certainly had the power to insist upon the alteration, I hardly had the right to. Nor, in the strictly limited time at my disposal, could I have expected to negotiate new Trade Regulations. I doubt if Government even yet thoroughly appreciate the extraordinary obtuseness and stubbornness, and the lack of business capacity of the Thibetans, or the inadequacy of the Government machine for dealing with foreign relations.

Then, again, military considerations had here, too, to be taken into account. I was constantly being urged not to keep the troops a day longer in Lhassa than could be helped, so that they might not suffer from the approaching winter. As soon, therefore, as the Convention was signed, I told General Macdonald that he might take the 20th September as the date for leaving. This would give the Amban time to get an answer from Peking, authorizing him to sign the Adhesion Agreement if the Chinese Government showed any inclination to settle the matter. If they were inclined to be argumentative, our leaving Lhassa would have more effect than our remaining, for the Amban certainly felt our presence there extremly useful in checking the Thibetans, and making them more amenable to him. General Macdonald, therefore, made arrangements all the way down the line for the return of the force on or within a few days of the 20th September.

The convoy which was ready to start from Gyantse to stock the posts, if we had to stay, was countermanded, and troops and transport along the line of communications began to return to India. Arrangements of this kind in a country like Thibet cannot be made or altered at the last moment; and as I had been led to expect that my action regarding the indemnity clause was to be supported, I had arranged farewell visits and ceremonies which it would have been very awkward to postpone.

Subsequent events have shown that my action has enabled us to leave Thibet with some feeling of confidence that our relations have been placed on a basis rooted in friendly sentiment. They have also shown that, if I had not finished my negotiations when I did, but had delayed the final settlement only a few days, the Chinese would have prevented the Convention being signed at all. We have at least got the Convention, and we have got it with goodwill behind it. And if I have obtained too much, what we do not wish for can at any time be given back.

His Majesty's Government, I understand, now wish to reduce the amount of indemnity from 75 lakhs of rupees to 25 lakhs. Now that I have forced the Thibetans to acknowledge that 75 lakhs is due to us for their misdemeanours, the remission may be made with good grace as an act of generosity on our part. As a matter of business, I think we ought to expect from them the opening of a trade mart at Zayul, which would be as much to their interest as ours; and my idea had been that an arrangement of this nature might very easily have been made when the revision of the Trade Regulations came to be discussed.

But if His Majesty's Government wish the alteration in the amount of the indemnity to be made at once, we must trust to the good feeling of the Thibetans to subsequently make us a concession in regard to Zayul. By the Convention they undertake to consider the question of opening new marts, and our generosity in reducing the indemnity may be taken as a ground for asking for the opening of Zayul.

But while reducing the amount of the indemnity, His Majesty's Government wish also to limit the period of occupation of the Chumbi Valley. This is a very serious sacrifice of the interests of the Government of India. Chumbi is the key to Thibet. It is also the most difficutt part of the road to Lhassa. With Chumbi in our possession, we have a clear run into Thibet, for the Tang La Pass across the watershed is an open plain several miles wide. With Chumbi in the possession of the Thibetans the difficulties of an advance into Thibet are trebled. We got through it this time by diplomatic management. But the valley is full of difficult gorges and positions of greater strength than any on the further part of the road to Lhassa; and if we now give the valley up, our troops will have a most difficult task before them in the event of any future advance into Thibet. Nor do the Thibetans show any resentment whatever at the idea of our prolonged occupation of Chumbi, for the valley is not looked upon as part of Thibet proper, and is on the Indian side of the watershed and inhabited by a separate race. Supposing, however, that His Majesty's Government, with these considerations before them, still desire to limit our occupation of the Chumbi Valley to three years, the Viceroy has merely to state this intention in the ratification of the Convention. There might be advantage in attaching to such a declaration a statement that we reserve to ourselves the right to reoccupy the valley if the indemnity is not paid; but we presumably would always have this right in any case, as every nation has a right to enforce a Treaty obligation which is not fulfilled. Any special statement to that effect might not, therefore, greatly strengthen our position, while it might give rise in certain quarters to the idea that we still had designs upon the valley.

All that seems necessary, therefore, in order to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government, is for his Excellency the Viceroy, in ratifying the Convention, to declare that the amount of indemnity will be reduced from 75 to 25 lakhs of rupees, and that the occupation of the Chumbi Valley by us would cease when the first three instalments have been punctually paid and when the trade marts at Gyantse and Gartok have been effectively opened for three years.

I would then at once write to the Regent informing him of his Excellency's graciousness, and would invite him to India to receive the ratification. Further discussion regarding Trade Regulations and the opening of a trade mart at Zayul might then be commenced, and suchlike negotiations might go on indefinitely with the advantage of keeping us in continued touch with the heads of the Thibetan Government.

In this way I hope the wishes of His Majesty's Government will be met and our good relations not be jeopardized as they might have been if I had refused the Regent's proposal regarding the mode of payment of the indemnity; or if I had attempted any alteration of the Convention only a few days after it had been solemnly contracted.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND.

Simla, October 18, 1904.

No. 59.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 10.)

Sir, *India Office, November* 9, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Campbell's letter of the 2nd November, transmitting a copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, dated the 1st instant, as to the question where the Thibet Adhesion Agreement should be negotiated.

Having regard to the decided opinion expressed by Sir E. Satow in support of the view, which has been held from the first by the Government of India, that the negotiations should be conducted at Calcutta, Mr. Brodrick is prepared, in deference to the views of Sir E. Satow and the Government of India, to modify the opinion expressed in my letter of the 17th October, and to agree to the negotiations being conducted at Calcutta by the Viceroy, if the Marquess of Lansdowne sees no objection to the adoption of this course.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

No. 60.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November* 11.)

(No. 244.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 11, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to my telegram No. 236 respecting Thibet, that I mentioned to Prince Ch'ing that the rumour of China's intention to declare Thibet a Chinese province had reached me. He assured me this measure had not been contemplated, and added that to accomplish it would be difficult.

I told Prince Ch'ing that I was gratified to hear this; it would be very extraordinary action to take in view of the negotiations between Great Britain and China that were pending. If it had not been considered in the Grand Council, the idea had yet been mentioned to a member of this Legation by an official of standing.

(Separate.)

The official was Wu Ting-fang, as reported in my despatch No. 351.

(Repeated to India.)

No. 61.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 11, 1904.

THIBET: Adhesion Agreement.

Your telegrams Nos. 235 of the 1st instant and 237 of the 2nd instant.

Having regard to the opinion which you have expressed, strongly supporting the view of the Government of India that the negotiations should be conducted by the Viceroy at Calcutta, His Majesty's Government have decided in favour of that course.

You may inform Chinese Government to that effect.

No. 62.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1904.

I LAID before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 7th instant, relative to the question where the Thibet Adhesion Agreement should be negotiated.

In view of the fact that the Secretary of State for India considers it desirable to defer to the opinion of the Government of India and of Sir E. Satow, Lord Lansdowne

agrees with Mr. Secretary Brodrick that the negotiations should be carried on at Calcutta.

A telegram has been addressed to Sir E. Satow, instructing him to inform the Chinese Government accordingly.

I am, &c.
(Signed) F. H. VILLIERS.

No. 63.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 11th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 12, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 11, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 7th instant: Thibet. I have ratified the Convention in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Government. I have also, as suggested by you, addressed friendly letter to the authorities at Lhassa. I shall be glad to be informed of your wishes as to the publication of the text of Convention and of the appended Declaration. Do you wish the full text of the Declaration telegraphed to you, so that publication may take place simultaneously here and in England?

No. 64.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th November, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, November 14, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 64.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 7, 1904.

THIBET. Your Secret letter of the 6th October and your telegram of the 21st October have been considered by His Majesty's Government.

As regards indemnity, the form of the declaration which you propose to make to the Thibetans on ratifying the Convention is approved, but the stipulation providing that, as security for fulfilment of provisions as to the trade marts, the Chumbi Valley is to be occupied until the marts have been opened effectively for three years should be maintained, and the declaration should be worded accordingly.

As regards the Agreement giving the Trade Agent at Gyantse the right of access to Lhassa, His Majesty's Government have decided to disallow it. I would suggest that you should inform the Thibetans that, while you do not consider it necessary for this provision to be embodied in a formal undertaking, you appreciate the good feeling which they have displayed in accepting it.

His Majesty's Government regard the Agreement as unnecessary, and as inconsistent with the principle on which their policy has throughout been based. It would, moreover, serve to open the door to others desirous of obtaining the right of proceeding to Lhassa, professedly for purposes of commerce, but with the intention of using it for political purposes.

No. 65.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 18.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 27th October, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 16, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Captain Rawlings to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.) *Gyantse, October* 18, 1904.

GARTOK expedition reached Shigatse on 13th, and left on 17th, and received with great hospitality.

Great crowds awaited arrival outside town. Captain O'Connor and Europeans received in State by Tashi Lama on 15th. Relations most friendly. Everything has passed off satisfactorily up to date. Valley fertile, and promises well in trade. We hope to reach Simla about middle January. Will you kindly warn the posts from our border to Simla of our approach ?

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Captain O'Connor to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.) *Gyantse, October* 18, 1904.

Shigatse, October 15.—Arrived Shigatse with Gartok party, 13th. Received in most kindly manner and lodged in house, property of Tashi Lama's parents. Interview with Prime Minister, who is Abbot, we met Khamba Jong, 14th.

Received by Tashi Lama, 15th. Lama most cordial in his manner, and referred to former friendly relations between his predecessors and Indian Government. Am to see him again privately in few days.

Visited Tashi Lumpo monastery to-day and shown all over it. Nepalese Representative and traders have called. Gartok party nearly completed preparations, and start to-morrow or next day.

Inclosure 3 in No. 65.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 13, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of the correspondence which has taken place between the Chinese Resident and myself regarding the term " Foreign Powers " in clause 9 of the Convention.

Inclosure 4 in No. 65.

Colonel Younghusband to Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhassa.

Lhassa, September 11, 1904.

WITH reference to the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet, concluded on 7th September, I have the honour to state that the term "Foreign Powers" in clause 9 does not include China.

I have also the honour to state that there is no objection on my part to Chinese subjects proceeding for purposes of trade to the marts named in clause 2 of the same Convention.

Inclosure 5 in No. 65.

Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhassa to Colonel Younghusband.

Lhassa, September 13, 1904.

IN regard to the Treaty concluded between Great Britain and the Thibetan Government, I have the honour to state, with reference to clause 9, that I have all along maintained that Thibet being a dependency of China, China is not bound by the restrictions mentioned therein. On the other hand, however, the Chinese Government will not directly or indirectly hypothecate or transfer in any way to others anything in the sense of clause 9 without having first obtained the consent of the British Government thereto

Referring to the Agent to be sent by your Government to reside at Gyantse, I agree to his visiting Lhassa, whenever occasion arises, to discuss with me and the Thibetan officials matters of a commercial nature.

Inclosure 6 in No. 65.

Government of India to Lieutenant-Colonel Ravenshaw.

Simla, October 20, 1904.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 26th September, 1904, forwarding a copy of a letter addressed by the Prime Minister of Nepal to the four Kazis at Lhassa.

2. The assistance which has been rendered by the Prime Minister and by the Nepal Durbar throughout the Thibet negotiations has been of the greatest value to the British Government, and his Excellency the Viceroy is sure that the Prime Minister's action in writing this letter of sound advice and exhortation to the Lhassa Kazis has been prompted by an earnest desire to establish feelings of friendship and good understanding between the parties to the recent Agreement. I am to request that you will make a communication to his Excellency to this effect, and that you will convey to him the warm thanks of the Government of India and their appreciation of this further proof of his good-will towards the British Government.

No. 66.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 19.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 19th November, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 19, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 66.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 19, 1904.

TELEGRAPHIC report dated Gyantse, the 17th instant, has been received from Captain O'Connor, to the effect that there are persistent rumours of intention on the part of Thibetans to renew hostilities. It is said that three buried cannons have been dug up from Gyantse Jong and conveyed to Shigatse, and that all military officers have been summoned to meet Teling Kusho at the latter place. Captain O'Connor reports that there is no need for anxiety, and that he is well prepared against attack.

No. 67.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November* 21.)

(No. 344.)

My Lord, *Peking, September* 29, 1904.

IN pursuance of the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram No. 138 of the 21st September, to make representations to the Chinese Government in the sense of the warnings addressed by Colonel Younghusband to the Chinese Resident at Lhassa, reported in the Viceroy of India's telegram of the 18th September, and to lay stress on the fact that Chinese suzerainty over Thibet was recognized by His Majesty's Government in asking China for her adhesion to the Agreement signed with the Thibetans, I have the honour to report that on the 23rd instant I had an interview with Prince Ch'ing, with whom was present Mr. Wu Ting-fang, Junior Director of the Foreign Board.

I began by referring to my conversation of the 14th instant with His Excellency Nat'ung (which was reported briefly in my telegram No. 200 of the same day). The latter had broached the subject by inquiring whether I had any news, to which I had replied by saying that the Agreement with the Thibetans had been signed on the 7th instant, and that the Chinese Resident was only awaiting authorization to sign the Adhesion Agreement. I had explained the nature of this document, which was also to be signed by Colonel Younghusband on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and that the ratifications were to be exchanged in London.

Nat'ung had stated to me that the draft Agreement with the Thibetans presented certain difficulties, which he was not empowered to state to me, and the Board had telegraphed to the Resident for further information. I on my part had replied to him that I had no authority to discuss matters of detail. However, on the very same day that Nat'ung had informed me the Board had telegraphed for further information, the Resident had furnished Colonel Younghusband with copies of telegrams from the Board instructing him not to sign the Adhesion Agreement, as the Agreement with the Thibetans robbed China of her suzerainty, and that they objected to Great Britain making a Convention with Thibet at all. (It should be observed that I was not then in possession of the full text of the telegrams communicated by the Resident, forwarded by Colonel Younghusband on the 15th September, which only reached me on the 25th.) I presumed that this was a correct account of the telegrams referred to. The Prince replied that it was.

I went on to state that I was instructed to inform His Highness that His Majesty's Government were greatly surprised at this attitude on the part of the Chinese Government. It had all along been well understood that, the Thibetans having refused to recognize the Convention of 1890 on the ground that they were not parties to it, the present Mission would negotiate with them with the assistance of the Resident. Two days after his arrival at Lhassa the British Commissioner communicated to the Resident, through the Secretary of the latter, the terms of the Agreement which it was proposed to make with Thibet; and from that moment the Resident and the British Commissioner worked together in harmony to obtain their acceptation by the Thibetan negotiators. The papers in my possession showed clearly that the Resident was made acquainted with everything that passed, and he was usually—probably always—present at the meetings of the negotiators. Nothing was kept back from him, and he was in a position from the outset to report everything to his Government. The telegraph line was placed at his disposal on the 6th August, but already on the 27th July I had transmitted for the Foreign Board a telegram to his address. This telegram, which reached Simla on the 28th, was at once sent on to Gyantse, and the officer in command there was instructed to forward it at once,

and also to transmit a copy to the Resident by means of Chinese runners. Up to the 15th September I had forwarded for the Foreign Board as many as seven telegrams (the 27th July, 10th, 12th, 26th August, 9th, 10th, and 15th September), but how many the Board had received from the Resident over our lines I had no means of knowing, as they did not pass through my hands.

On the 10th August, I continued, the Resident forwarded to Colonel Younghusband the written answer of the Thibetans to the British conditions, which was returned to them as inadmissible also through the Resident. The draft of the Adhesion Agreement had also been communicated to him before the 17th August. On the 19th August the Resident handed to the British Commissioner the Thibetan reply, in which they practically agreed to all the British terms. As before observed, he was also in possession of the draft Adhesion Agreement. On the 30th August the main clauses of the Agreement as it now stands were agreed to by the Acting Regent and the National Council with the full knowledge of the Resident. (I might have added that this took place in his presence.) These citations showed that from the very first the British Commissioner made our intentions known to the Resident, and gave him every facility for informing the Chinese Government.

I added that Thibet had all along repudiated the right of China to make a Treaty on her behalf without her being a party to it. Great Britain, however, had throughout the negotiations recognized the suzerainty of China, and on the occasion of the Agreement being signed with the Thibetans, Colonel Younghusband expressly declared to them in presence of the Resident that we recognized it. The mention of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 in the preamble and in clause 1 were a further proof of this, and I laid stress on the fact that China had been asked to sign the Adhesion Agreement as affording irrefragable evidence of its recognition on the part of Great Britain.

Prince Ch'ing interrupted me here with great eagerness, and said that the Chinese Government perfectly understood now that Great Britain sincerely desired to respect Chinese suzerainty over Thibet, as the Resident had reported the reception of two letters from Colonel Younghusband throwing a new light on the question. This report had given great satisfaction, and no difficulty remained in the way of the Amban signing the Adhesion Agreement, except that presented by clause 9 of the Agreement with the Thibetans. This clause was, His Highness recognized, aimed at Russia only, but it appeared also to infringe the most-favoured-nation rights not only of Russia but also of the other Treaty Powers, and it would create difficulties for China. There was another point which he would like to mention for the purpose of obtaining my advice. The Chinese Government recognized that the Dalai Lama had proved himself a worthless creature. Under his rule the country had become disorganized and the people undisciplined. He had now also abandoned his post.

They proposed, therefore, to dispatch an official of experience in foreign affairs to Thibet to reorganize the Administration. His Highness' object in mentioning this plan before going further was to avoid exciting any suspicion as to their motives in the mind of the Indian Government. The projected appointment would not cause any delay in settling the terms of the Agreement. In a few days they would send instructions to the Resident. They did not wish to change the Agreement signed with the Thibetans, but to have an explanatory clause added to the Adhesion Agreement by way of gloss on clause 9.

I asked whether I might inform His Majesty's Government that China did not object to the Agreement on account of its having been signed with the Thibetans, but only because of clause 9.

The Prince replied in the affirmative. The earlier telegrams from the Resident had not explained the attitude of His Majesty's Government as now demonstrated by the two letters received from the British Commissioner. All the Chinese Government had learnt was that an Agreement had been signed with Thibet, and, as far as they had known, China was ignored. But on hearing of the two letters and their contents they were perfectly satisfied, and all they wanted now was the addition of a clause embodying the declarations made by Colonel Younghusband and explaining clause 9.

I said that, in view of his Highness' declaration that the Chinese Government were satisfied on the question of their suzerainty, it would, I presume, be unnecessary to say any more on that point.

The Prince said that they were quite satisfied as to that, but he would wish to know what I thought of their sending an experienced official to put things straight in Thibet. It would take him two or three months only to reach Lhassa by way of India.

I replied that, not having any instructions, I was not prepared to discuss the project, but would be willing to telegraph it to His Majesty's Government. What seemed more

important was that the Chinese Government should make it clear what they wished in respect of clause 9. What sort of an explanatory statement did they desire? If his Highness could tell me that, for the information of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, it would save time. The idea of sending a special Commissioner to Thibet seemed to imply considerable delay. Why not telegraph to the Resident what their views were?

The Prince responded that the Resident would, of course, be informed by telegraph of their views with regard to the Agreement, but the contemplated appointment was a separate matter. This special Commissioner was to regulate Thibetan affairs and insure the maintenance of good relations with India. He hoped their motives would not be misconstrued. They did not suspect the Indian Government of any harmful designs, and he hoped similar confidence would be extended to China. The Resident was fully trusted by the Chinese Government, and he would not have to await the arrival of the Special Commissioner in order to conclude his negotiations with Colonel Younghusband.

I observed that if the Resident received instructions to sign the Adhesion Agreement His Majesty's Government would presumably offer no objection to the proposed dispatch of a Special Commissioner to Thibet; but any suggestion that his arrival at Lhassa should be awaited in order to settle the Adhesion Agreement would not commend itself.

His Highness assured me, in reply, that directly the Chinese Government had fully considered the Agreement they would telegraph to the Resident to discuss the question of clause 9 with Colonel Younghusband. They now knew that Great Britain was not interfering with their suzerainty, but only guarding herself against Russia, and the project of appointing a special officer to reorganize the country was rendered necessary by the misrule of the Dalai Lama.

I said I would inform His Majesty's Government of what was contemplated, and repeated my suggestion that it would save time if the Foreign Board, when telegraphing their instructions to the Resident, would acquaint me with their tenour, for the information of His Majesty's Government.

Mr. Wu here suggested that perhaps I might suggest to them some form of words which could be adopted with regard to Article 9, on which their instructions to the Resident could be based. Surely it would be easy for me to say what would be accepted as a satisfactory solution. I declined, however, to offer any advice on this point, the discussion of which, I repeated, formed no part of my instructions. I had fulfilled those in explaining that the Agreement did not infringe the suzerainty of China, but had merely to report what His Highness informed me were the views of the Chinese Government.

Prince Ch'ing having agreed to acquaint me with the nature of the instructions to be sent within the next few days to the Resident at Lhassa, the conversation terminated.

A copy of this despatch has been transmitted to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 68.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 351. Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Peking, October 6, 1904.*

AS pointed out in my telegram No. 207 of the 26th September, the instructions telegraphed to the Amban by the Chinese Government on that day did not correspond with the statement made to me by Prince Ch'ing on the 23rd September, as reported in my telegram No. 206, the important difference being that the Prince had told me that the Chinese Government were not asking for any change in the Agreement already signed with the Thibetans, whereas the instructions actually sent to the Amban directed him to negotiate an alteration in it.

By my instructions Mr. Cockburn called, on the 3rd instant, on Na Tung and Wu Ting-fang (the latter having been present at my interview with the Prince) with a view to obtaining an explanation of this change of front. Na-tajên, whom he saw first, disclaimed any knowledge of the matter except what he had learnt from Wu-tajên, but said that the alteration in the proposed instructions was, he believed, due to the Grand Council, and that Wu Ting-fang had objected, when he saw the instructions, that they did not agree with what had been arranged.

On the Thibetan question generally Na-tajên had little to say. He agreed that foreign Powers had little real ground for their protests founded on the most-favoured-nation clauses in their Treaties with China, but said that China nevertheless found herself in a most difficult position.

He had seen a Reuter's telegram announcing the departure of the British troops from Lhassa, and on Mr. Cockburn's remarking that it did not clearly appear from it whether Colonel Younghusband had also left, he looked very grave and said that would be a most undesirable step.

The impression left on Mr. Cockburn's mind was that the course events have taken at Lhassa was quite unexpected by Na-tajên, who had apparently relied on the ability of the Amban, of whom he has always spoken in warm terms of praise, to arrange some solution at Lhassa which should be acceptable to the Chinese Government, and for this reason had supported all the Amban's suggestions with regard to dealing with the Dalai Lama. His expectations having been disappointed, Na-tajên is probably disinclined to take any prominent part in the present discussions.

From him Mr. Cockburn went on to call on Wu-tajên, whose explanation of the alteration in the instructions to the Amban agreed with those given by Na, but were more detailed. According to Wu the Prince's original intention was to supply the Amban with a detailed draft showing the nature of the reservations to be inserted in the Adhesion Agreement, but he was overruled by the Grand Council, who decided to send the general instructions already communicated to your Lordship. The Prince, according to Wu, was somehow persuaded that three was no real contradiction between the tenour of these and the assurances given to me.

He had a great deal to say about the good results to be expected from the appointment of Tang Shao-yi, whom he had himself recommended, and about the necessity of bringing Thibet under more direct Chinese control, and invited Mr. Cockburn's opinion on the desirability of transforming Thibet into a regular Chinese province. Mr. Cockburn reminded him that the Chinese Government would then become responsible for the safety of foreign travellers all over Thibet, to say nothing of difficulties in connection with commerce and missionaries, and recommended great caution in handling the Thibetan problem, with the features of which the Chinese Government was, according to Wu-tajên's own admissions, very imperfectly acquainted. At least let them await the result of Tang's study of it.

Wu also enlarged on China's difficulty in meeting the protests of foreign Powers, and while showing some inclination to admit the justice of Mr. Cockburn's argument that nothing in the Thibetan Convention infringed existing rights of foreign Powers in that country, said that there was difficulty in defining the status of Thibet when challenged on the point by foreign Representatives, who wished to know whether it was Chinese territory or not. Mr. Cockburn rejoined that at all events no Power had ever enjoyed in Thibet the privileges granted by Treaty in China proper. One could not obtain, for instance, a passport for Lhassa, nor could one take goods under transit pass to that destination.

Wu then recurred to Tang's appointment, and said that it had not yet been definitely decided what route he should take, but probably he would proceed viâ India.

Wu, like Na, referred to the Reuter's telegram reporting the Mission's departure from Lhassa, but seemed much less concerned than his colleague about the possibility of Colonel Younghusband having left with the troops, probably because he has never been a supporter of the Amban.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 69.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 352. Very Confidential.)
My Lord, *Peking, October 6, 1904.*

IN my despatch No. 344 of the 29th September I had the honour to report the results of an interview with Prince Ching, at which I repeated to His Highness the warnings addressed to the Amban by Colonel Younghusband, and laid stress upon the fact that, by asking China to adhere to the Agreement signed by him with the Thibetans, His Majesty's Government had recognized Chinese suzerainty over Thibet. The con-

versation recorded in that despatch was summarized in my telegram No. 206 of the 23rd September. Three days later I had occasion to transmit to your Lordship by the same medium copy of the telegraphic instructions addressed to the Amban by the Chinese Government, and to point out certain discrepancies between its contents and the language used to me by the Prince on the 23rd. Subsequently I received from India a repetition of the Viceroy's telegram of the 29th September, your Lordship's telegrams No. 142 of the 29th September and No. 144 of the 1st October, the latter of which contained further instructions in reply to inquiries contained in my telegram No. 211, and I proceeded to ask for an interview with Prince Ching for the 5th instant. But as the telegraphic instructions to the Amban above mentioned seemed to indicate that my task would be only half performed if I contented myself with a conversation with Prince Ching, I requested Mr. Cockburn to see Natung and Wu Ting-fang, the junior Vice-President and junior Director of the Foreign Board, and endeavour to prepare the way for what I should have to say to His Highness. An account of his interviews is contained in my immediately preceding despatch.

Up to this moment I had been acting on the belief that Colonel Younghusband was still at Lhassa, and would probably remain there until the 15th instant, and the instructions I received from your Lordship, as well as telegrams from India, seemed to be based upon the same expectation. Otherwise to attempt to demonstrate to the Chinese Government that they would do well to instruct the Amban to sign the Adhesion Agreement would have been without any practical object. After all my arrangements had been made, however, I received on the 1st instant a copy of the Viceroy's telegram of the 30th September to the Secretary of State for India, and then for the first time learnt that Colonel Younghusband had quitted Lhassa on the 23rd ultimo.

As it was too late to abandon the proposed interview I went to the Prince yesterday afternoon as arranged. Evidently he had expected a conversation about Thibet, but in order to avoid creating the impression that this was the principal object of my visit, I discussed several other topics at some length before I approached that of the Thibetan Agreement. Being precluded by the circumstances from urging the immediate adhesion of China to that compact, I had to fall back on a discussion of the change of attitude on His Highness' part indicated by the instructions destined for the Amban. I was consequently unable to utilize to their full extent the arguments contained in your Lordship's two telegrams above mentioned and the Viceroy's telegram.

The conversation which ensued is given exactly as it occurred, in the following record derived from carefully-prepared Memoranda and notes. His Excellency Wu Ting-fang was with Prince Ching, and I was accompanied by Mr. Cockburn and Mr. Mayers, the latter of whom took the notes.

Myself. Now I want to talk to your Highness about Thibet.

Prince Ching. Please wait till Mr. Wu has told you my views on that question.

Mr. Wu Ting-fang (speaking in English). His Highness has just been talking over the Thibetan question with me, and desires to give you an explanation of his views. The last telegraphic instructions to the Amban were not based upon any wish to raise difficulties, but were due to the fact that other Powers were certain to place China in a very difficult position by appealing to the most-favoured-nation clauses in their respective Treaties; if China agreed to clause 9 and granted trade privileges to Great Britain, other Powers would be bound to ask for similar privileges themselves. China wished to have a complete answer ready for them, and it was with this object in view that the Chinese Government instructed Yu Tai to consult again with Colonel Younghusband, in order to find some way of obviating the difficulty in which China found herself placed.

Myself. That is in reference to your telegram of the 26th September to the Amban, which was sent through me and of which you gave me a copy. I had already telegraphed to His Majesty's Government an account of what your Highness had said to me on the 23rd September. On that occasion I had explained to your Highness the grounds on which Colonel Younghusband had concluded an agreement with the Thibetans, and that Chinese suzerainty was expressly recognized by us. Your Highness stated, in reply, that the Amban had only recently reported the receipt of two letters from Colonel Younghusband which completely removed from the mind of the Chinese Government all impression that Chinese suzerainty had been diminished; that they did not object to the Agreement having been signed by the Thibetans, but that Article 9 created difficulties.

Prince Ching. Yes; we desire to have Article 9 explained, and that the Amban should negotiate with Colonel Younghusband some means of obviating the difficulty raised in respect to the most-favoured-nation rights of other Powers.

Myself. I had noticed, of course, that the telegram of the 26th September was not in accordance with the statement of views above mentioned, but I sent it on to India for the Amban, as I had always desired to facilitate your communications with him.

At the same time I telegraphed its contents to His Majesty's Government, as we had agreed I should do at our interview on the 23rd September, being, as I am, only an intermediary in this matter.

Now I have received the observations of His Majesty's Government upon your Highness' telegram to the Amban. They observe that, while your Highness informed me on the 23rd that only Article 9 offered difficulties, the instructions addressed to the Amban state that "the ten Articles, &c., still require careful consideration." Can your Highness inform me why all were referred to if only clause 9 is the stumbling-block?

Prince Ching. What we want is something done to Article 9; the others only require, perhaps, a little polishing.

Myself. The Amban's instructions say that the expression "any foreign Power" in the Article your Highness mentions cannot be accepted by China owing to the most-favoured-nation clause in the various Treaties; and Thibet being under Chinese authority, it cannot alone be placed in a different position to the rest of the Empire. The Amban is therefore to persuade Colonel Younghusband to make "satisfactory alterations in this Article before it can be acted upon." The instructions do not indicate to the unfortunate Amban what "alterations" would be considered "satisfactory."

Prince Ching. We could not give him explicit instructions on this point till he had consulted with Colonel Younghusband.

Myself. Then I pity the Amban. He is left to fight out the question with Colonel Younghusband without any indication of what the Chinese Government wants. Of course, the first thing Colonel Younghusband would ask would be, "What do you want?" The Amban would then be reduced to replying, "Well, to tell you the truth, I don't know."

Prince Ching. The Amban would naturally tell Colonel Younghusband that clause 9 is provoking universal opposition. Colonel Younghusband would appreciate the difficulty which has been raised and make some suggestion.

Myself. Why should Colonel Younghusband make any suggestions? He would rather say to the Amban, "I am quite content with the Article as it stands. It is for you to make a proposal, and I will see if I can accept it." The result would be that neither party would be able to suggest anything, and the negotiations would come to a stop. Perhaps this is what the Chinese Government desires. It is what is known as "gaining time."

Prince Ching. Oh, no; we had no such object in view.

Myself. Now, if the Wai-wu Pu had told the Amban, "if clause 9 be explained in such and such a way it would be rendered innocuous," Colonel Younghusband could have considered the proposal. But, as I said, he would not make suggestions, and the Amban probably does not know enough about the Treaties with foreign Powers to be able to do so without explicit instructions.

Prince Ching. But is Colonel Younghusband still at Lhassa?

Myself. No; he has left. I heard of his departure after having arranged this interview with your Highness.

Prince Ching. You know about T'ang Taotai's appointment. We shall send him by way of India, and then he can discuss this matter with the Indian Government.

Myself. When I last saw your Highness I fully expected Colonel Younghusband would be in Lhassa for another three weeks, but I have since heard that he left on the same day as General Macdonald. Under the circumstances it seems scarcely possible that the Adhesion Agreement should be arranged between him and the Amban unless

the latter hurries after him and overtakes him before reaching the frontier. The position, therefore, is this :—

We have made an Agreement with the Thibetans which we have no doubt of their carrying out. We have shown our readiness in every way to recognize the rights of China. Our Commissioner has been perfectly open with the Amban, keeping him informed from the first of the terms which he was going to ask, working with and through him, and forwarding all his telegrams to Peking, while the Legation performed the corresponding office for the Foreign Board. I have no doubt that your Highness' last telegram has been transmitted to the Amban by runners from Gyantse, but it did not reach Lhassa in time. Even if it had, no good would have come of it, since His Majesty's Government are quite satisfied with the wording of the Agreement and are not prepared to make any alteration in it.

What I therefore wish to know in respect to the telegram of the 26th September is, which is the view of the Chinese Government—what your Highness said to me on the 23rd, or what the telegram said on the 26th ? As the latter arrived too late it might be best to consider it non-existent, and to take what your Highness said the other day as the basis upon which to come to an agreement. His Majesty's Government are perfectly willing, I feel sure, to act in a conciliatory spirit and agree as to the interpretation of clause 9, but what they will not do is to make any change in the Agreement with the Thibetans.

Prince Ching. I perfectly understand. When T'ang Taotai arrives in Peking he will call on you, and I hope that our plan of sending him viâ India will result in some arrangement being arrived at.

Myself. I should explain that the instructions I am now acting on were addressed to me before His Majesty's Government knew that Colonel Younghusband had left, and are therefore based on the supposition that he and the Amban might still settle the question.

Mr. Wu. And now a new man is to appear on the scene and to proceed to Thibet, viâ India, with instructions which will enable him to take the place of the Amban in consulting with Colonel Younghusband in India or elsewhere.

Prince Ching. Our reason for sending T'ang Taotai is that Yu Tai, the Amban, has really no experience of foreign affairs.

Myself. His Majesty's Government are quite willing to enter into some form of Adhesion Agreement with China, whose suzerainty she has gone out of her way to recognize, since China had failed to insure the execution of the Convention of 1890 and the Supplementary Agreement of 1893, both of which the Thibetans refused to acknowledge as binding on themselves. It should not be impossible to frame an explanation of clause 9 showing that it in no way infringes the most-favoured-nation rights of other Powers.

Prince Ching. If the Thibetans had only respected the former Convention things would never have come to this pass. The Americans, German, French, and Italian Ministers have all protested against China agreeing to the Convention ; and what we have to anticipate is that if we agree they will come to us with their most-favoured-nation clauses, and Germany will want similar reservations in respect to Shantung, France in respect to Yünnan, Japan in respect to Fuhkien, and so on.

Myself. In that case it might be better, perhaps, that there should be no Agreement with China.

Prince Ching. Oh, that would never do. Where would our suzerainty be then ?

Myself. It must be remembered that the political status of Thibet is not at all like that of the eighteen provinces of China. It is an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, disposing freely of its revenues, and its Administration is altogether independent. The Emperor does not appoint a Viceroy ; he has only a Resident there.

Prince Ching. Yes. It is different, but that won't prevent other Powers dragging in their most-favoured-nation clauses.

Myself. But we have already special arrangements with China in respect to trade over the Burma-Yünnan frontier, with special tariff rates which other nationalities get advantage of for their goods. They could enjoy similar trade advantages for their

goods in Thibet, but what His Majesty's Government cannot admit is that there should be any other foreign Power wielding political influence in that country.

Prince Ching. After all, if you recognize Chinese suzerainty, what is the use of the clause? It is for us to see after that. But once you take such an open step as to provide against foreign influences by Treaty, mischief results with other Powers.

Myself. I may perhaps have private views on that point, but can only say that I did not negotiate this Agreement. His Majesty's Government will not change it, and it must be regarded as a *fait accompli.*

Prince Ching. Granting that no actual change is made, it is difficult to see how China is to be saved from the importunities of other Powers.

Myself. Can your Highness tell me what motive the American Minister could possibly have in mentioning this matter to your Highness?

Prince Ching. No, I don't know.

Myself. I have read in Chinese newspapers what your Highness has told me about the observations of foreign Representatives, and their names were correctly given. I must say the Chinese press has been extraordinarily well informed on this matter. In the telegram of instructions to the Amban the observation occurs that "the Thibetan Treaty received early publicity in the newspapers." Probably the Amban will think it is the British Government or the British Legation that has committed this indiscretion of disclosing to the press negotiations which, as far as concerns the Chinese Government, are uncompleted. But when I next see the Amban I shall tell him it was not so, but that I read the Agreement first in a Chinese newspaper, which seems to prove sufficiently that the indiscretion was that of a Chinese official. The press has even told us that the Amban had to procure a remittance of 40,000 taels through Calcutta because the Thibetans would not allow the money to come through from Szechuan, which seems to be quite true, but they added what is not true, that it was intended for distribution to the British soldiers.

Prince Ching. It is surprising how much the newspapers find out sometimes, though, in the main, they are unreliable.

Myself. Sometimes they seem to get into the most secret places, like the fine dust of Peking.

The interview then closed.

Your Lordship will perceive from the foregoing record that the Prince carefully avoided committing himself in any way, except to the general statement that Article 9 of the Agreement, if accepted by China, would expose her to the danger of having claims made on her by other Powers for recognition of their exclusive political influence in those parts of the Emperor's dominions in which they have already declared themselves to have a special interest. He declined to reaffirm his language of the 23rd September, and when pressed to say what other articles required, in the language of the instructions to the Amban, "careful consideration," refused to say more than that they required, perhaps, a little "polishing." Equally unavailing were my attempts to obtain some indication of the manner in which he considered it possible to get over the clear and precise language of Article 9. On my part, though I mentioned in general language the kind of formula which might possibly be adopted, I did not feel authorized to suggest anything definite. The Prince, your Lordship will observe, no longer entertains the high opinion of Yu Tai's capacity which he expressed to me on the 23rd September, and it is probable that colleagues of Chinese descent on the Grand Council and in the Foreign Board have convinced him that a Manchu official had better be extremely cautious when discussing high politics with a foreign Representative. It is for this reason that T'ang Taotai, late of Tien-tsin, has been recommended for the task of finding a remedy for the Thibetan Agreement, as he is a Cantonese, speaks English, and has had a long experience of foreigners and their ways.

The impression left on my mind by the conversation was that the Chinese Government, while affecting now to be quite satisfied with the assurances they have received as to the recognition of their suzerainty, hold Article 9 to be especially objectionable, as facilitating demands from other Powers for the creation of spheres of influence. At the same time they probably feel that the undertaking not to alienate territory nor to

grant certain other privileges to any foreign Power without the consent of Great Britain does, in fact, constitute the latter a partner with China in regard to Thibet, where previously she possessed exclusive control.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

No. 70.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 21st November, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 21, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 21, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 14th instant.

Please see telegram No. 237 from Sir E. Satow to Foreign Office.

We suggest that Prince Ching should be informed, in reply to his inquiry, that Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department will be happy to meet Tang at Calcutta till March, or at Simla after that date, for the purpose of negotiations. Chinese Government might also be asked to state probable date of Tang's arrival in India.

(Repeated to Foreign Department with Viceroy.)

No. 71.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 10th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, November 22, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 71.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 2, 1904

PLEASE refer to the telegram dated the 1st instant from His Majesty's Minister at Peking regarding the rumoured intention of the Chinese Government to declare Thibet a province of the Chinese Empire. It is suggested by Lord Lansdowne that Sir E Satow should be instructed that he may, if he thinks fit, address a warning to the Chinese Government to the effect that His Majesty's Government would not regard such action on the part of China as modifying the situation, or as calling for any departure from the policy which we have already announced. I should be glad to learn your views on the subject.

Inclosure 2 in No. 71.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 10, 1904.

THIBET. Your telegram of the 5th instant. Instructions in the sense of my telegram of the 2nd were sent to Sir E. Satow on the 8th.

No. 72.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 23.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 3rd instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 21, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 72.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, August* 27, 1904.

WE propose, as indicated in draft Convention forwarded with our despatch of the 4th August, to negotiate details of Trade Regulations separately. Colonel Younghusband, however, proposes to arrange at once that Indian tea be admitted to Thibet at rate of duty not exceeding that at which tea is admitted into India. We propose to sanction this with your approval.

Repeated to Colonel Younghusband and Sir E. Satow.

Inclosure 2 in No. 72.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *Gyantse, August* 28, 1904.

Lhassa, August 23.—It is quite possible we may be able to get through Trade Regulations now without much difficulty or delay. If Government think this desirable, I would suggest following alterations in 1893 Regulations :—

1. If Thibetans wish to impose a tariff under Regulation 4, it might be fixed at 5 per cent. *ad valorem.*

2. In Regulation 6, for " Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer " we might put " British Agent and responsible Chinese or Thibetan official."

3. Regulations 7 and 8 might be abolished.

4. In General Article 1 same amendment as in Regulation 6 might be made.

Inclosure 3 in No. 72.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) *India Office, August* 28, 1904.

I AGREE to the proposals contained in your telegram dated the 27th August regarding Thibet trade negotiations.

Inclosure 4 in No. 72.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

Simla, September 10, 1904.

I AM directed to send, for your information, a copy of a tentative draft of Trade Regulations to be substituted for those drawn up between the British and Chinese Governments in 1893.

2. I am to explain that the draft has not been finally settled, and is only sent in its present form as a basis for future telegraphic correspondence, if necessary.

Inclosure 5 in No. 72.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, September* 10, 1904.

FOLLOWING is rough draft of Trade Regulations with Thibet:—

"1. No discrimination, direct or indirect, shall be exercised as against merchandize of British or British Indian origin or manufacture, or as against any class of merchandize imported into Thibet by, or on account of, British subjects. No tariff discrimination, advantages, or facilities of any kind whatsoever, shall be accorded to trade in any class of goods over any frontier of Thibet which are not immediately granted in respect of trade over the frontiers of India and Thibet. No privileges or facilities not granted to British subjects shall be conceded to the subjects of any other country. The subjects of the British and Thibetan Governments sholl each within the territory of the other enjoy all the privileges and advantages in the matter of trade that may have been, or may hereafter be, accorded to the subjects of any other nation.

"2. Import duties in excess of 5 per cent. *ad valorem* shall not be levied upon goods imported into Thibet from British India. Wherever possible, specific duties, not exceeding this rate, shall be fixed, and the specific duties prescribed may be revised from time to time on the demand of either party, subject always to the proviso that they shall in no case exceed 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. *Ad valorem* rates will be calculated on the basis of market cost at the frontier of Thibet.

"3. Import duties upon merchandize brought into Thibet from British India shall be leviable once only in respect of any goods; and the duties shall be collected at certain fixed places on or near the frontier, to be chosen by agreement between the Government of India and the Thibetan Government. The Customs stations chosen may subsequently be altered from time to time, after reasonable notice has been given, with the consent of the Government of India.

"4. Goods shall not be unnecessarily detained for the purpose of assessment to import duty; and in no case shall the period of detention exceed four days. Goods which have been examined at the Customs stations, and which have been released therefrom after payment of the duty leviable, shall not be subject to further examination after they have passed beyond the prescribed limits of the Customs zone. These limits shall be fixed for each station, and shall not, unless by special agreement, extend in any direction to a greater distance than 10 miles from the frontier.

"5. No export duties shall be levied by the Thibetan Government upon goods exported to British India from Thibet, otherwise than in accordance with an export tariff to be settled by agreement between the Government of India and the Thibetan Government. The rates of export duty fixed by the tariff shall in no case exceed 5 per cent. *ad valorem;* and the provisions of these Regulations, in so far as they relate to import duty, shall (unless it is otherwise declared) apply also to the export duties leviable under this Article.

"6. Subject to the provisions of Article 11, the Government of India shall admit all goods from Thibet into British India at the same rates of duty, and subject in all respects to the same conditions, as are from time to time imposed by them in respect of goods imported into British India by sea from other foreign countries.

"7. Goods of every description may, subject to the provisions of Article 11 of these Regulations, be exported freely from India to Thibet, subject to the same rates of duty, and to the same conditions, as are from time to time imposed by the Government of India in respect of goods exported by sea to foreign countries.

"8. The Government of India agree to admit all goods (other than goods, the entry of which into British India is prohibited under Article 11 of these Regulations) imported into British India from Thibet free of duty for a period of five years from the date of signature of these Regulations. During this period no export duty will be levied upon goods exported from British India to Thibet.

"9. The Government of India shall be free to send officers to watch the conditions of British trade at any or each of the marts established, or hereafter to be established, under Article 2 of the Agreement between the British and Thibetan Governments, dated the .

"10. All subjects of His Britannic Majesty shall be permitted to reside and to build, purchase, rent, or otherwise acquire houses and godowns for their own accommodation, and the storage of their goods at all marts established, or hereafter to be established, under Article 2 of the Agreement dated the . The Thibetan Government undertake that suitable facilities for the above purposes shall be provided for British subjects, and also that a special and fitting residence shall be provided for the officer or officers appointed by the Government of India under Article 9 to reside at each mart. British subjects shall be at liberty to sell their goods to whomsoever they please, to purchase native commodities in kind or in money, to hire transport of any kind, and in general to conduct their business without any vexatious restrictions, and they shall not be subjected to any tolls, cesses, or imposts of any kind in excess of, or other than, the duty mentioned in Articles 2 and 5. Rest-houses shall be constructed by the Thibetan Government at suitable stages on the roads from the frontier to each of the marts established, or hereafter to be established, at which British subjects can break their journey in consideration of a reasonable daily rent.

"11. Import and export trade in the following articles—arms, ammunition, military stores, salt, liquors, and intoxicating or narcotic drugs—may, at the option of either Government, be prohibited entirely, or permitted only on such conditions as either Government on their own side may seem fit to impose.

"12. All disputes arising in connection with these Regulations, in which the interests of British subjects are concerned, shall be referred for decision to the British Trade Agent at the mart concerned, who shall decide the matter with the assistance of two Thibetan consultative assessors. Each party shall have the right to nominate one assessor. The decision of the British Trade Agent shall be final, subject to a further reference to the Government of India, should the Thibetan Government so desire.

"13. No monopolies of any kind connected with trade or industrial enterprise shall be granted by the Thibetan Government to any person, persons, or corporation, without the previous consent of the Government of India.

"14. After the lapse of five years from the date on which these Regulations shall come into force, and on six months' notice given by either party, these Regulations shall be subject to revision by Commissioners appointed on both sides for the purpose, who shall be empowered to decide on and adopt such amendments and extensions as may be mutually agreed, and as experience may have proved to be desirable.

"15. In the event of any question arising as to the interpretation of these Regulations, the English text alone shall be held to be authoritative and binding upon both the Governments."

Draft has not been finally settled, and is only sent in its present form as a basis for future telegraphic correspondence, if necessary.

Inclosure 6 in No. 72.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, September* 10, 1904

YOUR telegram of the 28th August.

Text of draft Trade Regulations under Article 2 of draft Agreement follows. It is understood that China has no claim to duties at present levied on trade in Thibet, and that whole amount of Customs duties would go to Thibet. If this is not the case, possibly some surtax might be allowed, or rate of Customs duty increased to 8 per cent.

Following provisions are suggested in case of surtax being necessary, but it would be much better to avoid introduction of this further complication at present:—

"5. In addition to the import duty under Article 2, a surtax, not exceeding 5 per cent., may be levied upon all goods entering Thibet from India, subject always

to the condition that it shall not be levied on goods imported from India unless levied in like manner on goods imported from all other countries. The surtax, if levied, shall be assessed at the same time and in the same manner as the import duty on the goods; and the provisions of these Regulations, in so far as they relate to import duty, shall, unless otherwise declared, apply also to the surtax leviable under this Article.

"6. The surtax under Article 5 shall be deemed to be a consolidated tax leviable in lieu of all internal taxation upon goods imported into Thibet from British India; and, whether this tax is or is not levied, no dues, other than the dues leviable under Articles 2 and 5 of these Regulations, and no internal taxation of any kind shall be levied upon goods imported into Thibet from British India."

Question of securing indemnity on Customs and of our collecting Customs on frontier, subject to guarantee of minimum collection of 1½ lakhs a-year, is under consideration. It is hoped that you may be able to negotiate these Regulations before you have to leave Lhassa under orders already communicated.

Inclosure 7 in No. 72.

Government of India to Colonel Younghusband.

(Telegraphic.) *Simla, September* 15, 1904.

MY telegram of 10th September.

Please prefix following preamble:—

"Regulations regarding trade as amended by common consent between British and Thibetan Governments under Article II and III of the Anglo-Thibetan Convention of 1904. The follow amended Regulations are substituted for those made under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893."

Text already sent stands, but if you consider anything has been omitted in 1893 Regulations which should be repeated, you can add it, as draft is more for guidance in negotiations than rigidly fixed.

You can tell Thibetans that, if they accept and sign these Regulations promptly, you will recommend leniency as regards indemnity, as suggested in my telegram of yesterday. If Amban will also sign the Regulations so much the better, but at any rate signature of these by Thibetans will probably meet our purposes, and you should make every effort to secure their consent.

Inclosure 8 in No. 72.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Sir, *Simla, October* 28, 1904.

OF the five copies of the Convention which I signed at Lhassa on the 7th September with the Thibetan Government, one was handed over by me to the Thibetan Government and one to the Chinese Amban. I have now the honour to deliver to you the three remaining copies, and in doing so I desire to take the opportunity of recapitulating the main results of the Mission with the charge of which I was honoured, and to bring to the favourable notice of the Government of India the valuable services rendered by the members of my staff.

2. When the Mission entered Thibet at the beginning of July of last year, the Thibetan Delegates refused to discuss matters at any other place than Yatung; they returned all written communications addressed to them; they refused to report to their Government anything which I said; they absolutely repudiated the Convention made by the Chinese Government on their behalf in 1890; and they showed a distinct inclination to rely upon a foreign Power to aid them in defying us. The attitude of the local Chinese officials was hardly more satisfactory. The then Amban, instead of coming himself to the frontier to settle matters, deputed a low grade official to meet me. He ignored my despatches to him, either replying direct to the Viceroy instead of to me, or writing to me in demi-official form, implying that it was beneath his dignity to correspond directly with me.

The conduct of our relations with Bhutan was not at first under my control, but at the time of my assuming charge little was known of the Bhutanese, and their attitude towards us was uncertain. Such was the position a year ago.

3. As a result of the action of the Government of India during the past year, there has now been signed in the Audience Room of the Dalai Lama's Palace in Lhassa itself, in the presence of the Chinese Amban and of all the chief men of Thibet, a Convention which defines our boundaries, places our trade relations with Thibet upon a satisfactory footing, and gives us the right to exclude any foreign influence if we should so wish, and which contains an acknowledgment from the Thibetans that an indemnity is due for the insults shown us.

It is gratifying to be able to record, too, that this Convention has been concluded without leaving any feeling of resentment behind. In spite of the military operations which we were forced to undertake, and in spite of the Thibetans being compelled to pay an indemnity, the disposition of the Thibetans towards us was distinctly more favourable when we left Thibet than when we entered it. British officers were cordially received in the great monasteries of Lhassa and shown round the most sacred shrines. British soldiers and Indian sepoys were able to wander without let or hindrance round the till now forbidden city. Not only in Lhassa, but at every single post down the long line of communications country produce and local manufactures were brought in readily for sale. Thibetan officials everywhere showed us civility. On the morning the Mission and escort left Lhassa, the Regent visited the Mission, and conferred on Mr. White, Captain O'Connor, and myself, and also upon General Macdonald what was an unprecedented honour in presenting us with images of Buddha, which are very rarely presented by so high a Lama even to Buddhists, and never to Christians. The entire Council assembled in a tent pitched a mile outside Lhassa to bid farewell to the Mission, and expressed their firm intention to conform to the terms of the Convention. And every symptom since the signing seems to show that they mean to. They, without any demur, furnished a passport for a party to proceed from Gyantse to Gartok to open a trade mart there, and deputed an official to accompany the party. They also furnished passports for a party to proceed down the Brahmaputra to Assam if the Government of India had desired that piece of exploration to be undertaken; and for Mr. Wilton to return to China by Ta-chien-lu. Captain O'Connor and the Gartok party have been very cordially received at Shigatse, and every facility for preparing for their journey has been afforded them. The Tashi Lama has granted a private interview to Captain O'Connor, and informed him he approved of the Convention, though he would be glad to see the amount of the indemnity reduced. A Lhassa official has arrived at Gyantse to arrange for the opening of the trade mart there; and though the maintenance of a postal service with India did not form part of the terms of the Convention, far from opposing the maintenance of such a line, he has offered to build houses for the dâk-runners employed.

4. I have always regarded the conclusion of a Convention on paper as of minor, and the establishment of our relations with the Thibetans on a footing of mutual good-will as of fundamental importance. With the force I had at my back it was easy to compel the Thibetans to sign any Convention we had liked to impose on them, but there was little advantage in bringing back a Convention which was only extorted from them by force, and which was not framed or negotiated in such a manner as to carry with it a considerable degree of spontaneous assent, and it was especially necessary to secure the good-will of the people in general.

The result of our Mission to Kabul in 1840 was to estrange the Afghans from us from that time to this, and an intense race hatred was engendered. It would be unwise to predict that we shall never have difficulty in seeing that the present Convention is properly carried out. But I may safely say that no feeling of race hatred has been left behind, and that the Thibetans are better disposed towards us than they have ever been before; and this I consider to be incomparably the most important result of the policy of combined firmness and moderation which the Government of India so unswervingly pursued during the past year.

5. A result of minor, though of very considerable, importance is the improvement of our relations with Nepal and Bhutan. Our relations with Nepal were not in my charge. I can therefore only testify to the proofs of good-will afforded by the assistance given me by the Nepalese Representative at Lhassa which enabled me to carry through the Convention with so much good feeling. With the Bhutanese Government I was in more direct contact, and was able to procure from them permission for the construction of what will in future be the principal road piercing the Himalayas throughout their entire length. And so interested in our proceedings in Thibet did the Bhutanese become, that the Tongsa Penlop himself, the principal man in Bhutan, accompanied the Mission to Lhassa,

put me into communication with leading men, and was highly instrumental in effecting a settlement.

A year ago the Bhutanese were strangers; to-day they are our enthusiastic allies, and our surveyors are being assisted in searching for the best route through their country to Thibet.

6. It is needless to state that these results could never have been obtained if the Government of India had not supported me with an exceptionally able staff, or if the discipline and conduct of the troops escorting the Mission had not been of the highest. It was the gallantry and endurance of the troops which made the negotiations possible in the first instance; but it was the high discipline maintained, and the good temper and admirable behaviour displayed by the troops, which largely tended to placing our relations with the Thibetan people on so favourable a basis.

7. To my staff I am particularly indebted. Mr. White, whose acquaintance with the Sikkim–Thibet frontier dates back to the Sikkim campaign of 1888, and who was appointed Joint Commissioner with me last year, very effectively exerted his great personal influence in Sikkim towards utilizing all the resources of the State for the dispatch of the Mission escort. At Lhassa itself he was mainly instrumental in effecting the important political object of breaking down the Thibetan barrier of exclusion, in gaining access to the monasteries, and bringing us into personal contact with the leading Lamas.

Captain O'Connor was also with the Mission from the first. For years past he has, on his own initiative, studied the Thibetan people and language. He has compiled a report on Thibet, which he is now revising in the light of the fuller knowledge he has acquired; and this intimate acquaintance with the language, geography, and people of Thibet, combined with his sympathetic disposition towards the Thibetans, was of the highest value in negotiating with them and attracting them towards us.

Mr. Wilton, His Majesty's Acting Consul at Chungking, joined the Mission at Khamba Jong in August last year, and from the first rendered me invaluable service, not merely in dealing with the Chinese officials, but also in advising me in dealing with the general political situation, his clearness of judgment, shrewdness, and experience in diplomatic work being especially helpful for two months during my absence from Mission head-quarters when summoned to Simla last October. In December he was appointed Assistant Commissioner.

Mr. Walsh joined the Mission in December as an Assistant Commissioner. Like Captain O'Connor, he also had studied Thibetan for some years, and while holding political charge in the Chumbi Valley compiled a valuable report on that district. He received and conducted preliminary negotiations with the Bhutanese Envoys, and proceeded to Lhassa to assist in negotiating new Trade Regulations, if that were possible.

Captain Walton, I.M.S., joined the Mission at Khamba Jong in August 1903 as medical officer and naturalist. He has made valuable scientific collections, and materially contributed towards the good feeling established with the Thibetans at Lhassa by opening a dispensary, which, by the exercise of his tact and medical skill, became exceedingly popular.

Captain Ryder, R.E., joined the Mission in October 1903. He is, I consider, a most valuable trans-frontier survey officer, for he combines great professional zeal with admirable tact in dealings with strange peoples. He was ably assisted by Captain Cowie, R.E.

Mr. Hayden, of the Geological Survey, also displayed the greatest zeal in pursuing his professional duties under the most trying climatic conditions, and invariably exercised that tact and discretion in dealing with the people which is not only so essential for the furtherance of scientific objects, but which is so helpful politically to the leader of a Mission.

It does not fall within my province to speak of the professional value of the work accomplished by the scientific members of the Mission; but I am anxious that the Government of India should know that their behaviour contributed largely to the success of the Mission when scientific zeal, not combined with tactful behaviour, might have led to direful results politically.

In conclusion, I would desire to take the opportunity of acknowledging the cordial assistance invariably rendered me by my Private Secretary, Mr. Vernon Magniac.

And though their duties were purely military, yet, as they were in the initial stages directly connected with the Mission, I should not like to omit mention of the late Captain Bethune, 32nd Pioneers, who commanded the Mission escort at Khamba Jong, and of Major Bretherton, D.S.O., Chief Supply and Transport Officer. Captain Bethune was an

deal officer to command the escort to a Mission. He never omitted a single military precaution, but was ever ready and eager to meet the enemy if hostilities broke out. He was deeply respected by his men and by all who came in contact with him. Major Bretherton made all arrangements for the advance of the Mission to Khamba Jong and its maintenance there. His energy was boundless, and he possessed just that amount of forcefulness, tempered by a sufficiency of tact, which was essential for the carrying out of his duties. The loss of these two brave and capable officers is one which the Government of India has real cause to regret.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,
British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

No. 73.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

(A.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 14th November, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, November 23, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 73.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 14, 1904.

THIBET Convention. Question of publication must be considered in connection with selection of papers for presentation to Parliament. Text of Declaration appended to Convention, and of your letter to Lhassa authorities, can be forwarded by post.

No. 74.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 24.)

(B.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 14th instant, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, November 23, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 74.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, November* 14, 1904.

THIBET. His Majesty's Government, having regard to your view and the strong opinion of His Majesty's Minister at Peking, have decided that the negotiations for securing the adhesion of China shall be conducted at Calcutta. This decision was communicated to Sir E. Satow, by telegraph, on the 11th instant, with an intimation that he may inform the Chinese Government accordingly.

No. 75.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 25.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 24th November, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, November 24, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 75.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 24, 1904.

MY telegram of the 19th instant: Thibet. In telegram dated the 20th instant Captain O'Connor reports he is of opinion that it is probably with a view to compensate for exactions (?) that Thibetan generals are reconstituting their regiments. O'Connor does not think that there is any cause to fear that hostilities will be resumed.

No. 76.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 173.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, November* 25, 1904.

THIBET: Adhesion Agreement. Your telegram No. 237 of the 2nd November.

Inform Chinese Government that the Secretary of the Indian Foreign Department will be happy to meet Tang Shao-yi at Calcutta till March or at Simla after that, for purpose of negotiation.

When does Tang expect to reach India?

No. 77.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received November 26.)

Sir, *India Office, November* 25, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to invite the attention of the Marquess of Lansdowne to the telegram from the Viceroy of the 21st instant, suggesting, with reference to the negotiations as to the adherence of China to the Thibetan Convention, that the Chinese Government should be asked when Commissioner Tang may be expected to arrive in India, and that they should be informed that the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department will be prepared to meet him for the purposes of the negotiations at Calcutta or Simla, according to the date of his arrival.

Mr. Brodrick would suggest, for Lord Lansdowne's consideration, that His Majesty's Minister at Peking should be instructed to make a communication to the Chinese Government in the sense suggested by the Viceroy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

No. 78.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 26, 1904.

T'ANG informs me that he will be in Calcutta in eight weeks from now (see your Lordship's inquiry on this subject in your telegram No. 173). He leaves Tien-tsin about the 10th December, but will spend ten days or so with relations at Canton.

No. 79.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November* 26.)

(No. 255. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 26, 1904.

T'ANG informs me with regard to Thibet that the Dalai Lama is approaching Urga, and is now only a few days' march away.

For fear he should try to make his escape to Russia, orders have been sent that he is to be removed to the Kumbum Monastery close to Hsining.

No. 80.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received November* 27.)

(No. 256.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Peking, November* 27, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to repeat to your Lordship a telegram which I have to-day addressed to the Acting Viceroy of India:—

I have been requested by T'ang to supply him with the English text of the Agreement signed at Lhassa, as the Chinese Government have the Chinese translation only.

I have informed T'ang that the text could not for the present be made public, as certain modifications regarding the period of occupation of the Chumbi Valley and the indemnity were in contemplation.

Is there any reason why he should not be given the English text confidentially? Might we not also give him that of the proposed Adhesion Agreement?

No. 81.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received November* 29.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 26th November, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, November 28, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 81.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *November* 26, 1904.

THIBET. My telegram of the 24th instant. Telegraphing on the 23rd instant, Captain O'Connor reports that he has had interview with Lhassa Abbot, who explained that it was for the purpose of ascertaining the extent of losses recently sustained by Thibetans, and of enrolling fresh men, that all local troops were summoned to Shigatse. Abbot declared that nothing was further from their thoughts than a resumption of hostilities, and begged that we should not impute any hostile significance to the action which had been taken.

No. 82.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick,

forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 10th November, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, December 1, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 82.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Simla, October 31, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of a despatch, dated the 6th October, 1904, from the Chinese Imperial Resident in Lhassa, conveying certain objections to the Convention of the 7th September, and asking me to inform him in what way discussions of the necessary alterations may be made.

2. I propose, with the approval of the Government of India, to inform him, in reply, that if the Chinese Government wish to further discuss the matter, they should communicate with His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking.

Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhassa to Colonel Younghusband.

(Translation.) *October* 6, 1904.

[Quotes *in extenso* telegram from the Wai-wu Pu to his address, which was communicated to his Excellency the Viceroy by His Britannic Majesty's Minister in China in his telegram dated the 26th September, 1904.]

I have the honour to state that the above objections set forth in the telegram from the Wai-wu Pu represent truthfully the present state of affairs which may cause the other foreign Powers to make trouble, so that not only will great difficulties be raised for China, but also, it is to be feared, that Great Britain will gain nothing.

I have the honour to ask you to consider the question very carefully, and inform me, at your earliest convenience, in what way discussion of the necessary alterations may be carried on, so that I may be able to telegraph to the Wai-wu Pu for their approval, and the Treaty be signed at an early date, to the mutual good relations of our respective countries.

No. 83.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 5.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of correspondence relative to the Convention with Thibet.

India Office, December 3, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 83.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Simla, October* 6, 1904.

WE have the honour to forward, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of the Agreement which was concluded at Lhassa on the 7th September between the Government of India and the Thibetan authorities. The terms are those of the draft forwarded with our secret despatch dated the 11th August, and approved, subject to certain verbal alterations, in your telegram of the 2nd September.

This message was repeated to Colonel Younghusband, but failed to reach him before the Convention was actually signed, and the modifications desired by His Majesty's Government have not, therefore, unfortunately, been introduced.

2. In your telegram of the 6th July you left to our discretion the amount of the indemnity to be demanded under Article VI of the Agreement; and in view of our lack of information as to the resources of the country, we thought it advisable to leave Colonel Younghusband a free hand in this respect, though, as reported in our telegram of the 26th June, we had already suggested that 100,000*l.* per mensem from the date of the attack on the Mission at Gyantse until one month after the conclusion of the Agreement seemed to us a suitable demand. On the 30th August we informed you by telegraph that our Commissioner was claiming an indemnity of 50,000 rupees a-day, the equivalent of 100,000*l.* per mensem, from the date of the attack on the Mission; but that, as Colonel Younghusband regarded this sum as exorbitant, he proposed to reduce the amount in consideration of the concession of a mart at Zayul in Eastern Thibet. On the 5th September we were informed, in reply, that His Majesty's Government agreed that the amount was excessive, and saw no objection to obtaining the additional mart proposed. These views were communicated on the 7th to Colonel Younghusband, who in the meanwhile, after consulting persons who were well qualified to know the actual facts as to the condition of Thibet, and after making personal inquiry at Lhassa, had modified his opinion in the matter, and believed that it was well within the power of the Thibetans to pay the sum named. On the 2nd September he telegraphed that the Tongsa Penlop had suggested to the Thibetans that they should authorize the Indian Government to collect the customs at the intended marts, and devote the proceeds to the payment of the indemnity. Colonel Younghusband added, however, that, pending definite proposals from the Thibetans, he was making no move in the matter. On the 4th the Ti-Rimpochi, who the same day had been definitely recognized as Regent by the National Assembly, intimated that the Thibetans were prepared to accept our terms, but begged that the indemnity, amounting on the basis indicated to 75,00,000 rupees, might be paid in annual instalments of one lakh each. Colonel Younghusband, anxious at this critical moment to remove the last remaining obstacle to the signature of the Convention, consented, though reluctantly, to modify the terms of Article VI in accordance with this request, and on the same day the Regent affixed his private seal to a copy of the draft Agreement. It is unfortunate that Colonel Younghusband did not word the alteration to the effect that instalments of "not less than one lakh" should be paid annually, and omit all mention of the total period for repayment, but it is probable that he had reason to fear that any further bargaining might reopen the whole negotiation. The Thibetans were most anxious that the Agreement should be concluded on the 7th September, which was, according to their calculations, a most propitious day, and Colonel Younghusband thought it well to meet their wishes, so it was signed in a formal manner at the Potala on the 7th September, in the presence of the Amban, and attested by the seal of the Dalai Lama, which had been specially intrusted by him to the Ti-Rimpochi, and by the seals of the Council, of the three great monasteries, and of the National Assembly. It may be noted here that the Nepal-Thibet Treaty of 1856, was sealed by the same authorities, and in that case also the Dalai Lama's seal was attached by a proxy.

3. The conclusion of the Agreement was reported to you direct by Colonel Younghusband on the same day, and on the 13th September you telegraphed that the amount of the indemnity raised a difficulty, especially when the provision for payment was read in connection with clause 7 of the Agreement, the effect being that it might be necessary to hold the Chumbi Valley for seventy-five years—a result which would be inconsistent with the declarations of His Majesty's Government as to their intended withdrawal, and with the instructions conveyed in your telegram of the 6th July. You desired us accordingly to consider whether it would not be possible, without prejudice to the signed Agreement, to intimate that a reduction would be made if the terms were duly fulfilled, and if futher trade facilities were given. On the following day we replied that we recognized the necessity of avoiding the appearance of an indefinite occupation of the Chumbi Valley, and that we proposed to grant a remission of 25 lakhs, in consideration of certain subsidiary concessions which we hoped to obtain, namely, (1) the right of collecting, on behalf of the Thibetan Government, the customs dues leviable on Indian trade at their frontier, coupled with a guarantee of a minimum annual revenue to be assigned to the service of the indemnity; (2) the concession of an additional trade mart at Zayul; and (3) permission to carry out certain surveys in Thibet. On the same date Colonel Younghusband was informed of your views as to the reduction of the indemnity, and was instructed to inquire whether the Thibetans would be prepared to agree to the arrangements indicated. On the 16th you approved our recommendation, and

authorized us to reduce the indemnity from 75,00,000 rupees to 25,00,000 rupees, obtaining by way of set off any or all of the concessions named by us. These instructions were at once communicated to our Commissioner on the 17th September, but they cannot have reached him until five days later. In the meantime, however, Colonel Younghusband had already fixed the date of his departure from Lhassa, and actually set out on his return journey on the 23rd, after telegraphing to explain that he was not attempting any re-adjustment of the Convention already signed, as any such endeavour at that stage would jeopardize the whole settlement.

4. The risks and difficulties of a protracted stay at Lhassa have been recognized from the outset. High passes intervene between the capital and Gyantse, and, owing to the serious objections raised by the military authorities, which have been so strongly endorsed by yourself, our object throughout has been to avoid in any case the need for retaining troops at Lhassa during the winter, and to withdraw the Mission and its escort at the earliest possible date. Uncertainty as to the period for which he would be able to stay at Lhassa has undoubtedly hampered Colonel Younghusband in no small degree. On the 16th August you directed that the troops should start back on a day to be named by the military authorities in communication with Colonel Younghusband. On the 21st Colonel Younghusband urged the importance of being able to remain at Lhassa up to the latest date possible, and on the 25th telegraphed inquiring whether he was to understand that he was to receive orders from the military authorities as to the date of his return. On the 31st August General Macdonald telegraphed, explaining that, for reasons stated, he considered it inadvisable that the troops should remain at Lhassa after the 15th September, and that, in the absence of orders to the contrary, he would leave on that date. On the same day Colonel Younghusband again telegraphed, with reference to this message, that, in the event of his negotiations not having been completed by the date named, he would place himself under the protection of the Chinese Amban. Prior to the receipt of the last two messages, however, we had telegraphed on the 2nd September, in reply to Colonel Younghusband's message of the 25th August, that the matter was one in which he should receive orders only from the Government of India, and that we wished to receive an expression of his opinion as to the possible duration of the stay at Lhassa after he had consulted General Macdonald. It was added that we saw no reason why the departure should not be postponed until the middle of October, if necessary, but that the 15th October was the latest day; and that, in the absence of any convincing representations from General Macdonald as to the impossibility of doing so, the Mission must remain at Lhassa until the Convention was concluded, or until the date named. On the 16th September, a further message was sent to Colonel Younghusband, informing him that, as it was most desirable to secure a final settlement of the subsidiary points which it was proposed to secure as a set-off to the reduction of the indemnity, he was authorized, in case of necessity, on the departure of the main force, to retain at Lhassa for a reasonable time an escort of a strength not exceeding 500 men.

5. It will thus be seen that, on the date on which arrangements were actually made for the signature of the Convention, Colonel Younghusband had reason to believe that it might be impossible to protract his stay beyond the 15th September, and we consider, therefore, that he was fully justified in using his discretion as he did, and in signing the Convention on the 7th, without awaiting approval of the amount of the indemnity, and the method of its payment. We need not dwell on the immense difficulties of securing unanimous agreement among the numerous Thibetan negotiators, for they must have been fully evident to you from the reports which we have sent you, but we desire to point out that any alterations in the terms at this critical moment would probably have led to a recommencement of the whole discussion. Apart, moreover, from the military considerations which made an early withdrawal advisable, subsequent events have shown that it was of the utmost importance to secure the formal consent of the Thibetans to our terms before the Chinese Government were able to raise difficulties. On the afternoon of the day on which the Regent affixed his private seal to the draft Convention, the Amban handed to Colonel Younghusband a long letter from the National Assembly, raising various minor objections to the terms, and it is impossible to say to what extent the Chinese Resident might have succeeded in magnifying these difficulties, in order to prevent the conclusion, possibly, of any Agreement at all, or certainly of one so favourable to our interests, had the Convention not been signed before the receipt from Peking of the views held by the Wai-wu Pu as to the alleged infringement of Chinese suzerainty, and as to the supposed detraction from the most-favoured-nation rights of their European Powers.

6. We regret extremely, however, that the result has been that effect has not been

given to the instructions of His Majesty's Government. We are not yet in possession of a complete statement of the reasons which induced Colonel Younghusband eventually to leave Lhassa on the 23rd September without carrying out the subsequent instructions regarding the reduction in the amount of the indemnity, and we prefer to withhold any expression of our opinion as to the wisdom of his action in this respect, until we receive the fuller explanations which he has promised. It remains, therefore, at present only to consider what measures should now be taken to comply with your wishes. Subject to the opinion of Colonel Younghusband, who hopes to reach Simla on the 14th October, and whose arrival we propose to await before arriving at a definite decision, we believe that it may be possible to carry out any modifications of the Convention that may be considered necessary somewhat in the following way, though we must point out that up to the present no objection has apparently been raised by China or any other Power either as to the amount of the indemnity, or to the method of payment, or to the retention of Chumbi pending payment, which the Thibetans fully accepted; and that until China has generally acquiesced in the arrangements made, and we have obtained compensatory advantages, we consider that it would be most undesirable to alter the Thibetan Convention as signed. The Trade Regulations have still to be revised, as contemplated by Article III of the Convention, and we would suggest that the intimation regarding a reduction in the amount of the indemnity should be postponed until this matter is taken up, as we propose it should be, without delay. The negotiation of the Trade Regulations we propose to intrust to Captain O'Connor, who has held the office of Secretary to the Mission, and who has now remained at Gyantse as our first trade agent. It is possible that, for this purpose, it may be necessary for him again to visit Lhassa. To this we believe that no objection would be raised by the authorities at that place. Simultaneously with the conclusion of the main Agreement, the Thibetan Government expressed their willingness to permit our Agent at Gyantse to proceed, in certain circumstances, to Lhassa, and in token of their consent to such an arrangement, handed to Colonel Younghusband the written undertaking of which we have the honour to inclose a copy. We have instructed our Agent that no use should be made of the permission thus accorded without the express consent of the Government of India. But in the event of another visit to Lhassa becoming necessary in connection with the Trade Regulations, the document may be of use. In your telegram of the 4th August you informed us that His Majesty's Government had decided not to demand, as a term of our settlement, the grant of right of access for our Agent at Gyantse to Lhassa. In view, however, of the circumstances explained in Colonel Younghusband's letter of the 9th September, and having regard to the fact that no objection was raised by the Lhassa authorities, we trust that you will permit us to approve our Commissioner's action in this matter, as we are still of opinion that the right may be of the greatest value to us hereafter, and, hedged in as it is by the conditions expressed in the written authority, it cannot be held to commit us to any political control over Thibet, while there seems to be no necessity whatever to publish this purely subsidiary Concession, on which it may never be necessary to act. As in the case of the indemnity, we consider that Colonel Younghusband used his discretion in very difficult circumstances with great perspicacity and a fearlessness of responsibility which it would be a grave mistake to discourage in any of our Agents. At the same time we desire to express our sincere regret that the instructions of His Majesty's Government were not carried out to the letter, as they would have been if communication with our Commissioner had not been a matter of twelve days even by telegraph,

7. We take the present opportunity to forward, for your information, the further correspondence detailed in the annexed schedule.

We have, &c.

(Signed) AMPTHILL.
KITCHENER.
E. F.-G. LAW.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
J. P. HEWETT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 83.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord, *India Office, December* 2, 1904.

YOUR Excellency was informed by my telegram of the 7th November of the decision arrived at by His Majesty's Government as to the modification of the provision concerning the indemnity embodied in the Convention signed at Lhassa on the 7th September by Colonel Younghusband, and as to the disallowance of the separate Agreement concluded by him on the same day, giving the British Trade Agent at Gyantse the right of access to Lhassa in certain contingencies. Your ratification of the Convention in a form to give effect to that decision affords me an opportunity of reviewing the settlement which has been arrived at.

2. The Convention as ratified carries out in full the policy laid down in my telegram of the 26th July and my despatch of the 5th August; and His Majesty's Government cordially congratulate your Excellency's Government on the successful issue of the labours of the Mission. When Lord Curzon, in his despatch of the 8th January, 1903, made his proposal for a Mission to Lhassa, Thibet, though lying on our borders, was practically an unknown country, the rulers of which persistently refused to hold any communications with the British Government even on necessary matters of business; and if the Thibetan Government had become involved in political relations with other Powers, a situation of danger might have been created on the frontier of the Indian Empire. This risk has now been removed by the conclusion of the Convention, and His Majesty's Government fully recognize that the result is due to the patience and firmness shown by Colonel Younghusband during the long and trying period which elapsed between the dispatch of the Mission to Khambajong in the spring of 1903 and the signature of the Convention on the 7th September last. His Majesty's Government also fully recognize the services of the officers of the Mission accompanying Colonel Younghusband, and the admirable conduct of the troops under the leadership of General Macdonald. It is most satisfactory, having regard to the obstinacy of the Thibetans in the past, that, besides concluding the Convention, Colonel Younghusband has good reason to believe that the relations which he established with them at Lhassa were generally friendly. This affords a ground for hoping that they will observe in a spirit of good faith the conditions to which they have agreed. In reference to the conduct of the troops and the members of the Mission, I have already informed you of the gracious command of His Majesty the King that a special medal should be granted in recognition of the services which they have rendered.

3. It is with great reluctance that I have to add to these congratulations a reference to your letters of the 6th and 26th October, in which you express your regret that, when the Convention was signed, full effect was not given to the policy of His Majesty's Government in respect of the indemnity and the separate Agreement. The fact that it has been necessary to reverse Colonel Younghusband's action in these two matters is a sufficient indication of the serious nature of his disregard of the instructions he had received.

4. As to the indemnity, it was laid down by my telegrams of 6th and 26th July that it was not to exceed in amount a sum which the Thibetans might be expected to pay in three years, and that the Chumbi Valley was to be held as security till it had been liquidated. It appears from Colonel Younghusband's Reports of the 22nd and 28th August, and the 1st September, that the payment of the indemnity by instalments spread over a long period of years had been suggested by him to the Thibetans in reply to their plea that it was impossible for them to provide in cash within three years the sum demanded. These Reports, however, were sent by post, and were not received by me till October. No reference was made in your telegrams to the mode of payment adopted by Colonel Younghusband, and it was with complete surprise that His Majesty's Government learnt from your telegram of the 12th September that Colonel Younghusband had inserted in the Convention a stipulation that the indemnity was to be paid in seventy-five annual instalments, and that he had retained without modification the proviso that the Chumbi Valley was to be occupied as security till the full amount had been paid. The effect of this was to make it appear as if it were our intention to occupy for at least seventy-five years the Chumbi Valley, which had been recognized in the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 as Thibetan territory. This would have been inconsistent with the repeated declarations of His Majesty's Government that the Mission would not lead to occupation, and that we would withdraw from Thibetan territory when

reparation had been secured. I therefore, after congratulating your Excellency and Colonel Younghusband on the conclusion of the Convention, authorized you to reduce the indemnity and to modify the provision for the occupation of the Chumbi Valley as security. It was hoped by His Majesty's Government that it would have been possible to effect this before Colonel Younghusband left Lhassa; but though it appears from a communication sent by him shortly after the signature of the Convention that he desired liberty to prolong his stay, it is clear that in the circumstances it was not desirable that he should have postponed his departure. There being thus no opportunity for settling the matter on the spot, I directed you, when ratifying the Convention, to modify it in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty's Government.

5. As to the separate Agreement, the question of claiming for the Trade Agent at Gyantse the right of access to Lhassa was carefully considered, as you are aware, before His Majesty's Government decided that no such condition was to be included in the terms of the settlement, and a subsequent request made by you for a modification of this decision was negatived by my telegram of the 3rd August. No subsequent reference was made to me on the subject, and it was not till the receipt of your letter of the 6th October that I learned that Colonel Younghusband had taken on himself the responsibility of concluding an Agreement giving the Trade Agent at Gyantse the right to visit Lhassa to consult with the Chinese and Thibetan officers there on commercial matters which it had been found impossible to settle at Gyantse. In the circumstances, His Majesty's Government had no alternative but to disallow the Agreement, as inconsistent with the policy which they had laid down.

6. The object of that policy, as stated in Lord George Hamilton's despatch of the 27th February, 1903, was that British influence should be recognized at Lhassa in such a manner as to exclude that of any other Power, and that Thibet should remain in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart, and which has hitherto caused her presence on our frontier to be a matter of indifference to us. We have aimed at effecting this result, not by establishing a Resident at Lhassa, but by obtaining the consent of the Thibetan Government to a Convention by which they undertake neither to receive the Agent of any foreign Power nor to grant concessions or assignments of revenue to the subject of any foreign Power, without the previous consent of the British Government. All that we have demanded for ourselves, apart from reparation for injuries in the past, is that the commercial facilities conceded to us in principle by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893, should be placed on a satisfactory basis, and given such an extension as we are justified in claiming, having regard to the traffic on the existing trade routes, and to the position of India as the limitrophe country with Thibet on that part of her frontiers which is not conterminous with the Chinese Empire. Should the Thibetans fail hereafter to observe the terms of the Convention, the situation will have to be reconsidered; but His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the course which they have adopted is that which, in existing circumstances, is best calculated to attain the objects which they have in view so far as Thibet is concerned, and most in keeping with the policy which, in the interests of the British Empire as a whole, they have determined to observe.

7. In my despatch of the 5th August I drew attention to the fact that questions of Indian frontier policy could no longer be regarded from an exclusively Indian point of view, and that the course to be pursued in such cases must be laid down by His Majesty's Government alone. It is essential that this should be borne in mind by those who find themselves intrusted with the conduct of affairs in which the external relations of India are involved, and that they should not allow themselves, under the pressure of the problems which confront them on the spot, to forget the necessity of conforming to the instructions which they have received from His Majesty's Government, who have more immediately before them the interests of the British Empire as a whole.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 83.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Secret.)

My Lord, *India Office, December* 2, 1904.

THE views of His Majesty's Government on the Convention concluded with the Thibetan Government on the 7th September last were conveyed to your Excellency in my despatch No. 58, dated the 2nd December, 1904. It is necessary, however, that I should

add to the observations contained in that despatch a reference to the passage in the eighth paragraph of your Secret letter of the 9th October, in which you speak of the "attempt made in May last to secure an amicable settlement with Russia by deferring to her views about Thibet."

2. This reference to the negotiations for securing the adhesion of the Russian Government to the Khedivial Decree drafted in connection with the Anglo-French Agreement appears to show a misapprehension both of the character of those negotiations and of the considerations which have guided His Majesty's Government in dealing with the question of Thibet. Their policy was outlined in Lord George Hamilton's despatch of the 27th February, 1903; it was definitely propounded in the telegram of the 28th May, 1903, authorizing the negotiations at Khambajong; it was reaffirmed without modification in the telegram of the 6th November, 1903, and the instructions contained in my telegrams of the 6th and 26th July, and my despatch of the 5th August last, gave detailed effect to principles which had been laid down in unmistakable language for your guidance many months before the communications with the Russian Government, to which you refer, took place. The policy decided on by His Majesty's Government was dictated solely by what they conceived to be desirable in the interests of India, in view of the many difficult questions raised by the position of the Chinese Empire. It is true that when, in connection with the Anglo-French Agreement, a question arose as to the rights of other Powers in Egypt, the abandonment by the Russian Government of its Treaty rights in that country was accompanied by an engagement on the part of His Majesty's Government to carry out in Thibet the policy which they had already determined upon and publicly announced as, in their opinion, the best for the Empire. It accordingly became obligatory upon them, as a matter of national good faith, after the communication to the Russian Government embodied in Lord Lansdowne's despatch to Mr. Spring-Rice of the 10th May, 1904. Your Secret letter of the 30th June, 1904, referring to this communication, stated that your Excellency's Government desired entirely to associate themselves with the policy involved in the declaration to the Russian Ambassador that "so long as no other Power endeavours to intervene in the affairs of Thibet, they will not attempt either to annex it, to establish a Protectorate over it, or in any way to control its internal administration."

3. I have thought it necessary to advert to the language in your Secret letter No. 193 in order to place it on record that His Majesty's Government, in their dealings with Thibet, have been guided throughout by considerations of the interests of India.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ST. JOHN BRODRICK.

No. 84.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 10.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated 8th December, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, December 10, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

December 8, 1904.

GARTOK Expedition. Letter received from Rawling, dated the 10th November, of which following is substance: Party reached Sarka Jong, longitude 85, on the 10th November. Thibetans received them very well everywhere. Every opportunity taken during journey to explain to Thibetans of all ranks Treaty, which has always been received with best feeling. They expect to arrive Gartok on the 10th December, and Simla about same date in January.

No. 85.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 12.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 10th December, relative to the Thibet Convention.

India Office, December 12, 1904.

Inclosure in No. 85.

Viceroy of India to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Calcutta, December* 10, 1904.

YOUR telegram of the 7th instant: Thibet Convention.

Convention was ratified in following terms:—

"This Convention wss ratified by Viceroy and Governor-General in Council at Simla on the 11th day of November (A.D.), 1904."

Declaration appended to Convention was as follows:—

"His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General having ratified the Convention which was concluded at Lhassa on the 7th September, 1904, by Colonel Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Thibet frontier matters, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and by Lo Sang Gyal Tsen, the Gaden ti Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three Monasteries Sera, Drepung, and Gaden, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Thibet, is pleased to direct as an act of grace that the sum of money which the Thibetan Government have bound themselves, under the terms of Article VI of the said Convention, to pay His Majesty's Government as an indemnity for the expense incurred by the latter in connection with dispatch of armed force to Lhassa be reduced from 75 thousand rupees [*sic*]* to 25 thousand rupees [*sic*],* and to declare that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity as fixed by the said Article: provided, however, that the trade mart[s], as stipulated in Article II of the Convention, shall have been effectively open for three years, as provided for in Article VI† of the Convention, and that, in the meantime, the Thibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects."

We are reconsidering the question of the form of Adhesion Agreement.

No. 86.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th December, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies will be sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, December 15, 1904.

* Lakhs, not thousands, are intended.

† Meant for VII. Article VII provides that marts must have been opened effectively for three years.

Inclosure in No. 86.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 15, 1904.

THIBET. Telegram from O'Connor, dated the 11th instant, states that friendly attitude of people in general at Lhassa and elsewhere is confirmed by all reports which have reached him at Gyantse. The leading men at Shigatse had sent him friendly messages, and he had received letters from Tashi Lama. He adds that wool is being collected in large quantities at Shigatse with a view to exportation to Indian markets.

No. 87.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 16.)

Sir, *India Office, December* 14, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to forward, to be laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a letter from the Government of India as to the future position in Thibet of the officers of the Chinese Imperial Customs Service under the arrangements as to trade to be made in accordance with Article II of the Thibet Convention.

2. Mr. Brodrick would suggest, for Lord Lansdowne's consideration, that the views of His Majesty's Minister at Peking, to whom a copy of the letter has been communicated direct, should be obtained on the proposals which the Government of India make with the object of preventing any interference by these officers with the course of our trade in Thibet.

3. I am also to state that Mr. Brodrick will be glad to be favoured with Lord Lansdowne's views on the suggestions of the Government of India: —

(1.) That the Customs arrangements under the Tariff to be negotiated with the Thibetans should be under Indian control; and

(2.) That the proceeds of the duties should be assigned to the service of the indemnity.

4. Both these conditions were mentioned in the Viceroy's telegram of the 14th September in connection with the question of reducing the indemnity. Mr. Brodrick thinks it would be desirable to secure them, if this can be done without raising undue opposition on the part of the Thibetans. As regards (1), he is of opinion that there would at any rate be no objection to a stipulation in the Trade Regulations that the collection of the duties by the Thibetans is to be subject to the inspection of our agents. As regards (2), the terms of the declaration as to indemnity appended by the Viceroy to the ratified copy of the Convention seem to Mr. Brodrick to make it doubtful whether the Government of India would be justified in insisting on any special security.

5. With reference to the statement that any customs to be levied hereafter will be collected at the frontier between the Chumbi Valley and Thibet proper, Mr. Brodrick proposes to warn the Government of India to use no language inconsistent with the recognition of the Chumbi Valley as part of Thibet.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure in No. 87.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Simla, November* 10, 1904.

WE have the honour to address you regarding the position of the officers of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service who at present hold appointments in Thibet.

2. The first Commissioner of Customs was posted to the mart opened for British trade at Yatung in 1894, shortly after the conclusion of the Trade Regulations provided for in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 regarding Thibet, and in a despatch dated the 24th March, 1894, Sir Nicholas O'Conor forwarded to us a copy of the instructions issued to the first incumbent of the post by Sir Robert Hart. Under the Trade Regulations of 1893, no duty was to be levied for a period of five years; and although it was stipulated that on the expiry of that term a tariff might be agreed upon, no steps have so far been taken in this direction, and up to the present day no customs duty has been levied on merchandize imported into or exported from Thibet. Still, however, a Chinese Customs officer remains posted to Yatung, and on the appointment of the late incumbent, Captain Parr, to be Joint Chinese Commissioner for the purpose of conducting negotiations with Colonel Younghusband, another officer, Mr. Henderson, was at once sent to take his place at Yatung. The object with which a succession of officers has been maintained for no apparent purpose during the past eleven years is not clear. But, whatever the object, so long as we believed, or professed to believe, that the Chinese Government possessed real authority in Thibet, there was no sufficient reason for refusing to acquiesce in their presence. Now, however, we have learnt that China herself only claims Thibet as a dependency, that she actually derives no revenue from her feudatory, and that she has no power either to conclude Agreements affecting Thibet without the concurrence of the Thibetan Government, or to give effect to Conventions concluded with her in regard to Thibet; and we have had on our own account, though with Chinese assent, to take measures to exact reparation from the authorities at Lhassa, and to conclude with them an Agreement which the Chinese Amban at Lhassa, who was specially deputed to assist in effecting a settlement, recognized as reasonable and appropriate, and cordially co-operated with our Commissioner in securing from the Thibetan Government, but which the Chinese Government have so far declined to recognize. The position has thus been changed, and it has become obviously undesirable to permit the continued residence on the frontier of Chinese Customs officers, whose fiscal functions can only find scope by the levy of dues which, under the Convention of the 7th September, are the perquisite of the Thibetan Government, and whose presence may be utilized to support the suggestion that the post or posts at which they are stationed are Treaty ports, at which other Powers are free to claim equality not only of commercial, but also of political rights. We may further mention that the presence of these Customs officers is resented both by the Thibetans and by the local Chinese officials. During the recent negotiations the Amban went so far as to ask Colonel Younghusband that Captain Parr should not be used as an intermediary, but that all dealings should be direct between himself and the British Commissioner. The effect, moreover, of the employment of persons of British nationality in Chinese service is to suggest to the uninformed Thibetans that the British nation is in some manner or other subservient to the Chinese Government.

3. Under the Agreement which has been concluded the Chumbi Valley remains for a term under our direct control, and during the period of our occupation no question can arise of any Customs post at Yatung, which lies at the Indian end of the valley. Any customs which may hereafter be levied will be collected at the frontier between the Chumbi Valley and Thibet proper. But it is intended in arranging a Tariff to stipulate that the Customs arrangements shall be under Indian control, and that the proceeds shall be assigned to the service of the indemnity payable under the Agreement which has just been concluded. On every ground, therefore, it reems to us desirable that the Chinese Customs officers should cease to reside at any point on or in the neighbourhood of the Indo-Thibetan frontier. His Majesty's Government will doubtless desire, so far as possible, to save the susceptibilities of the Chinese Government, and will probably prefer, as the matter is one of considerable delicacy, not to have to make a formal demand for their withdrawal. We would suggest, therefore, that Sir Ernest Satow should be consulted as to the possibility of taking informal steps to obtain their recall in such a manner as to avoid raising any contentious issue. It is possible that he may be able to make the Chinese Government see the advisability of saving the expense involved in the unnecessary presence of Imperial Maritime Customs officers on the Indian-Thibetan frontier, or, should the position of our negotiations with China over this Thibet question render it desirable, Sir E. Satow might remind them that we shall at any rate not permit of interference on the part of those officials with the course of our trade with Thibet. Captain Parr is, we understand, already under orders to proceed on transfer to Kowloon, and in his case no difficulty need apparently arise. As regards

Mr. Henderson, who is at present residing at Yatung, we think it possible that His Majesty's Minister may be able to effect our object through Sir Robert Hart.

4. We are forwarding a copy of this despatch direct to Sir Ernest Satow.

We have, &c.

(Signed) AMPTHILL.
E. F.-G. LAW.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
J. P. HEWETT.

No. 88.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow.

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1904.

QUESTION of Chinese Customs officers in Thibet.

What are your views respecting suggestions made by Government of India in their despatch No. 215 of the 10th ultimo?

No. 89.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 20.)

Sir, *India Office, December* 17, 1904.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to forward, to be laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne, the copy of a letter from the Government of India, inclosing the final Report of the British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Affairs, together with copies of the Convention as ratified, of the Declaration concerning the indemnity appended by the Viceroy to the ratified Convention, and of the letter from the Government of India to the Thibetan Government, informing them that it is not considered necessary to embody in a formal instrument the provisions of the Agreement concluded with Colonel Younghusband, giving the British Trade Agent at Gyantse the right, under certain circumstances, to visit Lhasa.

I am also to inclose, to be preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office, signed copies of the three versions—English, Chinese, and Thibetan—of the Convention, together with a signed copy of the Viceroy's Declaration appended to the ratified instruments.

I am to add that Mr. Brodrick concurs entirely in the commendations of the services of the officers of the Mission expressed by the Government of India.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HORACE WALPOLE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 89.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)
Sir, *Simla, November* 17, 1904.

WE have the honour to transmit, for the information of His Majesty's Government, a copy of a letter from the British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters, containing his final Report on the results attained by the Mission in Thibet, of which he has been the head during part of both last and this year.

Colonel Younghusband forwards signed copies of the three versions—English, Chinese, and Thibetan—of the Agreement which he concluded with the Thibetan Government on the 7th September last; and of each of the versions we have the honour to furnish His Majesty's Government with one copy as ratified by his Excellency the Viceroy. We also transmit a signed copy of the Declaration which has been appended to the ratified instruments, in obedience to the instructions contained in your telegram of the 7th November, as well as a copy of the despatch intimating to the Thibetan Government the decision of His Majesty's Government not to ratify the Declaration

signed in September last as to the right of the British Agent to visit Lhassa for trade purposes.

The Commissioner has in his letter briefly summarized the history of the events which preceded the signature of the Agreement, and there is therefore no need for us to do more than to indorse his account of what passed, and to add that he is fully justified in considering that the feeling of good-will which the Mission has left behind it in Thibet, as well as in Nepal and Bhutan, is of even more importance than the actual conclusion of the Agreement, valuable as it is

His Majesty's Government are already in possession of our views as to the merit of Colonel Younghusband's achievement; but we take this further opportunity of stating that, in our opinion, the satisfactory results referred to above are mainly due to the conspicuous tact, ability, and constancy displayed by him during the whole course of his arduous negotiations—negotiations which were rendered all the more difficult by the rigour of the climate and the circumstances of physical discomfort, and not to say danger, in which they had to be carried on. It is true that in one particular the Commissioner has failed to earn the approval of His Majesty's Government, but we feel confident that, when the importance of what he has achieved, taken as a whole, has been more fully realized, His Majesty's Government will not withhold from him a generous measure of approval.

We have the honour, before closing this despatch, to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the services of the other members of the Mission which are recorded by Colonel Younghusband in his present letter; and we desire to express our special concurrence in his remarks as to the good work done by Mr. White, first as Joint and later on as Assistant Commissioner; by Captain O'Connor, who acted as intermediary between the Commissioner and the Thibetan Government, and whom we have now appointed to be the first British Trade Agent at Gyantse; by Mr. Wilton, who was employed in a similar capacity in respect of the Chinese officials; and by Mr. Walsh, who held the important post of Political Officer in the Chumbi Valley during a large part of the negotiations.

We have, &c.

(Signed) AMPTHILL.
E. F.-G. LAW.
E. R. ELLES.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.
J. P. HEWETT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 89.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Sir, *Simla, October* 28, 1904.

OF the five copies of the Convention which I signed at Lhassa on the 7th September with the Thibetan Government, one was handed over by me to the Thibetan Government and one to the Chinese Amban. I have now the honour to deliver to you the three remaining copies and in doing so I desire to take the opportunity of recapitulating the main results of the Mission with the charge of which I was honoured, and to bring to the favourable notice of the Government of India the vuluable services rendered by the members of my staff.

2. When the Mission entered Thibet at the beginning of July of last year, the Thibetan Delegates refused to discuss matters at any other place than Yatung; they returned all written communications addressed to them; they refused to report to their Government anything which I said; they absolutely repudiated the Convention made by the Chinese Government on their behalf in 1890; and they showed a distinct inclination to rely upon a foreign Power to aid them in defying us. The attitude of the local Chinese officials was hardly more satisfactory. The then Amban, instead of coming himself to the frontier to settle matters, deputed a low grade official to meet me. He ignored my despatches to him, either replying direct to the Viceroy instead of to me, or writing to me in demi-official form, implying that it was beneath his dignity to correspond directly with me. The conduct of our relations with Bhutan was not at first under my control, but at the time of my assuming charge little was known of the Bhutanese, and their attitude towards us was uncertain. Such was the position of affairs a year ago.

3. As a result of the action of the Government of India during the past year, there has now been signed in the Audience Room of the Dalai Lama's Palace in Lhassa itself, in the presence of the Chinese Amban and of all the Chief men of Thibet, a Convention which defines our boundaries, places our trade relations with Thibet upon a satisfactory footing, and gives us the right to exclude any foreign influence if we should so wish, and which contains an acknowledgment from the Thibetans that an indemnity is due for the insults shown us. It is gratifying to be able to record, too, that this Convention has been concluded without leaving any feeling of resentment behind. In spite of the military operations which we were forced to undertake, and in spite of the Thibetans being compelled to pay an indemnity, the disposition of the Thibetans towards us was distinctly more favourable when we left Thibet than when we entered it. British officers were cordially received in the great monasteries of Lhassa, and shown round the most sacred shrines. British soldiers and Indian sepoys were able to wander without let or hindrance round the till now forbidden city. Not only in Lhassa, but at every single post down the long line of communications, country produce and local manufactures were brought in readily for sale. Thibetan officials everywhere showed us civility. On the morning the Mission and escort left Lhassa the Regent visited the Mission and conferred on Mr. White, Captain O'Connor, and myself, and also upon General Macdonald, what was an unprecedented honour, in presenting us with images of Buddha, which are very rarely presented by so high a Lama even to Buddhists, and never to Christians. The entire Council assembled in a tent pitched a mile outside Lhassa to bid farewell to the Mission, and expressed their firm intention to conform to the terms of the Convention. And every symptom since the signing seems to show that they mean to. They without any demur furnished a passport for a party to proceed from Gyantse to Gartok to open a trade mart there, and deputed an official to accompany the party. They also furnished passports for a party to proceed down the Bramahputra to Assam if the Government of India had desired that piece of exploration to be undertaken, and for Mr. Wilton to return to China by Ta-chien-lu. Captain O'Connor and the Gartok party have been very cordially received at Shigatse, and every facility for preparing for their journey has been afforded them. The Tashi Lama has granted a private interview to Captain O'Connor, and informed him he approved of the terms of the Convention, though he would be glad to see the amount of the indemnity reduced. A Lhassa official has arrived at Gyantse to arrange for the opening of the trade mart there, and though the maintenance of a postal service with India did not form part of the terms of the Convention, far from opposing the maintenance of such a line, he has offered to build houses for the dâk runners employed.

4. I have always regarded the conclusion of a Convention on paper as of minor, and the establishment of our relations with the Thibetans on a footing of mutual good-will as of fundamental, importance. With the force I had at my back it was easy to compel the Thibetans to sign any Convention we had liked to impose on them. But there was little advantage in bringing back a Convention which was only extorted from them by force, and which was not framed or negotiated in such a manner as to carry with it a considerable degree of spontaneous assent. And it was especially necessary to secure the good-will of the people in general.

The result of our Mission to Kabul in 1840 was to estrange the Afghans from us from that time to this, and an intense race hatred was engendered. It would be unwise to predict that we shall never have difficulty in seeing that the present Convention is properly carried out. But I may safely say that no feeling of race hatred has been left behind, and that the Thibetans are better disposed towards us than they have ever been before, and this I consider to be incomparably the most important result of the policy of combined firmness and moderation which the Government of India so unswervingly pursued during the past year.

5. A result—of minor, though of very considerable, importance—is the improvement of our relations with Nepal and Bhutan. Our relations with Nepal were not in my charge. I can therefore only testify to the proofs of good-will afforded by the assistance given me by the Nepalese Representative at Lhassa which enabled me to carry through the Convention with so much good feeling. With the Bhutanese Government I was in more direct contact, and was able to procure from them permission for the construction of what will in future be the principal road piercing the Himalayas throughout their entire length. And so interested in our proceedings in Thibet did the Bhutanese become, that the Tongsa Penlop himself, the principal man in Bhutan, accompanied the Mission to Lhassa, put me into communication with leading men, and was highly instrumental in effecting a settlement. A year ago the Bhutanese

were strangers; to-day they are our enthusiastic allies, and our surveyors are being assisted in searching for the best route through their country to Thibet.

6. It is needless to state that these results could never have been obtained if the Government of India had not supported me with an exceptionally able staff, or if the discipline and conduct of the troops escorting the Mission had not been of the highest. It was the gallantry and endurance of the troops which made the negotiations possible in the first instance; but it was the high discipline maintained and the good temper and admirable behaviour displayed by the troops which largely tended to placing our relations with the Thibetan people on so favourable a basis.

7. To my staff I am particularly indebted. Mr. White, whose acquaintance with the Sikkim–Thibet frontier dates back to the Sikkim campaign of 1888, and who was appointed Joint Commissioner with me last year, very effectively exerted his great personal influence in Sikkim towards utilizing all the resources of the State for the dispatch of the Mission escort. At Lhassa itself he was mainly instrumental in effecting the important political object of breaking down the Thibetan barrier of exclusion, in gaining access to the monasteries, and bringing us into personal contact with the leading lamas.

Captain O'Connor was also with the Mission from the first. For years past he has on his own initiative studied the Thibetan people and language. He had compiled a Report on Thibet which he is now revising in the light of the fuller knowledge he has acquired. And this intimate acquaintance with the language, geography, and people of Thibet, combined with his sympathetic disposition towards the Thibetans, was of the highest value in negotiating with them and attracting them towards us.

Mr. Wilton, His Majesty's Acting Consul at Chungking, joined the Mission at Khamba Jong in August last year, and from the first rendered me invaluable service, not merely in dealing with the Chinese officials, but also in advising me in dealing with the general political situation, his clearness of judgment, shrewdness, and experience in diplomatic work being especially helpful. For two months during my absence from Mission head-quarters, when summoned to Simla last October, he was in charge of the Mission at Khamba Jong, and conducted the difficult operations of withdrawing the Mission from that post. In December he was appointed Assistant Commissioner.

Mr. Walsh joined the Mission in December as an Assistant Commissioner. Like Captain O'Connor, he also had studied Thibetan for some years, and while holding political charge in the Chumbi Valley, compiled a valuable report on that district. He received and conducted preliminary negotiations with the Bhutanese Envoys, and proceeded to Lhassa to assist in negotiating new Trade Regulations if that were possible.

Captain Walton, I.M.S., joined the Mission at Khamba Jong in August 1903 as Medical Officer and naturalist. He has made valuable scientific collections, and materially contributed towards the good feeling established with the Thibetans at Lhassa by opening a dispensary which, by the exercise of his tact and medical skill, became exceedingly popular.

Captain Ryder, R.E., joined the Mission in October 1903. He is, I consider, a most valuable trans-frontier survey officer, for he combines great professional zeal with admirable tact in dealings with strange peoples. He was ably assisted by Captain Cowie, R.E.

Mr. Hayden, of the Geological Survey, also displayed the greatest zeal in pursuing his professional duties under the most trying climatic conditions, and invariably exercised that tact and discretion in dealing with the people which is not only so essential for the furtherance of scientific objects, but which is so helpful politically to the leader of a Mission.

It does not fall within my province to speak of the professional value of the work accomplished by the scientific members of the Mission. But I am anxious that the Government of India should know that their behaviour contributed largely to the success of the Mission when scientific zeal, not combined with tactful behaviour, might have led to direful results politically.

In conclusion, I would desire to take the opportunity of acknowledging the cordial assistance invariably rendered me by my Private Secretary, Mr. Vernon Magniac.

And though their duties were purely military, yet as they were in the initial stages directly connected with the Mission, I should not like to omit mention of the late Captain Bethune, 32nd Pioneers, who commanded the Mission escort at Khamba Jong, and of Major Bretherton, D.S.O., Chief Supply and Transport Officer. Captain Bethune was an ideal officer to command the escort to a Mission. He never omitted a single

military precaution, but was ever ready and eager to meet the enemy if hostilities broke out. He was deeply respected by his men and by all who came in contact with him. Major Bretherton made all arrangements for the advance of the Mission to Khamba Jong and its maintenance there. His energy was boundless, and he possessed just that amount of forcefulness, tempered by a sufficiency of tact, which was essential for the carrying out of his duties. The loss of these two brave and capable officers is one which the Government of India has real cause to regret.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND,

British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters.

Inclosure 3 in No. 89.

Convention between Great Britain and Thibet.

WHEREAS doubts and difficulties have arisen as to the meaning and validity of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, and as to the liabilities of the Thibetan Government under these Agreements; and whereas recent occurrences have tended towards a disturbance of the relations of friendship and good understanding which have existed between the British Government and the Government of Thibet; and whereas it is desirable to restore peace and amicable relations, and to resolve and determine the doubts and difficulties as aforesaid, the said Governments have resolved to conclude a Convention with these objects, and the following Articles have been agreed upon by Colonel F. E. Younghusband, C.I.E., in virtue of full powers vested in him by His Britannic Majesty's Government and on behalf of that said Government, and Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council, of the three monasteries Se-ra, Dre-pung, and Ga-den, and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly on behalf of the Government of Thibet.

I.

The Government of Thibet engages to respect the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, and to recognize the frontier between Sikkim and Thibet, as defined in Article I of the said Convention, and to erect boundary pillars accordingly.

II.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to open forthwith trade marts to which all British and Thibetan subjects shall have free right of access at Gyantse and Gartok, as well as at Yatung.

The Regulations applicable to the trade mart at Yatung, under the Anglo-Chinese Agreement of 1893, shall, subject to such amendments as may hereafter be agreed upon by common consent between the British and Thibetan Governments, apply to the marts above mentioned.

In addition to establishing trade marts at the places mentioned, the Thibetan Government undertakes to place no restrictions on the trade by existing routes, and to consider the question of establishing fresh trade marts under similar conditions if development of trade requires it.

III.

The question of the amendment of the Regulations of 1893 is reserved for separate consideration, and the Thibetan Government undertakes to appoint fully authorized Delegates to negotiate with Representatives of the British Government as to the details of the amendments required.

IV.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to levy no dues of any kind other than those provided for in the tariff to be mutually agreed upon.

V.

The Thibetan Government undertakes to keep the roads to Gyantse and Gartok from the frontier clear of all obstruction and in a state of repair suited to the needs of the trade, and to establish at Yatung, Gyantse, and Gartok, and at each of the other trade marts that may hereafter be established, a Thibetan Agent who shall receive from the British Agent appointed to watch over British trade at the marts in question any letter which the latter may desire to send to the Thibetan or to the Chinese authorities. The Thibetan Agent shall also be responsible for the due delivery of such communications and for the transmission of replies.

VI.

As an indemnity to the British Government for the expense incurred in the dispatch of armed troops to Lhassa, to exact reparation for breaches of Treaty obligations, and for the insults offered to and attacks upon the British Commissioner and his following and escort, the Thibetan Government engages to pay a sum of 500,000*l.*—equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees—to the British Government.

The indemnity shall be payable at such place as the British Government may from time to time after due notice indicate, whether in Thibet or in the British districts of Darjeeling or Jalpaiguri, in seventy-five annual instalments of 1 lakh of rupees each, on the 1st January in each year, beginning from the 1st January, 1906.

VII.

As security for the payment of the above-mentioned indemnity, and for the fulfilment of the provisions relative to trade marts specified in Articles II, III, IV, and V, the British Government shall continue to occupy the Chumbi Valley until the indemnity has been paid, and until the trade marts have been effectively opened for three years, whichever date may be the later.

VIII.

The Thibetan Government agrees to raze all forts and fortifications, and remove all armaments which might impede the course of free communication between the British frontier and the towns of Gyantse and Lhassa.

IX.

The Government of Thibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British Government:—

(*a.*) No portion of Thibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise given for occupation, to any foreign Power;

(*b.*) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Thibetan affairs;

(*c.*) No Representatives or Agents of any foreign Power shall be admitted to Thibet;

(*d.*) No Concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power. In the event of consent to such Concessions being granted, similar or equivalent Concessions shall be granted to the British Government;

(*e.*) No Thibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any foreign Power, or the subject of any foreign Power.

X.

In witness whereof the negotiators have signed the same, and affixed thereunto the seals of their arms.

Done in quintuplicate at Lhassa, this 7th day of September in the year of our Lord 1904, corresponding with the Thibetan date, the 27th day of the 7th month of the Wood Dragon year.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel*,
British Commissioner.

Thibet Frontier Commission:
(Seal of British Commissioner.)

(Seal of the Dalai Lama, affixed by the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche.)

(Seal of Council.)

(Seal of the Dre-pung Monastery.)

(Seal of Sera Monastery.)

(Seal of Ga-den Monastery.)

(Seal of National Assembly.)

In proceeding to the signature of the Convention, dated this day, the Representatives of Great Britain and Thibet declare that the English text shall be binding.

(Signed) F. E. YOUNGHUSBAND, *Colonel*,
British Commissioner.

Thibet Frontier Commission:
(Seal of British Commissioner.)

(Seal of the Dalai Lama, affixed by the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche.)

(Seal of Council.)

(Seal of Dre-pung Monastery.)

(Seal of Sera Monastery.)

(Seal of Ga-den Monastery.)

(Seal of National Assembly.)

(Signed) AMPTHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Convention was ratified bp the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the 11th day of November, A.D. 1904.

(Signed) S. M. FRASER,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Inclosure 4 in No. 89.

Declaration signed by his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, and appended to the ratified Convention of September 7, 1904.

HIS Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, having ratified the Convention which was concluded at Lhassa on the 7th September, 1904, by Colonel Younghusband, C.I.E., British Commissioner for Thibet frontier matters, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government; and by Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen, the Ga-den Ti-Rimpoche, and the representatives of the Council of the three monastries (Sera, Dre-pung, and Ga-den), and of the ecclesiastical and lay officials of the National Assembly, on behalf of the Government of Thibet, is pleased to direct as an act of grace that the sum of money which the Thibetan Government have bound themselves under the terms of Article VI of the said Convention to pay to His Majesty's Government as an indemnity for the expenses incurred by the latter in connection with the dispatch of armed forces to Lhassa, be reduced from 75,00,000 rupees to 25,00,000 rupees; and to declare that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity as fixed by the said Article, provided, however, that the trade marts, as stipulated in Article II of the Convention,

shall have been effectively opened for three years as provided in Article VI of the Convention; and that, in the meantime, the Thibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects.

(Signed) AMPTHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Declaration was signed by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in Council at Simla, on the 11th day of November, A.D. 1904.

(Signed) S. M. FRASER,
Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Inclosure 5 in No. 89.

Government of India to Lo-Sang Gyal-Tsen.

Sir, *Simla, November* 15, 1904.

I HAVE the honour, by the direction of the Government of India, to inform you that his Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General has been pleased to ratify the Convention which was concluded on the 7th September, 1904, by the Representatives of His Britannic Majesty's Government and of the Thibetan Government respectively.

2. It is with much pleasure that I also forward a Declaration, signed by His Excellency the Viceroy, and appended to the English version of the ratified Convention, as well as a Thibetan translation of the same, from which you will perceive that His Excellency has been pleased to direct, as an act of grace, that the indemnity due from the Thibetan Government, under the terms of Article VI of the said Convention, shall be reduced from 75,00,000 rupees to 25,00,000 rupees; and to declare that the British occupation of the Chumbi Valley shall cease after the due payment of three annual instalments of the said indemnity, provided that the trade marts, as stipulated in Article II of the Convention, shall have been effectively opened for three years, as provided in Article VI of the Convention; and that, in the meantime, the Thibetans shall have faithfully complied with the terms of the said Convention in all other respects.

I am at the same time to point out to the Thibetan Government that the gracious consideration shown by the Government of India, in spontaneously reducing the amount of the compensation due from Thibet to so moderate an amount as 25,00,000 rupees, and in consenting to restore the Chumbi on such easy conditions as those described above, is largely due to the friendly and correct attitude that the Thibetan Government have adopted towards British interests since the signature of the Convention. In making this free concession, the Government of India is animated by the hope that the Thibetan Government will recognize the magnanimity of the British Government, and their sincere desire that the most friendly relations shall always prevail between the two contiguous countries of India and Thibet, whose interests are really identical. You will remember that this was the aim that Colonel Younghusband, the British Commissioner who negotiated and signed the Convention on behalf of the British Government, had steadily in view, and his Excellency is glad to see that the Thibetans are evincing a real appreciation of his friendly and sympathetic treatment of them, and an active desire to carry out the provisions of the Convention.

I am to take this opportunity of referring you to the Declaration signed by the British Commissioner and the Thibetan Representatives in September last, by which the British Agent, who is to be stationed at Gyantse, is accorded by the Government of Thibet the right, under certain circumstances, to visit Lhassa, and of informing you that the Viceroy, while fully appreciating the good feeling shown by the Thibetan Government in giving such an undertaking, considers it unnecessary to embody its provisions in a formal instrument.

I am, &c.
(Signed) S. M. FRASER,
Secretary to the Government of India.

No. 90.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 20.)

Sir, *India Office, December 19, 1904.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Brodrick to forward herewith, to be laid before the Marquess of Lansdowne, copy of a letter from the Government of India on the subject of the negotiations to secure the adhesion of China to the Thibet Convention.

The Government of India have been informed of Lord Lansdowne's views, as expressed in Mr. Campbell's letter of the 20th October, 1904, as to the ground on which Article IX of the Convention could best be defended. It does not seem probable to Mr. Brodrick, from the report of the conversation with Prince Ch'ing, recorded in Sir E. Satow's despatch of the 6th October, No. 352, that the Chinese Government will be willing to insert in the Adhesion Agreement a provision giving effect to the Amban's pledge "that they will not directly or indirectly hypothecate or transfer in any way to others anything in the sense of clause 9 without having first obtained the consent of the British Government thereto." Such a provision would raise the whole question of the most-favoured-nation clause; and Mr. Brodrick would suggest, for Lord Lansdowne's consideration, that the Government of India might be instructed not to make a direct request for its insertion in the Adhesion Agreement during the negotiations at Calcutta. But there seems no objection to the Amban's pledge being used for purposes of argument in the discussion with Commissioner Tang.

I am, &c.

(Signed) A. GODLEY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 90.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Simla, November 17, 1904.*

WITH reference to his Excellency the Viceroy's telegram of the 28th ultimo, we have the honour to transmit to you a copy of correspondence which passed last September between the British Commissioner for Thibet Frontier Matters and the Chinese Resident at Lhassa.

We regret that we have hitherto been unable to furnish His Majesty's Government with this correspondence owing to the fact that Colonel Younghusband's original communication on the subject never reached its destination.

The correspondence consists of—

1. A despatch from Colonel Younghusband of which the general purport is (*a*) that China is not aimed at in Article IX of the Thibet Convention of the 7th September, prohibiting the Thibetans from engaging in political or commercial intercourse with foreign Powers; (*b*) that Chinese subjects are not debarred from the right of access to the new marts for trade purposes.

2. A reply from the Amban which states in substance that China accedes (*a*) to the provisions of Article IX, and (*b*) to the engagement already given by the Thibetan Government as to the right of the British Trade Agent at Gyantse to visit Lhassa.

Though we fully recognize that the validity of these engagements is, strictly speaking, contingent on their confirmation by the British and Chinese Governments respectively, we venture to think that the assurance of the Amban (who, it may be noted, was given special powers to negotiate with Colonel Younghusband on all Thibetan questions) in regard to Article IX, even though unconfirmed, is valuable as likely to furnish His Majesty's Government in the future with a convenient leverage for keeping China in a line with our general policy in Thibet. On the other hand, Colonel Younghusband's engagements are harmless, and are in consonance with the present declared policy of His Majesty's Government.

We are of opinion, nevertheless, that the question of the advisability of obtaining Chinese confirmation to the Amban's assurances should be considered, and in regard to this point we offer the following observations:—

The main reasons which induced His Majesty's Government to adopt the policy of acting in close concert with China during the negotiations with Thibet may be briefly summarized as follows: They desired to avoid giving any colour to a possible charge on the part of foreign Powers that they were ignoring Chinese sovereignty in Thibet;

and they wished to prevent the possibility of China being able afterwards to lend herself as a cat's-paw to the introduction of foreign influences in Thibet.

His Majesty's Government have already proved their sincere desire to respect Chinese suzerainty by consistently consulting China at every phase of the negotiation of the Convention; and there only remains the task of insuring the exclusion of foreign influences in Thibet. To effect this it is desirable that we should obtain Chinese adherence to the satisfactory guarantees already obtained from the Thibetan Government. But our object in doing so is to strengthen, not to weaken, the guarantees, and we have, therefore, consistently deprecated the adoption of a policy by which we would obtain adherence by whittling away what we have already obtained from Thibet.

In the present case the same considerations appear to us to hold good as in the case of the Convention itself. The Amban's assurances in as far as they deal with Article IX, even if unconfirmed, considerably strengthen our position in Thibet; but it would obtain still further value if confirmation by the Chinese Government were obtained. We therefore see no objection to an endeavour being made to obtain such confirmation by the insertion of its purport as a provision in the Adhesion Agreement so long as no part of its substance is sacrificed.

As regards the question of the right of access to Lhassa, we had already acquainted His Majesty's Government with our views in our despatch of the 6th ultimo, when the assurance given by the Thibetan Government was sent to you. We have received in reply your telegram, dated the 7th instant, and a communication will be made to the Thibetan Government to the effect that, while we appreciate the good feeling shown by them in accepting the arrangement made by Colonel Younghusband, we do not consider it necessary to embody this in a formal Agreement. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary for us to discuss the question of its confirmation whether by the Amban or by the Chinese Government.

We have, &c.
(Signed) AMPTHILL.
E. R. ELLES.
A. T. ARUNDEL.
H. ERLE RICHARDS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 90.

Colonel Younghusband to Government of India.

Lhassa, September 13, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, copy of the correspondence which has taken place between the Chinese Resident and myself, regarding the term "Foreign Powers" in clause 9 of the Convention.

Inclosure 3 in No. 90.

Colonel Younghusband to Yu Tai.

Lhassa, September 11, 1904.

WITH reference to the Convention between Great Britain and Thibet, concluded on the 7th instant, I have the honour to state that the term "Foreign Powers" in clause 9 does not include China.

I have also the honour to state that there is no objection on my part to Chinese subjects proceeding for purposes of trade to the marts named in clause 2 of the same Convention.

Inclosure 4 in No. 90.

Yu Tai to Colonel Younghusband.

Lhassa, September 13, 1904.

IN regard to the Treaty concluded between Great Britain and the Thibetan Government, I have the honour to state, with reference to clause 9, that I have all along maintained that, Thibet being a dependency of China, China is not bound by the

restrictions mentioned therein. On the other hand, however, the Chinese Government will not directly or indirectly hypothecate or transfer in any way to others anything in the sense of clause 9 without having first obtained the consent of the British Government thereto.

Referring to the Agent to be sent by your Government to reside at Gyantse, I agree to his visiting Lhassa, whenever occasion arises, to discuss with me and the Thibetan officials matters of a commercial nature.

No. 91.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of inclosures in letters from the Foreign Secretary, Simla, dated the 17th and 24th November and the 1st December, relative to Thibet affairs.

Copies have been sent to the Director of Military Operations.

India Office, December 19, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 91.

Government of India to Colonel F. E. Younghusband.

Simla, November 6, 1904.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 31st October, 1904, regarding the request of the Chinese Imperial Resident at Lhassa to be informed of the way in which the discussions in connection with the objections of the Chinese Government to the Thibet Convention of the 7th September, 1904, may be made.

2. It seems doubtful whether the Resident ought, at this juncture, to be discouraged from communicating on Thibetan matters direct with the Government of India.

In these circumstances, it will be advisable to amend the terms of your proposed reply in so far as to suggest to the Resident that, if he should wish to discuss the matter further on behalf of the Chinese Government, he ought to communicate either with the Foreign Department of the Government of India or with His Britannic Majesty's Minister in China; but that, whether he addresses the former or the latter, he should invariably send a copy of his communication to the other.

Inclosure 2 in No. 91.

Government of India to Captain W. F. O'Conor.

Sir, *Simla, November 15, 1904.*

I AM directed to intimate to you, for communication to the Thibetan Government, that the Anglo-Thibetan Convention of the 7th September, 1904, has been duly ratified by his Excellency the Viceroy, and to forward a copy of Declaration signed by his Excellency the Viceroy, stating that the indemnity provided for under Article VI of the Convention has been reduced, as an act of grace, from 75,00,000 rupees to 25,00,000 rupees, and that the Chumbi Valley will be evacuated as soon as (1) three instalments of the indemnity have been duly paid; and (2) the provisions of Article VI as to the effective opening of the new trade marts for three years have been fulfilled.

I am also to forward under flying seal a despatch signed by me on behalf of the Government of India and addressed to the Regent of Thibet, the Ti-Rimpochi, in which, after congratulating him on his Excellency the Viceroy's act, and pointing out that it is due to the satisfactory behaviour of the Thibetan authorities since the conclusion of the Convention, he is informed that the Government of India, while appreciating the good feeling shown by the Thibetan Government in giving an undertaking that the British trade agent shall have the right of access to Lhassa for trade purposes, do not consider it necessary to embody the arrangement in a formal instrument.

You are directed by the Government of India to forward the signed Declaration and the despatch to the Ti-Rimpochi, with translations in Thibetan of these documents. The documents should be transmitted with a covering letter from yourself. In this letter, which should be of a complimentary character, you should congratulate the Thibetan Government, and point out that the gracious act of the Government of India is largely due to the friendly attitude which they have assumed since the signature of the Convention.

This Department should be furnished with copies of your despatch and of the Thibetan versions of all the documents to which reference has been made.

It is understood that the copy of the Convention with the Thibetan Government is engrossed on a single sheet of paper, a matter to which the Thibetan Government attach great importance. If they desire that the fact of ratification should be indorsed on their copy, it will be necessary that this should be sent to India for that purpose, and the Thibetan Government might be willing to depute the Ti-Rimpochi, or other high officers of the Government, to visit Calcutta to bring the Convention with them. If the suggestion is likely to meet with approval, of which you are the best judge, a cordial invitation on behalf of the Government of India can be extended to the Thibetan Government to this effect, and they can be assured that their Representatives will be heartily welcomed at Calcutta, where the friendly relations between India and Thibet that have been so happily inaugurated will be still further strengthened and confirmed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. M. FRASER,
Secretary to the Government of India.

Inclosure 3 in No. 91.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Ravenshaw to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Nepal, November* 15, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of a letter, dated the 30th September, 1904, from the four Kazis at Lhassa to the Prime Minister of Nepal, from which it will appear that there is dissatisfaction at the terms of the Convention lately signed at Lhassa, and it is suggested that the Prime Minister of Nepal should mediate to obtain a modification of the terms.

2. As the Prime Minister proposes to send a reply to the Kazis, and has asked my advice, I have suggested he should reply, in general terms, that a copy of their letter has been sent through the Resident in Nepal for the consideration of the Government of India. I anticipate the Prime Minister will send me a copy of his reply, which will be forwarded for the information of the Government of India.

3. In forwarding the Kazis' letter the Nepal Representative has written four letters to the Prime Minister, two of which are dated the 16th and two the 29th September last, translations of which have been sent to me. All these letters are very prolix, and three are for the most part merely reports of interviews with Colonel Younghusband and other British officers, the doings of the Mission, and the proceedings at the signing of the Convention at Lhassa. I have accordingly only forwarded the translation of one letter, dated the 29th September, 1904, and give a brief abstract of such news as may be of interest in the other letters.

4. The Nepal Representative, in conversation with Thiring Pochhe Lama and Charong Kazi, ascertained that it would be impossible to carry out the terms of the Convention which is said to have been forced on them under an ultimatum of seven days, and hence its non-fulfilment would lead to fresh complications; that the amount of the indemnity was far beyond the power of Thibet to pay; and that the permission given for a British officer to visit Lhassa in connection with trade matters would open the door to similar permission having to be given to officers of other European nations; and that they could agree to only one trade depôt at Phari; that the good offices of the Prime Minister would be asked with a view to personal representation by a deputation from Thibet, accompanied by representatives from Nepal, to the Viceroy of India; and if this was unsuccessful, the deputation would proceed to London and there conclude a lasting Treaty.

5. The Proclamation of the Chinese Amban at Lhassa, deposing the Dalai Lama and placing the Digarcha Lama in his place, is reported to be not only most unpopular, but is considered *ultra vires*, and will never be accepted, and the Proclamations have been spat at and torn down. The Amban is said to be disturbed at this behaviour, and is

strengthening his Chinese troops, and has asked for 500 of the latest rifles from the Emperor of China.

6. It is confidently expected that the Dalai Lama will now return to Lhassa, as his flight is justified by a similar action of the Emperor of China when he had to temporarily leave his capital. The Khensur Khembu, of the Sira Gamba, and representative monks from three Gambas have been deputed to bring back the Dalai Lama, while Thiring Pochhe Lama has given out that he will act in a way pleasing to the Dalai Lama.

Inclosure 4 in No. 91.

The Four Kazis of Lhassa to the Prime Minister of Nepal.

(Translation.)

(After compliments.) *September* 30, 1904.

WE received on Bhadra Badi, 14th, Wednesday, per favour of the Captain, your Representative here, your Highness' letters, dated the 10th Sravan Badi (23rd Sravan), Saturday, addressed respectively to his Holiness the Potala Lama and to ourselves. Because of the friendly and cordial relations subsisting between the Governments of Nepal and Thibet, the frank and detailed writing of your Highness gladdened our heart.

With reference to your Highness' remarks that, as there were no arrangements made previously for the supply of horses and transport, it was too late to make that arrangement and send an officer from there, with a view to help in settling the points at issue between the British and the Thibetan Governments, we beg to say that, although your Highness has had to be simply troubled for nothing in this matter, yet, on account of the instructions which you had given to the said Representative, we handed over to him, to satisfy all concerned, a paper written after consultation amongst ourselves and duly signed or sealed by us, and he, to the best of his ability, made earnest representations (on our behalf), but to no effect, either in upholding our dignity or mitigating the difficulties for us.

We had withdrawn our forces because, as followers of the Buddhistic religion, it was not at all befitting for our Durbar to go to war; but the officers and troops of the British Government having come up to Lhassa, concluded an arrangement such as had never taken place anywhere, and such as was not equitable or justifiable.

Contrary to the usage of British (diplomacy) in taking into consideration the views of both the parties concerned, an arrangement was made. In this matter we were forced to sign the paper containing the arrangement solely proposed from their side—*i.e.*, one-sided—involving points in the discussion of which there existed difference of opinion, and which were unfairly included therein, in spite of our protestations, our objections being disregarded on the ground that such were the positive orders of the authorities of the British Government.

As there was no help for it but to come to an arrangement of some sort, whatever it be, we were obliged to do the thing, a copy of which is the same as we have handed over to your representative here. In it there is not a single item which we had suggested or approved of by us.

The opening of trading depôts at those places where there were none before, and the matter of stationing British officers at those places not having been agreed to by us (both of which will be the fruitful source of future complications or collusion between the two Governments), as also the arrangements now made by them while at Lhassa with provisions for the removal or extension of such depôts or trade to other and more important places, should these entail a long and tedious fighting every year, it will be highly distressing to the Durbar professing the peaceful Buddhistic faith.

In this matter, should your Highness, in consideration of the fraternal relations existing between Thibet and Gorkha (Nepal), be pleased to represent (to the British) that such results are likely to follow, and have the inconveniences or difficulties removed, the two Governments will be highly blessed.

It was due to the British officers having addressed a letter expressing a desire for personal interview with him that his Holiness the Potala Lama had departed from the capital. Of this communication we have already informed your Representative, the Captain.

The letter addressed by your Highness to the Potala Lama has been forwarded to his Holiness. A reply to it from him will be sent only on his return here. We beg to mention it for your Highness' information.

Patra Chinha (token accompanying the letter), viz., one big silk scarf (khata), a packet containing five tâks of gold, two pieces of silver in the form of horse hoop, four khagams (ells) of Kochin silk of dark brown colour, and one piece of yellow Gyaser silk, are herewith sent for your Highness' acceptance.

Dated the 6th Ashwin Badi, Friday, 1961, corresponding with the 30th September, 1904.

Translation of a Letter from the Nepalese Representative at Lhassa.

With due respect I beg to lay before your Highness in the following lines the news that I have heard and gathered here for your Highness' kind perusal.

A clerk of the Yamun says that the Amban has received a letter from His Majesty the Emperor of China, instructing him not to interfere in the matter now at issue between the British and the Thibetan Governments, and to allow them to have their own way. He further says that there is a talk of the newcoming Amban being accompanied with about 500 Chinese sepoys.

It is reported that a paper was stuck up on the front wall of the Temple of Bhagwan by an unknown hand, in which it was written that the ex-Banda Kazi Ghyambatenjen was not true to his salt, as he, by going towards Digracha, fetched the British to Lhassa; that the Chikhiap Khembu of Itu was also a traitor, as his disposing of the State business without at all referring the same to the Potala Lama has led to such a confusion in the administration of the country; and that, consequently, the said Chikhiap Khembu and the ex-Banda Kazi should now eat and drink to their fill, as they had not long to live, their death being near at hand. It was further said that in the morning some men of the Laprang Nechang staff saw that paper so stuck up, and removed it to the Nechang Office.

The traders of Amdo say that they met the Potala Lama at Nakchewkha, and heard of a talk of his proceeding towards Mongolia, and they surmised that by this time he must have reached the district of Kharka.

Some 300 Khambali sepoys of Dhaya have arrived at Lhassa, ostensibly to worship the god Bhagwan. It appears to me that, perhaps, they were not sent back to their respective homes on account of a notice stuck up in this capital by the Amban to the effect that the Potala Lama was deposed, which, it was feared, might lead to a row between the Chinese and the Thibetans.

The said traders of Amdo further say that the Potala Lama, on his way towards Mongolia, met one Mongol Grandee at Nakchewkha, who accompanied him on his journey north.

The priest of the Temple of Bhagwan says that he has heard a vague report to the effect that Chikhiap Khembu went subsequently to join the train of the Potala Lama, but was not allowed to proceed, having been accused by the said lama as being a traitor, and hence he returned, and is now hiding in one of the monasteries round about Lhassa.

A rumour is current here that the Japanese and Chinese have combined, and are fighting against Russia, and that there is a probability of a war between the British and Kabulis.

Dhuila of Nechang says that there is a talk of sending a report to the Potala Lama, of the ultimate issue of the business with the British officers, by the hands of a Khengsur, *i.e.*, a retired Khembu, of the Sera Gumba, and the representative monks of the three Gumbas (monasteries), with a view to fetch him back, and that the Thibetan Government intend to send with these also some "prashad" (consecrated offerings) in the form of pills from Potala and some loads of incense and blanket for distribution by the Potala Lama.

Colonel Younghusband visited the two Gumbas, Sera and Dhaibung, and also the Temple of Bhagwan, and contributed to each a sum of 1,000 rupees (British Indian coin).

The Thibetans have taken back the 100 rifles of Martini-Henry pattern and the ammunition made at Teep from Labrang, and stored them up at Dhajio on Tuesday, the 12th Bhadra, from where they were first taken out, with a view to send them towards Nagarchay, Gyantse, when they were fighting in that direction.

Tongsa Penlop, the Raja of Dwa Dharma (Bhutan), left Lhassa the very day following the departure of the British officers.

The Amban having secretly sent the Chinese interpreter to Chharong Kazi, Itu Kazi, Sejung Kazi, and Lembar Banda Kazi to remind them of the custom of paying in advance

a money present to the Amba before the assumption of the office as Kazis, they, in reply, gave the Amban to understand that the former Kazis used to have large incomes, and, as a consequence, there were many candidates vieing with one another for the post, and making large money presents to the Amban and the Thibetan Government; that though they (the present Kazis) were not at all inclined to take up the office at a time like this, on being pressed by the Potala Lama, they had to accept it under compulsion, and not of their own sweet will; that they had no money with them, wherewith to meet the Amban's demands; and that, were the Amban to insist that, unless they made the payment, they would not have their offices as Kazis, they were quite willing to throw up their posts when they had to labour under such trying times; and that they would, however, make the customary presents after the Amban had obtained the sanction of His Majesty the Emperor of China to their appointments.

It is said that the Amban, having so far petitioned the Emperor of China for the sanction of the appointment of Sejung Kazi and the Itu Kazi only, the two others, viz., Chharong Kazi and Banda Kazi Lember, appeared to be dissatisfied, and, on the Thibetan Government inquiring why the latter two were omitted in his petition, the Amban replied that it was done so purposely, because it was apprehended that the British officers might resent such appointments, as these incumbents were unsuccessfully employed in settling the pending dispute with the British when they were sent to the Ghambajhong frontier; besides, there having been no precedence in sending for confirmation of the appointment of the four Kazis at one and the same time, confirmation of the former two only had been applied for, and that the same thing will be done in the case of the remaining two at a more convenient time. It appears that the Amban has withheld his countenance to the two, in order to extort something from them.

The Chinese here say that they were not at all inclined to enter into the service of the Amban, who, even in appointing them, demands a royalty in advance in proportion to their salary.

It is reported that the Kazis of Kasyal, while visiting the British, used to tell the latter that they should not put faith in any report that might reach their ears, unless the same came from themselves direct.

The Mongols and the people of Kharka who had been admitted long since as monks in the monasteries of Sera, Dhaibung, and Galden are now gradually going away to their homes, one or two at a time. It appears that their departure is due to the reports of the Russian side, which had reached here formally and on account of the Potala Lama, too, having gone in that very direction.

I hear that, when the Kazis of the Kasyal went to see the British officers off as far down as Kinjalupten, Colonel Younghusband expressed to them his pleasure at the Treaty they concluded, and told them that it would be better if they in future observe the Treaty which was then only on paper, practical fulfilment of which was yet to follow, and that the British officers would show them as much kindness as they could.

The Thibetan Government have now sent back to their respective monasteries the monks who were stationed at Potala Lama, the Temple of Bhagwan and Lhamukshe, for their protection.

It is said that Thiring Pochhay Lama who performed the State business as keeper of the State seal, and who went to Galden on Saturday, the 9th Ashwin, will return to Lhassa, after staying at the said Galden monastery for seven or eight days.

The interpreter attached to the Teep Arsenal says that he was told by the Chharong Kazi that military preparations must now go on apace in Thibet, for which mechanics from all parts of the country should immediately be called in, and that those now engaged in the Teep Arsenal should give head and heart in their work.

Three or four days before his departure from Lhassa, Colonel Younghusband asked to be provided with Thibetan mohars to the value of 12,000 to 15,000 British Indian coin to defray current expenses, for which an exchange to the Kathmandu Treasury would be given. I sent him a sum of 44,121 Thibetan mohars, and received from him a Treasury bill for 14,700 rupees, payable in Nepal, and this has been duly forwarded.

The Mongolian traders who had recently arrived here are now returning to their homes.

The Chinese sepoys under the Amban are at present given target practice every morning.

Bamun Babu and one other Mongol whom I had sent towards Nakchewkha to gather information of the Potala Lama and other news of that side, returned from Nakchewkha on Wednesday, the 13th Ashwin. Their report is as follows:—

"We went as far as Nakchewkha by way of Dhakunji. On Sravan Sudi, 1st,

the Potala Lama left Nakchewkha for the north, with a view to go to Jhyajudampa Lama of Kharka by way of Mongolia. The Mongols, who came from Mongolia, made large presents in cash and kind to the said lama. A Mongol grandee joined the retinue of the lama, and followed him, and so did the Lama Incarnate of Dhambrang Labrang Monastery of the place. All the above we heard from the inhabitants of the place on our arrival there. We happened to lodge with some Khambas of Gharwa, a place beyond Nakchewkha, who had come there to sell yaks. We asked them where they met the Potala Lama, to which they replied that, although they did not meet him, as they came by a separate road, they had heard that he intended at first to go to China or Russia, and that now Lhassa would never have happy days. On our inquiry as to how they could make the last statement about Lhassa, they replied that the head of Thibet or Lhassa was the Potala Lama; and when he would implore assistance either by going to Mongolia, China, or Russia, representing that he had to flee away because the British Government of India had forced him to do so, assistance was sure to come from either, in which case, when there would be a big war, how was Lhassa to flourish? We next inquired whether there was any news of troops advancing from Russia or Mongolia: even then they said that there was no such news at the time, but in a year or two, when all arrangements are complete in Russia, China, and Mongolia, they apprehended that a large army would advance from the north, to the detriment of Thibetan peace and happiness. Other people also, at Nakchewkha, said that the Potala Lama had gone north, and it was not impossible for him to return at the head of an army. On our return from Nakchewkha, when we arrived at the Kungo village, we found that the village was entirely deserted on account of the Khamba levies of Dhaya, sent for by the Thibetan Government, having looted the village and used the wooden portion of the huts as fuel. It was reported that the said Khamba levies from Dhaya demanded a heavy compensation for the loss of life among them (caused by the villagers), and wanted permission to pay respects to the Temple of Bhagwan at Lhassa, since they had come so far, before they would return home. They further wanted to know what travelling allowance they would get on their return journey, on receipt of which they would leave for their respective homes. These representations they have made through their Chiefs, who are now at Lhassa, and are provided with quarters by the Thibetan Government. Bazar report says that these Khambas will return in eight or nine days hence."

Dated the 14th Ashwin, Thursday, 1961 (corresponding with the 29th September, 1904).

No. 92.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received December* 21.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copies of telegrams from the Viceroy, dated the 3rd December, and to the Viceroy, dated the 6th December, relative to Thibet affairs.

India Office, December 20, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 92.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 3, 1904.

THIBET. It is expected that Chinese Commissioner Tang will reach Calcutta at the end of January. With reference to inquiry of His Majesty's Minister at Peking as to whether English copies of Thibet Convention and Adhesion Agreement may be furnished confidentially to Tang, I should be glad to be informed if these may be given, together with a copy of ratification. (See our Secret letter of the 17th November.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 92.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, December* 6, 1904.

THIBET Agreements: Your telegram of the 3rd December.

Copies may be given to Tang as proposed.

No. 93.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Mr. Secretary Brodrick, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of telegrams to the Viceroy, dated the 7th December, and from the Viceroy, dated 23rd December, relative to the Thibet Trade Regulations.

India Office, December 24, 1904.

Inclosure 1 in No. 93.

Mr. Brodrick to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, December* 7, 1904.

THIBET. Please refer to the letter from Foreign Secretary No. 44, inclosing draft Trade Regulations.

With regard to Article 1 of draft, please state whether intention is that same treatment as is accorded to Chinese subjects and goods is to be claimed for ours.

With regard to Article 13, you will bear in mind, in connection with the proposed veto on monopolies, that His Majesty's Government are pledged not to interfere in the internal administration of Thibet.

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

Government of India to Mr. Brodrick.

(Telegraphic.) P. *December* 23, 1904.

THIBET Trade Regulations.

Your telegram of the 7th instant.

The reply to your inquiry with regard to Article 1 is "yes." With regard to Article 13, the abandonment of provision regarding monopolies is, in our opinion, to be deprecated on the following grounds:—

The right to trade freely may be rendered nugatory in Thibet, as in Congo State, unless monopolies are prohibited. We understand that this is the attitude taken up by His Majesty's Government in regard to monopolies in China, Turkey, and Persia, countries in which we do not claim any right to interfere in internal administration. Moreover, apart from the obvious importance, from political point of view, of excluding Chinese and other foreign concession-mongers, we are anxious to make provision, without incurring odium, with a view to preventing inrush of British speculators in search of concessions for gold mines, &c., result of which might be to create friction between us and the Government of Thibet, and bring about the interference the avoidance of which is desired.

No. 94.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1904.

I LAID before the Marquess of Lansdowne your letter of the 19th instant relative to the negotiations for securing the adhesion of China to the Thibet Convention.

It is, in Lord Lansdowne's opinion, evident that Colonel Younghusband's intention in obtaining the assurance given in the Amban's letter to him of the 13th September was to guard against the possibility of a Chinese subject obtaining an important concession in Thibet, and then transferring it, without the consent of the British Government, to a foreign Power.

His Lordship, however, agrees with the Secretary of State for India in thinking that there is no necessity for inserting in the Adhesion Agreement either the assurance given to Yu Tai with respect to clause 9 or the counter-assurance received from him.

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

No. 95.

Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 31.)

(No. 391.)

My Lord, *Peking, November* 17, 1904.

I HAVE the honour to inclose semi-official correspondence which has passed between Prince Ch'ing and myself relative to the appointment of the late Customs Taotai of Tien-tsin, T'ang Shao-yi, to proceed to Thibet with a brevet of Deputy Lieutenant-General, and on his way thither to discuss with the Indian Government the Agreement concluded at Lhassa by Colonel Younghusband on the 7th September last.

The expression in Prince Ch'ing's last note "negotiations for the conclusion of a Thibetan Treaty" is perhaps not very clear, but may be fairly interpreted by us as meaning negotiations for the written adhesion of China to that Agreement. It is probable, however, that T'ang Shao-yi will be instructed to endeavour to obtain some modification of Article IX, in spite of Prince Ch'ing's statement that he did not wish to introduce any change, which was reported in my despatch No. 344 of the 29th September.

Since the date of my last despatch on this subject I have had no discussion with Chinese officials on the question, with the exception of that reported in my telegram No. 244 of the 11th instant, when I questioned his Highness regarding the rumoured intention of the Chinese Government to declare Thibet an ordinary province of China. I have the honour to inclose notes of the conversation that took place. As the Prince denied the existence of any such intention, I thought it unnecessary to state that such action on their part would not be regarded as modifying the situation or calling for any departure from the policy announced by His Majesty's Government, and I contented myself with observing that it would be an extraordinary proceeding to take while negotiations were pending between the two Governments. My despatch No. 351 of the 6th ultimo will have shown your Lordship that the idea was broached to Mr. Cockburn by Wu Ting-fang, and I have reason to know that Na-t'ung, another member of the Foreign Board, also entertained it. To the latter it seemed that there was a precedent in the case of the New Dominion which was formed out of Eastern Turkestan about 1882, and included in the administrative district of the Governor of Kansuh. The former most probably was inspired by the belief that a sort of annexion to China, though only on paper, would have the effect of annulling at once all the existing Treaties or Conventions made by Thibet with foreign States. Had the Prince avowed that this step was in contemplation, I was prepared to declare that His Majesty's Government would regard it as an unfriendly act, and would refuse to recognize it as having any effect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ERNEST SATOW.

Inclosure 1 in No. 95.

Prince Ch'ing to Sir E. Satow.

Your Excellency, *9th moon, 25th day (November 2), 1904.*

I HAVE the honour to recall to your Excellency's recollection our conversation on the subject of the negotiations between China and Great Britain with regard to the Indo-Thibetan Convention, in which I informed you of the appointment by China of Tang Shao-yi, a Metropolitan official of the third rank, with the brevet of Deputy Lieutenant-General, to proceed to negotiate with the high officers appointed by Great Britain.

Your Excellency has already promised to telegraph this for the information of His Majesty's Government.

Tang-tachen is now starting for Thibet, and will take the route viâ India. If within the next few days you receive a reply from His Majesty's Government, stating at what place they have decided that negotiations can most conveniently be conducted, I shall be glad if you will write to let me know.

I have, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 95.

Sir E. Satow to Prince Ch'ing.

Your Highness, *Peking, November 12, 1904.*

ON the 2nd instant, I received a letter from your Highness informing me that Tang-tachen was starting for Thibet, and asking me to let your Highness know if I received a reply from His Majesty's Government stating at what place negotiations could be most conveniently conducted.

As I mentioned yesterday to your Highness, the reply from His Majesty's Government had not then reached me, but this morning I have received from them a telegram acquainting me with their decision that the negotiations should be conducted at Calcutta the capital of India. I have accordingly the honour to transmit this information to your Highness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. SATOW.

Inclosure 3 in No. 95.

Prince Ch'ing to Sir E. Satow.

Your Excellency, *November 14, 1904.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter acquainting me with the decision of His Majesty's Government that Tang-tachen's negotiations for the conclusion of a Thibetan Treaty shall be conducted at Calcutta. This will be at once communicated to Tang-tachen in order that he may immediately proceed.

I have, &c.

Inclosure 4 in No. 95.

Memorandum of Conversation between Prince Ch'ing and Sir E. Satow respecting Thibet.

Sir Ernest then turned to the subject of Thibet. He had telegraphed to the Foreign Office the contents of his Highness' recent note regarding T'ang Shao-yi going to India, but so far had received no reply.

The Prince intimated that their intention was to send him to Thibet if no reply was received before long regarding his contemplated mission to India.

Sir Ernest advised that an answer should be waited for, as he could hardly go overland at this time of year.

The Prince said there was no immediate hurry of course. He would not be starting at once, in any case. The delay in replying on the part of the Foreign Office was, doubtless, connected with Lord Curzon's family anxieties, which, he understood, had delayed his Lordship's departure.

Sir Ernest then alluded to the reports now current that Thibet was to be made a province on the occasion of the Dowager Empress' birthday.

His Highness replied that they had no thought of this so far.

Sir Ernest expressed gratification at hearing this, as it would be considered a very extraordinary proceeding if done while negotiations were pending between China and His Majesty's Government regarding Thibet.

His Highness reiterated that the subject had not been discussed.

Sir Ernest said "perhaps not, in the Grand Council, but a Chinese official of some standing mentioned the idea recently in the British Legation."

His Highness replied that in any case it was not true, and that as an undertaking it would be very difficult.

Sir Ernest agreed, and said it could not be compared with the steps taken in the New Dominion, which were taken after a victorious campaign in that territory.

The Prince admitted that the conditions in Thibet were quite different.

Sir Ernest then asked what was the proper technical term in Chinese to express the relation of Thibet to China. In English China was described as the "suzerain" of Thibet. How was the idea expressed in Chinese?

The Prince said there was no proper word to express this. The Thibetans called the Emperor of China their "Huangshang," not "Ta Huangti," as a foreign nation would say. The word "suzerain" he supposed implied the "shang kuo," the "upper nation." The superiority of the Emperor over the Dalai Lama was demonstrated in his appointment by patent ("chih shu").

Sir Ernest asked whether in the Ming dynasty a "chih shu" was not also given to the Shogun of Japan.

His Highness. Yes; he believed so, though in that case it did not imply any claim on the part of China to sovereignty over Japan, but was merely the act of a big Power to a small one.

Sir Ernest asked whether China considered that in Mongolia both land and people were subject to China.

His Highness. Yes.

Sir Ernest. And Thibet?

His Highness. Thibet is on very much the same footing. We have conducted military operations in Thibet, in Ch'ien Lung's reign, and may be said to have subjugated it.

No. 96.

Foreign Office to India Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1904.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th instant, inclosing copies of telegraphic correspondence which has passed between the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy relative to Articles I and XIII of the draft Trade Regulations with Thibet.


The words "without the previous consent of the Government of India" at the end of Article XIII appear to Lord Lansdowne to be superfluous and likely to give rise to objections on the part of other Governments similar to those made in regard to Article IX of the Convention, which were no doubt in a great measure due to the presence in that Article of the same words.

His Lordship would therefore suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for India, that it would be preferable to omit them from Article XIII of the Trade Regulations.

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. A. CAMPBELL.

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Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Thibet Part V October to December 1904. Oct. 1905. TS Political and Secret Department Records: Series 20: Political and Secret Department Library (1757-1952): Foreign Office Prints (1843-1937) IOR/L/PS/20/FO84/5. British Library. China and the Modern World, link.gale.com/apps/doc/UJRFAL147901223/CFER?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-CFER&xid=27309ad7&pg=1. Accessed 21 Apr. 2022.